United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit June 5, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-60673
SHELTER INSURANCE COMPANY and BARBARA STEWART,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(1:03-CV-592)
Before KING, DeMOSS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs-Appellants Shelter Insurance Company and Barbara
Stewart (collectively “Appellants”) challenge the district court’s
directed verdict in favor of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Mercedes
USA”) dismissing Appellants’ manufacturing defect claim. The sole
issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly concluded
that Appellants failed to establish an essential element of their
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
claim under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63; specifically, that Stewart’s
Mercedes “was defective because it deviated in a material way from
the manufacturer’s specifications or from otherwise identical units
manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications.” MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)1.
In September 2001, Stewart bought a new, 2002 C240 Mercedes.
On November 21, 2001, she left her home and drove the car to a
shopping mall. Stewart returned home and parked the Mercedes in her
garage, and then took a nap with her daughter. When her daughter
woke up, she noticed smoke coming from the garage. Stewart
investigated and found the garage ablaze. The fire burned Stewart’s
Mercedes, garage, and parts of her home and its contents. Shelter
Insurance Company, Stewart’s insurer, paid for the damage.
The parties disagree on most of the rest, including where in
the garage the fire started and what caused it. Appellants’ theory
is that the fire started in the engine of Stewart’s Mercedes and
was caused by a defectively manufactured car battery. Mercedes
USA’s theory, on the other hand, is that the fire started in a
trash can right next to the Mercedes and was caused by burning
debris in the trash can, which Stewart had thrown away earlier that
day after cleaning out her fireplace.
Appellants sued Mercedes USA alleging various Mississippi
state law causes of action, including (1) traditional negligence,
(2) negligence based on res ipsa loquitur and (3) strict liability.
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Regarding strict liability, Appellants pointed to Miss. Code Ann.
§ 11-1-63 and its broad range of product liability theories: (1)
manufacturing defect, (2) inadequate warning, (3) design defect and
(4) breach of warranty. See id. at § 11-1-63(a)(i)1-4.
Mercedes USA moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial. With each of
their approximately seven theories of liability still in play,
Appellants presented their case-in-chief to the jury. At the close
of Appellants’ case-in-chief, Mercedes USA moved for a directed
verdict. Appellants responded to the motion by abandoning each of
their claims except their strict liability claim based on an
alleged manufacturing defect in the car battery. Appellants
conceded that they failed to prove negligence under any theory or
strict liability via inadequate warning, design defect, or breach
of warranty. Thus, their remaining theory was manufacturing defect-
-that Stewart’s Mercedes, specifically its battery, was defectively
manufactured and caused the fire.
With only the manufacturing defect claim remaining, the
district court heard argument from both sides, asked questions
regarding the record evidence as applied to Mississippi’s statutory
requirements for manufacturing defect claims, and made a decision.
The court ultimately held that Appellants failed to prove an
essential element of their manufacturing defect claim;
specifically, they failed to prove that the car battery “deviated
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in a material way from the manufacturer’s specifications or from
otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing
specifications.” Id. at § 11-1-63(a)(i)1. Thus, the court granted
Mercedes USA’s motion for a directed verdict and dismissed
Appellants’ claims.
Appellants moved to amend the judgment, the district court
denied the motion, and Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal.
The parties agree on the following: First, the only claim
before us on appeal is Appellants’ strict product liability claim
based on an alleged manufacturing defect in Stewart’s car battery.
Second, the claim is governed by Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(i)1.
And third, the only record evidence relevant to the claim is that
the car battery may have been the origin of the fire. Thus, in
effect, the parties agree on the sole issue, what law governs that
issue, and the existence of one and only one piece of evidence
relevant to that issue. Of course, the parties disagree on whether
this one piece of evidence is itself sufficient to let a jury
decide the issue. Our review is de novo. See Leverette v.
Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1999).
As the parties note, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63 provides that
in an action for damages allegedly caused by a defectively
manufactured product:
(a) The manufacturer or the seller of the product shall
not be liable if the claimant does not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that at the time the
product left the control of the manufacturer or seller:
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(i)1. The product was defective because it deviated
in a material way from the manufacturer’s
specifications or from otherwise identical units
manufactured to the same manufacturing
specifications . . . .
Id. at § 11-1-63(a)(i)1 (emphasis added).
The district court concluded that Appellants offered no evidence
relating to the italicized requirement, i.e., that Stewart’s
battery deviated in a material way from specs or a properly
constructed, 2002 Mercedes C240 car battery. The court found it
troubling that Appellants failed to enter into evidence even the
manufacturer’s specifications for such a battery, and similarly
failed to offer evidence of otherwise identical units. As a result,
the court decided that Appellants necessarily failed to show that
the battery in Stewart’s Mercedes deviated in any way, much less
deviated in a material way, from the manufacturer’s specifications
or otherwise identical units.
Appellants really do not contend otherwise. Rather, they argue
that the single fact that the battery caught fire necessarily
proves that the battery was defectively manufactured. That this is
Appellants’ sole argument is clear from the trial transcript, which
is consistent with Appellants’ appeal brief:
THE COURT: All right. How did [Stewart’s battery] deviate
from the manufacturer’s specification[s]? What proof is
in the record?
MR. KEMP [APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL]: Well, it burned.
THE COURT: Okay.
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MR. KEMP: . . . . This vehicle burned. Because it burned,
it deviated from the manufacturer’s specifications.
THE COURT: And that’s your argument?
MR. KEMP: That is one of my arguments. There are other
arguments . . . . Do you want me to make them?
THE COURT: No. I want to know what facts you have
established.
MR. KEMP: What facts have I established? Number 1 --
THE COURT: That show that [Stewart’s battery] deviated,
in a material way, from the manufacturer’s specs.
MR. KEMP: The biggest fact off all is the fact that it
burned [Stewart’s] house down.
The court again asked Appellants to specify what evidence they had
introduced to prove that the battery deviated from specifications
or otherwise identical units. Appellants responded: “That [the
battery has] a fuse system on it; that it should work if there’s an
electrical fault at or near the battery . . . . And, certainly, if
that fuse system doesn’t work, it deviates from the manufacturer’s
specifications.”
The court and Appellants continued back and forth on this same
point, but got nowhere. The court asked again: “[Y]ou are now
saying [Stewart’s battery was] defective because it deviated . . .
from the manufacturer’s specifications; is that correct?”
Appellants responded: “[Y]es, Your Honor, because it burned.”
For the reasons stated by the district court in its oral
ruling, we AFFIRM. We need look no further than the plain language
of the Mississippi statute. Appellants were required to prove that
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the battery deviated. See id. at § 11-1-63(a)(i)1. They failed to
even attempt to do so. Rather, they attempted to prove only that
the battery malfunctioned. As a result, they necessarily failed to
prove an essential element of their claim.
AFFIRMED.
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