[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-16625 AUGUST 11, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-02113-CV-1
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Plaintiff-Counter-
Defendant-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM M. HENLEY, JR.,
And All Others,
Defendant-Counter-
Claimant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(August 11, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
William M. Henley, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order
remanding the removed dispossessory action originally filed against him in state
court. The underlying action was based on a loan for real property that Henley
obtained from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”). After Henley failed to
repay the loan, Wells Fargo foreclosed, purchased the real property at the
foreclosure sale, and subsequently initiated a dispossessory proceeding, which
Henley attempted to remove to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1443.1
The district court remanded the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), finding that it
lacked jurisdiction. Henley now appeals.
Henley argues that the district court erred in implicitly finding that he had
failed to state adequate grounds for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1443(1)
because dispossessory defendants as a class are denied certain civil rights, and the
plain meaning of the statute does not require consideration of racial equality.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to remand a removed case.
Yusefzadeh v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., 365 F.3d 1244, 1245
(11th Cir. 2004).
Under § 1443, removal is proper “[a]gainst any person who is denied or
1
We have jurisdiction to consider only whether removal was proper under § 1443. 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d) (barring review of remand orders pursuant to § 1447(c)); Alabama v. Conley,
245 F.3d 1292, 1293 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) .
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cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the
equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons with the
jurisdiction thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).
Removal under § 1443(1) must satisfy a two-prong test. First, the petitioner
must show that the “right upon which [he] relies arises under a federal law
providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.” Alabama v.
Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted) (citing Georgia
v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 1788, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966)).
Claims of violations of rights under constitutional or statutory provisions of
general applicability or under statutes not protecting against racial discrimination
will not suffice. Id. Second, the petitioner “must show that he has been denied or
cannot enforce that right in the state courts.” Id. Land use rights generally are
reserved for state courts. Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 724 (11th Cir.
1991).
Here, Henley failed to allege adequate grounds for removal of his
dispossessory action pursuant to §1443(1), because his claim was not based on the
denial of civil rights stated in terms of racial equality. Furthermore, there was no
evidence that Henley would have been denied or could not enforce his rights in
state court. See Myers v. North Ga. Title & Tax Free Exchange, LLC, 527 S.E.2d
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212, 214 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). Accordingly, the district court properly remanded
the case, and we AFFIRM.
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