United States v. Rogers

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit June 11, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-20402
Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

BRALYONNE DONTRAILL ROGERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(4:05-CR-309-3)

Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Bralyonne Dontraill Rogers appeals his conviction -- following

a bench trial on stipulated facts -- for bank robbery and use of a

firearm during the commission of a bank robbery, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) & (d), 2, and 924(c). The district court

sentenced Rogers to a total prison term of 135 months and a total

supervised-release term of 5 years.

*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Rogers argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the results of a search and seizure that

followed an investigatory stop of the red sports utility vehicle

(“SUV”) in which he was a passenger. Specifically, Rogers maintains

that the investigatory stop was conducted attendant to a police

roadblock that was unconstitutionally broad in scope, not based on

particularized suspicion, and implemented in an unreasonably

intrusive manner. Further, Rogers contends that the police officers

did not have reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts to

focus on the passengers of the red SUV and ultimately detain them,

and he believes that the officers effectively relied on an

impermissible, race-based hunch by seizing the first vehicle

containing three black males.

We review a motion to suppress based on live testimony at a

suppression hearing by “accept[ing] the trial court’s factual

findings unless clearly erroneous or influenced by a incorrect view

of the law.” United States v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701, 704 (5th Cir.

2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below. United

States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1314 (5th Cir. 1993). “Questions of

law are reviewed de novo, as are the district court’s ultimate

conclusions of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.” United States v.

Vasquez, 298 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

We conclude that the district court did not err when it

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concluded that the roadblock established by the police had a proper

purpose and was implemented reasonably. The absence of an

individualized suspicion in the police roadblock context is not

dispositive of constitutionality. See generally Mich. Dep’t of

State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v.

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Roadblocks designed to

address specialized law enforcement purposes may be permissible

without the presence of individualized suspicion, provided the

court finds a favorable balance between “the gravity of the public

concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure

advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference

with individual liberty.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51

(1979); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004)

(quoting Brown).

The roadblock established by the Houston Police Department

(“HPD”) was a targeted law enforcement effort designed to address

a specific and dangerous crime -- an armed bank robbery -- about

which the HPD had particularized knowledge. Because the money

stolen during the bank robbery contained electronic tracking

devices (“ETDs”), the HPD were able to focus their attention on a

particular geographic area in which there was a high likelihood of

catching armed criminals fleeing from the commission of a specific

crime. Thus, the police roadblock was properly tailored to detect

evidence of a particular criminal wrongdoing rather than for

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general crime control, Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424, and accordingly,

it was not unconstitutional per se. See City of Indianapolis v.

Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (noting that “an appropriately

tailored roadblock set up to . . . catch a dangerous criminal who

is likely to flee by way of a particular route” would “almost

certainly” be permissible).

Furthermore, the roadblock established by the HPD was not

unreasonable under the circumstances, and it satisfies the

requirements of the Brown balancing test. The public concern of

apprehending armed bank robbers was substantial. Moreover, the

roadblock was a discretionary police tactic specifically tailored

in both time and place to further the public interest in

apprehension, as the roadblock was established within several miles

of the crime scene based on strong scientific evidence extracted

from the ETDs. Additionally, although the roadblock may have caused

some interference with subjective liberties, the objective

intrusion was minimal and brief. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at

558; see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-53 (citing Martinez-Fuerte).

Thus, the district court did not err in holding that the HPD

roadblock was permissible.

We also conclude that the district court did not err in

concluding that the police had sufficient articulable facts on

which to base a reasonable suspicion to focus on the occupants of

the red SUV. Whether an investigatory stop was objectively

4
reasonable is examined under the “totality of the circumstances.”

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). “Any analysis of

reasonable suspicion is necessarily fact-specific, and factors

which by themselves appear innocent, may in the aggregate rise to

the level of reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Santiago, 310

F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Factors that ordinarily constitute innocent behavior may provide

a composite picture sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion in the

minds of experienced officers . . . .” United States v. Hollaway,

962 F.2d 451, 459 (5th Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted). The

Government bears the burden of showing the reasonableness of a

warrantless search or seizure. United States v. Chavis, 48 F.3d

871, 872 (5th Cir. 1995).

We conclude that the police were justified in focusing on the

red SUV because: (1) the vehicle was located in the dense traffic

where the ETDs suggested the stolen money was to be found; (2) the

race and gender of the occupants of the SUV matched the description

of the suspects; and (3) the occupants of the SUV exhibited

behavior that experienced officers interpreted as suspicious

conduct. Although Rogers contends that the officers

unconstitutionally used race as a basis for their inquiry, the race

of the suspects was a relevant fact because of witnesses’

identifying information. Ultimately, the presence of three black

males exhibiting suspicious behavior in a location in which a

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reliable technology suggested the stolen money should be found

provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to the officers. The

officers had more than a minimal level of objective justification

for the stop and seizure. See United States v. Jacquez, 421 F.3d

338, 341 (5th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, the district court did not err when it denied

Rogers’ motion to suppress the evidence. The judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.