[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 10, 2006
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 05-16129 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
D. C. Docket No. 04-20856-CV-AJ
COMPANIA NAVIERA HORAMAR,
a foreign corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARINE GEAR, INC.,
d.b.a. Haley Marine Gears, Inc.,
MARINE GEARS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
d.b.a. Haley Marine Gears International, Inc.,
Defendants,
LANDSTAR SYSTEMS INC.,
a foreign corporation,
Defendant-Cross-
Defendant-Appellee,
LAN CHILE CARGO, S.A.,
a foreign corporation,
Defendant-Cross-
Claimant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
(August 10, 200)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Compania Naviera Horamar (“Horamar”) appeals the district
court’s order denying Horamar’s motion for leave to amend its amended complaint
to add a claim against appellee Lan Chile Cargo, S.A. (“Lan”) and the district
court’s grant of Lan’s motion for summary judgment.
We review a district court’s order denying a motion for leave to amend the
complaint under the abuse of discretion standard. Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc.
v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 376 F.3d 1065, 1077 (11th Cir. 2004). We review an
order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards that
bound the district court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Strickland v. Water Works and
Sewer Bd. of the City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2001).
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue of material fact
2
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Horamar’s untimely
motion for leave to amend its amended complaint. Horamar was aware, as early as
May 21, 2004, that the Warsaw Convention governed and preempted its state law
negligence claim against Lan. However, the record demonstrates that Horamar did
not file its motion for leave to amend its amended complaint to add a claim under
the Warsaw Convention against Lan until April 4, 2005, which was more than
eight months past the pleadings amendment deadline of July 23, 2004, less than
two months before the scheduled trial, and six months after Lan filed its motion
for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, Warsaw Convention’s
preemption of Horamar’s state law negligence claim. Consequently, we agree
with Lan that Horamar failed to meet the “good cause” standard of Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b), and the district court was not required to address the merits of Horamar’s
motion under the liberal standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See Sosa v. Airprints
Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998). Moreover, we affirm the district
court’s order granting Lan’s motion for summary judgment for the reasons set
forth in its well-reasoned order filed on October 4, 2005.
AFFIRMED.
3