United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit May 30, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30957
RONALD COLEMAN CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MARK HEBERT, WARDEN, ST. MARY PARISH LAW ENFORCEMENT CENTER;
DAVID A. NAQUIN, SHERIFF, ST. MARY PARISH,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(6:05-cv-00100)
Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Ronald Coleman Clark (“Clark”) appeals the decision
of the district court dismissing with prejudice his civil rights
lawsuit as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I.
In 2004, Clark was in the custody of the Sheriff of St. Mary
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Parish, Louisiana awaiting trial for murder. According to Clark,
Officer Charlene Joseph (“Officer Joseph”), a correctional officer
who was a cousin of his alleged victim, placed Clark in the same
dormitory as another cousin of his alleged victim. Subsequently,
Clark was attacked by the detainee cousin, causing Clark to become
blind in one eye. Clark filed an administrative grievance with the
Warden of the detention facility, arguing that the “entiler [sic]
facility” was responsible for his injury because of inadequate
manpower and security cameras. At the first level of review, it was
determined that Clark’s grievance was unfounded, and the Warden
agreed with this disposition on further review. Clark never sought
review by the Sheriff, which would have been the third and final
step in the administrative grievance process.
Clark later brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the
Sheriff of St. Mary Parish, David A. Naquin, and the Warden of the
detention facility, Mark Hebert, for violating his constitutional
rights. He sought $100 million in damages. In his complaint, which
he filed pro se, Clark alleged that the defendants had violated his
right to protection while in custody by providing inadequate
manpower and security cameras. He did not name Officer Joseph as a
defendant, and he did not provide any other reason why the Sheriff
or the Warden should be held liable. The Magistrate Judge
recommended that Clark’s complaint (1) be dismissed with prejudice
as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted or, in the alternative, (2) be dismissed without
2
prejudice for failing to exhaust available administrative remedies.
Clark filed an objection to the Magistrate’s recommendation,
stating summarily that he should be allowed to amend his complaint
because of “ineffective assistance and law library” and that he had
exhausted his administrative remedies because he “wasn’t gaven
[sic] a Request For Sheriff’s Review.” The district judge entered
judgment against Clark, dismissing his suit with prejudice as
frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.
II.
Typically, we review the dismissal of an in forma pauperis
complaint as frivolous for abuse of discretion, Stanley v. Foster,
464 F.3d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 2006); however, where, as here, the
district court also finds that the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, we review the entire complaint de
novo, see Gieger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).
Clark argues on appeal that (1) the district court should have
permitted him to amend his complaint to add Officer Joseph as a
defendant; (2) the district court should have permitted him to
conduct discovery, which would have revealed deliberate
indifference with respect to the Sheriff and the Warden; and (3)
the district court should have stayed the lawsuit to allow him to
exhaust available administrative remedies. Because the district
court did not dismiss Clark’s lawsuit for failure to exhaust, we do
3
not consider Clark’s third point of error.
Generally, a district court errs if it dismisses a pro se
complaint for failure to state a claim without giving the
complainant an opportunity to amend. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 326 (5th Cir. 1999). However, Jones recognizes that
if the protections afforded public officials are not to
ring hollow, plaintiffs cannot be allowed to continue to
amend or supplement their pleading until they stumble
upon a formula that carries them over the threshold. Such
a protracted process is likely to disrupt public
officials from their duties. . . . At some point a court
must decide that a plaintiff has had a fair opportunity
to make his case; if, after that time, a cause has not
been established, the court should finally dismiss the
suit.
Id. (quoting Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir.
1986)). In this vein, if it is evident that the plaintiff has
pleaded his best case, there is no need to give him an opportunity
to amend his pleadings. Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 793. Here, the
Magistrate Judge found, “Plaintiff’s complaint and the copies of
his ARP Grievances specifically detail his theories of liability
with respect to each named defendant. The thoroughness of the
complaint convinces the undersigned that [P]laintiff has pled his
best case and need not be afforded any further opportunity to
amend.” After thoroughly reviewing the record, we find no fault
with this finding. Throughout the grievance process and the
district court proceedings, Clark consistently complained about
general security problems at the detention facility, not Officer
Joseph’s alleged bad acts. Clark had ample opportunity to lodge a
4
formal complaint against Officer Joseph; he chose instead to
complain about the general security conditions in the facility in
which he was housed. It would be disruptive to permit Clark to
amend his complaint at this late date, especially considering that
he has not exhausted any available administrative remedies with
respect to Officer Joseph.
Further, the district court did not err in dismissing Clark’s
complaint without permitting discovery because Clark failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Clark alleged
only negligence on the Sheriff and the Warden’s part in securing
the facility, and negligence does not give rise to a § 1983 cause
of action. See Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 792 (“Recently, the Supreme
Court specifically held [in Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
(1986)] that a § 1983 civil rights claim cannot be based on a
negligent failure to protect.”). Moreover, the Sheriff and the
Warden cannot be held liable on any theory of respondeat superior
or vicarious liability. See Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 350
n.37 (5th Cir. 2006). To prevail against them as supervisors, Clark
would have had to allege facts supporting a failure to supervise,
id., and he did not.
III.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of Clark’s civil rights lawsuit as frivolous and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
5
AFFIRMED.
6