[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-15505 AUGUST 14, 2006
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-01701-CV-WSD-1
MARGARET CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA,
FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA,
Defendants-Cross-Defendants-Appellees,
RICHARD PENNINGTON,
individually and in his official capacity
as Chief of Police, Atlanta, Georgia,
JOHN AND JANE DOE 1-5,
Defendants-Appellees,
DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA,
THOMAS E. BROWN,
individually and in his official capacity
as Sheriff of DeKalb County, Georgia,
JACQUELYN H. BARRETT, individually,
MYRON FREEMAN, in his official capacity,
Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(August 14, 2006)
Before BIRCH, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case involves the mistaken arrest of Margaret Chapman pursuant to a
valid warrant. The district court concluded that the differences between the
description on the warrant and Chapman were sufficiently small that the mistaken
arrest was not unreasonable in the totality of the circumstances. We AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts necessary to the disposition of this appeal are not in dispute. On
27 September 2002, an arrest warrant was issued for “Margaret Irene Chapman.”
The warrant sought the arrest of a 5’4”, 210 pound, black female. The warrant
provided her social security number, birth date, and a street address without a city
or zip code.
On 15 June 2003, at 8 P.M., Chapman was detained by customs officials at
Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. Chapman showed identification that
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matched the description on the warrant, including full name, birth date, age, and
sex. Chapman’s social security number matches the warrant except that the first
two numbers are transposed. The height on the warrant was an inch shorter than
Chapman and the weight was 40 pounds heavier. The glaring inconsistency is that
Chapman is white.
Chapman spent the following eighteen hours in the custody of Atlanta City
Police, the Fulton County Jail, and the Dekalb County Jail. She alleges that she
was handcuffed, strip searched, forced to use a nonprivate toilet, deprived of
medications, forced to have blood drawn, and required to wear inmate’s clothing.
Chapman was released at noon on 16 July 2003. Dekalb County subsequently
dismissed the warrant for Chapman’s arrest, and it is undisputed that Chapman is
not wanted in connection with the forgery that caused the warrant to issue in
September 2002.
The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that in examining
the totality of the circumstances, “the officers who mistakenly arrested Plaintiff
made a reasonable mistake, and [they] committed no constitutional violation upon
which to base a section 1983 constitutional false-arrest claim.” R3-55 at 10
(citations and quotations omitted). On appeal, Chapman argues that a
constitutional due process violation occurred because the officers should have
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taken time to verify that she was the person sought by the warrant given the
discrepancy between her race and that identified in the warrant.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court’s order granting summary judgment,
applying the same standards as the district court. Crosby v. Monroe County, 394
F.3d 1328, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when the
evidence demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 56(c).
Our precedent governing mistaken arrests is Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d
1341 (11th Cir. 2002). The cause of action for mistaken arrests sounds in the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1346. In order to determine whether there was a
constitutional violation, we must examine the totality of the circumstances to see
whether the arrest was made pursuant to a reasonable mistake. Id. at 1347.
In this case, there was one significant difference between Chapman’s
characteristics and the description on the warrant: her race. The exact identity of
full name and date of birth, strikingly similar physical description, and virtually
identical social security number strongly suggest the reasonableness of the arrest.
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In Rodriguez, we held that, in the face of many similarities, one material difference
will not transform a reasonable arrest into an unreasonable one. Id. at 1347–48.
That test governs here, and we conclude that, given the totality of the
circumstances, Chapman’s arrest was reasonable even in the face of an obvious
racial discrepancy. See Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 42 (7th Cir. 1982)
(concluding that the mistaken arrest of a white woman pursuant to an arrest
warrant for a black woman did not violate the Constitution).
On appeal, Chapman asserts that her due process rights were violated
because there was an “insufficient amount of due process . . . afforded to her before
the decision . . . to hold [her] in custody” was made. Appellant’s Br. at xiii. This
claim is governed by Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979).
McCollan held that a person mistakenly arrested pursuant to a facially valid arrest
warrant was not entitled to more process in the form of another hearing to
determine whether there existed probable cause to detain the mistakenly arrested
person pending trial. Id. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 2694. This does not mean that a
person claiming innocence could be held indefinitely, but a valid warrant does
justify arrest and detention for some period of days. Id. at 144–45, 99 S. Ct. at
2694–95 (concluding that a detention for three days over a holiday weekend “does
not and could not amount to [a constitutional] deprivation”).
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An official “executing an arrest warrant is [not] required by the Constitution
to investigate independently every claim of innocence,” even if “the claim is based
on mistaken identity.” Id. at 145–46, 99 S. Ct. at 2695. “Nor is the official
charged with maintaining custody of the accused named in the warrant required by
the Constitution to perform an error-free investigation of such a claim.” Id. at 146,
99 S. Ct. at 2696. Because Chapman was arrested and held pursuant to a valid
arrest warrant and because she was released from custody in less than 24 hours, she
was not entitled to more process to review her claims of innocence in the face of
the mistaken arrest.
III. CONCLUSION
Chapman brought this § 1983 action because she was arrested pursuant to a
valid warrant, but she did not commit the crime described in the warrant. Although
Chapman was mistakenly arrested, the warrant’s description of her was close
enough that the totality of the circumstances require us to agree with the district
court that there was no constitutional violation in her arrest or detention.
AFFIRMED.
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