United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 19, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
06-30269
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAVID B. RIDGEWAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Before REAVLEY, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
David Ridgeway pled guilty to 22 fraud-related counts in
1992.1 In 1993, he was sentenced to 48 months imprisonment2 and
three years of supervised release. He was also fined $50,000 and
ordered to pay $100,000 in restitution to the Louisiana Insurance
Guaranty Association (LIGA). At the end of his term of supervised
1
The facts underlying these charges are recounted in United
States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994).
2
A year later, on the strength of the Government’s 35(b)
letter, this was reduced to 30 months imprisonment. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 35
release, Ridgeway voluntarily executed a note with LIGA agreeing to
pay at least $100 per month until his debt was paid.
In 2004, more than a decade after his sentencing and years
after his term of supervised release ended, the United States filed
a notice of lien against Ridgeway’s property. The lien was for
$150,000, which is the total of the fine plus the restitution.
Ridgeway does not dispute the Government’s authority to file
a lien against his property for the balance of his fine. However,
he contests the Government’s lien insofar as it concerns the
restitution order. Ridgeway argues that LIGA, not the Government,
is authorized to collect that debt. He filed a motion to set aside
the lien and to prohibit the Government’s further collection
efforts on behalf of LIGA. The district court denied Ridgeway’s
motion.
We AFFIRM the district court’s ruling.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The only question is whether the United States was authorized
to file the present lien, despite Ridgeway’s note with LIGA, years
after his terms of imprisonment and supervised release ended. This
is a question of statutory interpretation which we review de novo.
See United States v. Phillips, 303 F.3d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 2002).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
The parties agree that the law in effect at the time of
2
sentencing, in this case 1993, governs this dispute. See Hughey v.
United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 n.1 (1990). Unless otherwise
noted, the discussion below focuses on provisions as they existed
in 1993. This requires us to scrutinize the terms of the Victim
and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), which has since been
repealed by the Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA).3
We are particularly mindful of the provisions limiting payment
periods and the provisions addressing the Government’s power to
enforce restitution orders.
B. The Limitations Period for Restitution Payments
The VWPA allows a judge to order restitution payments
immediately or in installments. Ridgeway focuses on the provisions
of the Act limiting payment periods to a maximum of five years
after the term of imprisonment to argue that the Government no
longer has authority to collect on this restitution order.
However, we conclude that those provisions are directed at when
payments are due. The collection of outstanding debts, as the one
here, is governed by the enforcement provisions found in 18 U.S.C.
3
After conceding that the VWPA is the applicable law, the
United States curiously mentions that applying the MVRA would not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Whether it violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause is irrelevant, though, where the statute itself
explicitly limits its application to sentencing proceedings
initiated after its effective date. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A
(historical and statutory notes) (providing that relevant
amendments shall be effective “for sentencing proceedings in
cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after Apr. 24,
1996.”).
3
§ 3663(h).
We begin with the statutory language “as well as the design,
object and policy in determining the plain meaning of a statute.”
See Hightower v. Tex. Hosp. Ass’n, 65 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.
1995). The statute must be read as a whole, and only if the
language is unclear do we turn to statutory history. See Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991). The payment-period provisions
provide:
(f)(1) The court may require that [the] defendant make
restitution under this section within a specified period
or in specified installments.
(2) The end of such period or the last such installment
shall not be later than–
(A) the end of the period of probation, if probation
is ordered;
(B) five years after the end of the term of
imprisonment imposed, if the court does not order
probation; and
(C) five years after the date of sentencing in any
other case.
(3) If not otherwise provided by the court under this
subsection, restitution shall be made immediately.
18 U.S.C. § 3663(f)(1)–(3) (1993).
Ridgeway’s argument is that the limitation on payment periods
implicitly limits when the Government can collect on a restitution
order. Because the collection attempt here occurred more than five
years after Ridgeway completed his term of imprisonment, he
contends that it was unauthorized. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(f)(2)(B).
4
While he admits the debt still exists, he argues that it is
incumbent on LIGA to enforce it.
Variations of this argument have been addressed by our sister
circuits,4 but it is a matter of first impression for us. We agree
with those circuits finding that the time limitations in § 3663(f)
only apply to when payments are due, without directly limiting the
period during which the Government can collect overdue payments.
4
Compare United States v. Joseph, 914 F.2d 780, 786 (6th
Cir. 1990) (Government’s ability to enforce restitution order
limited by § 3663(f), victim responsible for collection after
that), and United States v. Bruchey, 810 F.2d 456, 459–60 (4th
Cir. 1987) (Government cannot compel defendant to sign
restitution note extending payments past limitations period), and
United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 803 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Section 3663(f) limits period in which payment is due, even if
payments are ordered immediately), with United States v. Rostoff,
164 F.3d 63, 66 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The fact that the last payment
of restitution is due at the end of supervised release has
nothing to do with the duration or expiration of the restitution
order.”), and United States v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1533 n.3
(11th Cir. 1997) (noting that defendant is not “off the hook” at
end of limitation period, as Government may collect overdue
payments thereafter), and United States v. House, 808 F.2d 508,
511 (7th Cir. 1986) (despite installment provisions, restitution
is debt and does not abate in five years).
Notably, Ridgeway relies on cases that do not involve the
Government collecting overdue payments, as here, but a district
court preemptively compelling a defendant to sign agreements that
will extend the payment’s due date beyond the limitations period.
See, e.g., Joseph, 914 F.2d at 786 (“[T]he court may not require
the defendant to execute a consent judgment or otherwise require
him to secure payment ‘during and after the period of
probation.’”); Bruchey, 810 F.2d at 460 (“By ordering the
defendant to sign a promissory note on which payments would in
all likelihood extend beyond her five years of probation, the
district court accomplished indirectly what the statute forbids
directly.”). We do not call those holdings into question.
Unlike those cases, the district court did not seek to extend the
time period in which Ridgeway’s payments were due, but is simply
allowing collection measures for the outstanding debt.
5
This is not an artificial or novel distinction. Similarly, in the
context of fines, in 1993 a district court could not order
installment-payments for a period of greater than five years, but
it could collect outstanding fines for up to twenty years. Compare
18 U.S.C. § 3572(d) (1993) (limiting period of installments to five
years), with 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(1) (1993) (liens used to collect
fines do not expire for twenty years).
We are sympathetic to Ridgeway’s position, and if § 3663(f)
contained the only relevant provisions, we might agree with him
that they implicitly limit the collection period. The purpose of
limiting payment periods to five years is unclear when collection
is allowed to continue so far beyond that time,5 but we must read
the statute as a whole. This requires us to consider § 3663(h),
which explicitly governs the enforcement of restitution orders.
5
The Government argues that this provision is strictly for
the benefit of victims, to ensure the district court will not
extend repayment periods indefinitely and deprive them of speedy
compensation. See, e.g., House, 808 F.2d at 511 (“The power of a
district court to establish a schedule of repayment . . . created
a risk that the schedule would be so extended as to make the
order ineffectual . . . . So § 3579(f)(2) limits the use of §
3579(f)(1) to drag out the process of restitution.”).
While that may be one purpose of this provision, the
legislative history also shows a reluctance to hold a defendant
perpetually liable. It recognizes that crime “may have lifelong
cost implications for the victim or the victim’s family, but it
also recognizes that there may sometimes be a practical necessity
in limiting both the amount of restitution ordered and the period
during which restitution payments are ordered to be made.” 1982
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2515, 2537–38 (emphasis added).
Read in context, the latter part of that statement contrasts with
the victim’s interest in lifelong repayment and denotes concern
for limiting the defendant’s liability.
6
C. The Enforcement Provisions and the Propriety of the Lien
We find that 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h) is the controlling provision,
as it provides the methods for enforcing restitution orders. We
navigate that provision and its cross-references in some detail,
and the reader is forewarned that the journey is cumbersome.
Section § 3663(h) provides, in full:
(h) An order of restitution may be enforced–
(1) by the United States–
(A) in the manner provided for the collection and
payment of fines in subchapter B of chapter 229 of this
title; or
(B) in the same manner as a judgment in a civil
action; and
(2) by a victim named in the order to receive the
restitution, in the same manner as a judgment in a civil
action.
18 U.S.C. § 3663(h)(1)–(2)(1993).6
The Government finds its authority for this lien in §
3663(h)(1)(A). The relevant provision of chapter 229, subchapter
B reads:
§ 3613 Civil Remedies for satisfaction of an unpaid fine
(a) Lien.-- A fine imposed pursuant to the provisions of
subchapter C of chapter 227 is a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property belonging to the person
fined.
18 U.S.C. § 3613(a). That section further indicates that such
6
The modern incarnation of this provision, derived from the
MVRA, gives the Government a broader grant of authority to enforce
restitution orders. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m).
7
liens do not expire until “twenty years after entry of the
judgment,” the year 2013 in this case. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(1).
The Government’s position, which we ultimately adopt, is
fairly straightforward: (1) Section 3663(h)(1)(A) allows it to
utilize all methods of collection provided for in Title 18, chapter
229, subchapter B; (2) one of those methods creates a lien on the
fined person’s property, see 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a); (3) those liens
do not expire for twenty years, see 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(1); and (4)
the underlying judgment is less than twenty-years old, and is
therefore proper.
Ridgeway responds that the section the Government cites only
applied to the collection of fines, but did not extend to the
collection of restitution until the MVRA was passed in 1996, three
years after this order was entered. See Motion to Prohibit
Government from Disbursing Funds at 1 (Dec. 7, 2005); see also Gray
Br. at 3.7 While Ridgeway did not raise it, there is a nuance that
supports this interpretation. Of the five sections comprising
chapter 229, subchapter B, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3611–15, the lien provision
is the only one that contains a clause limiting its application to
7
We highlight where this argument was briefed below because
the district court did not address it. It was probably too
dismissive of it, as it is not enough to find the Government’s
enforcement action was not time-barred by § 3663(f); the district
court should have further satisfied itself that the Government
had the affirmative authority to act as it did here. Because we
give this part of the analysis more consideration than either
party or the district court, we are careful to point out where
these arguments were made below.
8
fines “imposed pursuant to the provisions of subchapter C of
chapter 227.” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a). The Government’s position,
applying that provision to orders of restitution which are not part
of chapter 227, would seem to violate a cardinal rule that
statutory language not be rendered superfluous. See TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 21 (2001). Moreover, because § 3613(a) and
§ 3663(h) were both codified at the same time as part of the same
Act,8 it is difficult to read § 3613's unique language limiting its
application to fines as a mere oversight.
Nonetheless, while we are reluctant to render this limiting
language superfluous, it is clear from the statutory history that
§ 3663(h) envisioned using liens to enforce orders of restitution.
In fact, the 1984 version of § 3663(h) explicitly referenced using
liens to enforce restitution orders. It stated that the Government
could enforce orders of restitution “in the manner provided in
3[6]12 and 3[6]13.” See Comprehensive Crime Control Act, ch. 229,
§ 3663, 98 Stat. 1837, 2010 (1984).9 Only later did Congress
8
Both of these provisions were codified by the 98th
Congress as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.
See ch. 229, § 3613, 98 Stat. 1837, 2005 (1984); ch. 229, § 3663,
98 Stat. at 2010.
9
To explain the conspicuous use of brackets in this
quotation, the 1984 version actually cross-referenced sections
“3812 and 3813,” which were then, and remain now, non-existent.
This error was later remedied in 1988 through a “correction of
cross references,” changing the reference to “subchapter B of
chapter 229.” See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Tit. VII, § 7042, 102
Stat. 4181, 4399 (1988). That subchapter contains §§ 3611–15,
and it is clear from this history that the original cross-
9
broaden § 3663(a)’s reference to the entirety of chapter 229,
subchapter B. Thus, Congress captured the remaining provisions of
subchapter B; it did not exclude the lien provision.
While the limiting language in § 3613(a) cuts slightly against
using liens to enforce restitution orders, it certainly is not
directly contradictory to the clear meaning of § 3663(h) allowing
it. The Government was explicitly empowered to use liens to
enforce orders of restitution, and given the twenty-year expiration
period applied to such liens, the Government’s lien against
Ridgeway’s property has not expired.
D. The Note Executed With LIGA
Ridgeway’s final argument is that the note he voluntarily
executed with LIGA fully satisfies his restitution debt, and the
Government cannot accelerate that note. However, the Government’s
penal objectives in imposing and collecting restitution cannot be
waived by the victim. See United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846,
854 (9th Cir. 1989). In a very instructive case finding that
restitution orders were not subject to discharge in bankruptcy
proceedings, the Supreme Court found:
The criminal justice system is not operated primarily for
the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of society as
a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with punishing
the offender, but also with rehabilitating him. Although
restitution does resemble a judgment “for the benefit of”
reference was directed specifically at §§ 3612 and 3613, the two
provisions most directly concerned with the manner of enforcing
fines in subchapter B.
10
the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines
that conclusion. The victim has no control over the
amount of restitution awarded or over the decision to
award restitution . . . . Unlike an obligation which
arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law
duty, here the obligation is rooted in the traditional
responsibility of a state to protect its citizens by
enforcing its criminal statutes and to rehabilitate an
offender by imposing a criminal sanction intended for
that purpose.
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986) (citations and quotation
omitted).
LIGA could certainly waive its own rights to initiate a civil
suit against Ridgeway to collect overdue restitution, and it
appears to have done exactly that in this case. But it could not
waive the Government’s authority to collect restitution, as that
bears uniquely on the State’s right to administer punishment.
III. CONCLUSION
The limitation provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3663(f)(1)–(3) only
limit when payments are due, not when they can be collected. A
close review of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613(a) and 3663(h) reveals that liens
may be used to enforce restitution orders and that they do not
expire for twenty years. The Government’s lien is not time-barred
and is not superseded by Ridgeway’s note with LIGA. Therefore, we
AFFIRM the district court’s ruling.
11