[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-10700
August 11, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
BIA No. A95-905-491
LUIS CARLOS MOLINA,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(August 11, 2006)
Before DUBINA, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Carlos Molina, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review
of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed
without opinion the immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of asylum under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).1 On appeal, Molina argues the IJ erred
by denying asylum after finding that Molina did not demonstrate past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (“FARC”) based on his membership in the Liberal Party or his status as
a supporter of presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe’s message concerning the need
to rid Colombia of guerillas. After careful review, we deny the petition.
When the BIA issues an affirmance without opinion, the IJ’s decision
becomes the final order subject to review. See Mendoza v. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d
1283, 1284 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003). To the extent that the IJ’s decision was based on
a legal determination, our review is de novo. Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 261 F.3d
1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2001). Factual determinations, however, are reviewed
under the “highly deferential substantial evidence test,” which requires us to “view
the record in the light most favorable to the [IJ]’s decision and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022,
1026-27 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2245 (2005). Under
this standard, a denial of asylum may be reversed only if the evidence would
compel a reasonable factfinder to find that the requisite fear of persecution exists.
1
Because we find that Molina has not established a case for asylum under the INA, we do
not address his arguments that he also satisfied the higher standard for withholding of removal. See
Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2001). Molina has not appealed the denial
of relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), and therefore, any claim based on the CAT is deemed
abandoned. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).
2
See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 n.1, 117 L.
Ed. 2d 38 (1992); see also Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir.
2006) (“Findings of fact made by the Immigration Judge may be reversed by this
Court only when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact that the record may
support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the
administrative findings.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). “The trier of
fact must determine credibility, and this court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the [IJ] with respect to credibility findings.” D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2004).
An alien who arrives in or is present in the United States may apply for
asylum. See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Attorney General has
discretion to grant asylum if the alien meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.”
See INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A “refugee” is any person who is
unwilling to return to his home country or to avail himself of that country’s
protection “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
The asylum applicant carries the burden of proving statutory “refugee”
status. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001); 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(a). The applicant satisfies this burden by showing, with specific and
3
credible evidence: (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or
(2) a “well-founded fear” that his or her statutorily listed factor will cause future
persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b); Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. “To establish
asylum based on past persecution , the applicant must prove (1) that [ ]he was
persecuted, and (2) that the persecution was on account of a protected ground.”
Silva, 448 F.3d at 1236 (citations omitted). “To establish eligibility for asylum
based on a well-founded fear of future persecution, the applicant must prove (1) a
‘subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable’ fear of persecution, that is (2) on
account of a protected ground.” Id. (citations omitted).
“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated
incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation [.]” Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
There must be “specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that [the
petitioner] will be singled out for persecution on account of [his political] opinion.”
Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. Additionally, we have held that “evidence that either
is consistent with acts of private violence or the petitioner's failure to cooperate
with guerillas, or that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal
activity, does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily
protected ground.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247 1257-58 (11th Cir.
2006).
4
Here, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision that Molina was not
entitled to asylum, based on either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution, on account of a political opinion. First, the IJ made an adverse
credibility determination as to Molina’s testimony based on internal
inconsistencies, which the IJ specified and explained in his order. An adverse
credibility determination alone will support the denial of asylum. See Forgue v.
Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005); D-Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 819.
Moreover, the only evidence of Molina’s alleged past persecution attributable, with
any degree of specificity, to the FARC consisted of some threatening phone calls,
during which the FARC asked Molina to provide certain information, and the theft
of his wallet. Simply put, Molina’s mere refusal to cooperate with the FARC’s
demands is insufficient to show past persecution. See Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 392
F.3d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that alien did not establish past persecution
by FARC where FARC’s harassment was due to alien’s refusal to cooperate rather
than actual or imputed political opinion).
As for a well-founded fear of future persecution, other than his own
speculation, Molina presented no evidence that he would be harmed if he returned
to Colombia. The IJ noted that Molina had been gone from Colombia for two
(now four) years, and no longer held the airline position that gave him access to the
information the FARC demanded of him during the threatening phone calls.
5
Because Molina did not present “specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to
fear that he . . . will be singled out for persecution,” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231
(quotation omitted), we are not compelled to conclude that Molina has established
a case for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution by the FARC.
In sum, Molina has failed to establish that the record compels a finding that
the FARC persecuted him, or that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution
by the FARC, because of his political opinion, rather than solely on account of his
refusal to cooperate. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
PETITION DENIED.
6