United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 14, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-50215
Summary Calendar
WILLIE CLARK, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JULIE FISKE, Special Agent Internal Revenue Service; ROBERT
BREEN, Police Officer, Bag # 2318 Detective San Antonio Police
Department; JOHN DOES, United States Marshal; DEFENDANTS, ET AL.,
In Their Private and Official Capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(5:05-CV-485)
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Proceeding pro se, Willie Clark, Jr., challenges the
dismissal, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
and 56, of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action concerning the defendants’
attempt to execute an arrest warrant at his home.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Regarding the dismissal of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment claims, Clark has waived any related argument due to
inadequate briefing. See Rutherford v. Harris County, Texas, 197
F.3d 173, 193 (5th Cir. 1999); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-
25 (5th Cir. 1993).
As for Clark’s Fourth Amendment claim, the summary judgment
awarded the defendants is reviewed de novo, applying the same
standards as the district court. E.g., Threadgill v. Prudential
Sec. Group, Inc., 145 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1998). Such judgment
is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law”. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Clark fails to show a violation of
his constitutional rights in connection with the defendants’ entry
into his home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).
Concomitantly, he fails to show the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity. See Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168
F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the summary judgment
was proper.
Because his action was properly dismissed pursuant to the
defendants’ motions, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c), Clark’s motion for appointment of appellate counsel is
denied. His motions to dismiss his indictment and for new counsel
in his criminal proceedings are also denied. See Leverette v.
2
Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12(b)(3).
AFFIRMED; MOTIONS DENIED
3