Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co.

Case Number: 01-91-00498-CV 06/15/1992 Mandate issued 06/15/1992 Created for Data Conversion -- an event inserted to correspond to the mandate date of a process 05/12/1992 Court approved judgment sent to attys of record 05/06/1992 Motion to dismiss disposed Overruled 05/06/1992 Opinion issued ca judgment reversed; remanded to ca 05/06/1992 Petition to S.Ct. to publish C.A. opinion disposed Granted 05/06/1992 Petition to S.Ct. to publish C.A. opinion disposed Granted 05/06/1992 Order of the Court Issued Court of Appeals Opinion ordered published 05/06/1992 Application for Writ of Error - Disposed application granted pursuant to Rule 170, TRAP 05/06/1992 Writ of error issued to Court of Appeals. 05/06/1992 Opinion issued ca judgment reversed; remanded to ca 05/06/1992 Application for Writ of Error - Disposed application granted pursuant to Rule 170, TRAP 04/28/1992 appellee's reply to 90(c) petition 02/19/1992 Petition to publish CA opinion under TRAP 90(c) 01/30/1992 Reply to motion 01/24/1992 Notice requesting filing fee 12/20/1991 Reply filed 12/20/1991 Motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. 12/19/1991 Case forwarded to Court 12/03/1991 Application for Writ of Error - Filed OPINION

This is an appeal from the trial court's order approving the recommendations of a special master concerning discovery disputes. By order dated April 12, 1991, the trial court denied appellant's request for a hearing to overrule the protective order signed by the special master; overruled appellant's objections to the scope of the protective order; and granted in all respects appellee's motion for protective order.

In response to appellant's motion for extension of time to file her brief, appellee asks this Court to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction because 1) it is an improper appeal from an interlocutory order; 2) appellant has failed to timely file a brief; 3) appellant failed to provide notice to appellee of the appeal; and 4) appellant failed to provide a complete transcript to this Court. Because appellee's motion raises a question concerning our jurisdiction, we address that issue first.

*Page 357 Excluding four statutory exceptions1 not applicable here, an appeal can be prosecuted only from a final judgment or order. North East Independent School Dist. v.Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966); Denny's Inc. v. RainboBaking Co., 764 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ); Prodeco Exploration, Inc. v. Ware, 684 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ). Until the trial court severs out a party or an issue, a judgment that does not dispose of all issues and parties is purely interlocutory and not yet appealable. Cherokee Water Co. v. Ross, 698 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. 1985).

In her motion for extension of time to file her brief, appellant asserts she is bringing the appeal pursuant to TEX.R.CIV.P. 76a. Rule 76a pertains to the sealing of courtrecords; it does not address protection from disclosure or dissemination of documents during discovery. In pursuing her appeal at this stage of the litigation, appellant attempts to equate an interlocutory order sealing court records, which is appealable, TEX.R.CIV.P. 76a(8), with an interlocutory order pertaining to discovery, which is not appealable. Appellant's proper remedy in this case is to file an application for writ of mandamus complaining that the trial court abused its discretion in approving the protective order.

The order appealed from is interlocutory and we are without jurisdiction to consider it. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Our order of July 18, 1991, granting appellant's motion for extension of time to file her brief, is withdrawn as improvidently granted.

1 See in TEX.CIV.PRAC. REM.CODE ANN. Sec.51.014 (Vernon Supp. 1991).