The issue for decision is whether the Public Service Commission (PSC) has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of utility rates and service which extends to a city contracting for the sale and supply of water to a PSC-regulated county water district.
As background:
The Simpson County Water District (District) is a statutorily created public water district operated and regulated pursuant to KRS Chapter 74 and is expressly subject to the Kentucky Public Service Commission, which is operative under KRS Chapter 278. The City of Franklin (City) has heretofore established and now operates and maintains a municipal waterworks by virtue of the provisions of KRS Chapter 96.320-96.510.
On April 5, 1967, both parties entered into and executed their first Water Purchase Agreement whereby the price for treated water to the District was at a rate of 21½ cents per 1,000 gallons per month.
Thereafter two supplemental agreements (August 26, 1982 and April 3, 1986), were executed which increased the price of water to the District to the rate of 84.78 cents per 1,000 gallons per month. Subsequently, on June 25,1990, the City adopted an ordinance which increased the water rate to all customers and specifically increased the water rate charged the District from 84.78 cents to $1.3478 per 1,000 gallons. On May 13, 1991, the City passed a second ordinance which increased only the rate charged the District from $1.3478 to $1.68 per 1,000 gallons. The District, however, continued to pay only the 1986 rate.
The City filed this action seeking damages for delinquent payments and a declaratory judgment that the three water purchase agreements were void. The trial court dismissed the action and concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. A three-*462judge panel of the Court of Appeals rendered a split decision reversing and remanding the case to Simpson Circuit Court. The majority opinion reasoned that the city was not a utility nor did its relationship acting as a supplier to a PSC-regulated utility bring it within the PSC’s jurisdiction.
The appellee forthrightly states that cities are specifically exempted from regulation by the Public Service Commission under the definitional term of KRS 278.010(3) which provides as follows:
“Utility” means any person except a city, who owns, controls or operates or manages any facility used or to be used for or in connection with: ... (d) The diverting, developing, pumping, impounding, distributing or furnishing of water to or for the public, for compensation; ....
The City states that there are no exceptions to the exemption afforded a city under the foregoing statutory provision. However, the legislature provides a rates and service exception specifically set forth in KRS 278.-040(2), which states:
The jurisdiction of the commission shall extend to all utilities in this state. .The commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of rates and service of utilities, but with that exception nothing in this chapter is intended to limit or restrict the police jurisdiction, contract rights or powers of cities or political subdivisions.
It is acknowledged by the parties that the PSC has only such authority that is granted to it by the legislature and it is clear that the legislature vested the PSC with exclusive control of rates and service of utilities. The legislature has conferred upon cities an exemption from the PSC’s power to regulate local utilities in every area except as to rates and service.
Profoundly, reference to a “city” under the statutory scheme includes city-owned utilities. We give no validity to the argument that since the City is exempt from regulation by the PSC, KRS 278.200 should be interpreted to apply only when the regulated utility is the provider, not the recipient, of the service. Simply put, the statute makes no such distinction. The statute has but one meaning — the City waives its exemption when it contracts with a regulated utility upon the subjects of rates and service.
Effective regulation of rates and service of public utilities resulted from the Kentucky General Assembly’s passage of the Public Service Commission Act of 1934. The primary issue on appeal is whether, under the act, a city waives its exemption from PSC regulation by contracting to supply a commodity to a PSC-regulated utility. The section of the original act creating the rates and service exception appeared in Carroll’s Code, 1936 Revised Version, Section 3952-27 which provided as follows:
Authority of the commission to change contract rates. — The commission shall have power, under the provisions of this act, to enforce, originate, establish, change and promulgate any rate, rates, joint rates, charges, tolls, schedules or service standards of any utility, subject to the provisions of this act, that are now fixed or that may in the future be fixed, by any contract, franchise or otherwise, between any municipality and any such utility, and all rights, privileges and obligations arising out of any such contracts and agreements regulating any such rates, charges, schedules or service standards, shall be subject to the jurisdiction and supervision of the commission; provided, however, that no such rate, charge, schedule or service standard shall be changed, nor any contract or agreement affecting same shall be abrogated or changed until and after a hearing has been had before the commission in the manner prescribed in this act.
Nothing in this section or elsewhere in this act contained is intended or shall be construed to limit or restrict the police jurisdiction, contract rights, or powers of municipalities or political subdivisions, except as to the regulation of rates and service, exclusive jurisdiction over which is lodged in the Public Service Commission.
Thus, any contract as to rates and service arising between a city and a utility required PSC authority. As the PSC, by express language, retained exclusive jurisdiction over regulation of rates and service, this simply *463created the rates and service exception which the trial court found as vesting the PSC with exclusive jurisdiction over a city’s attempt to affect utility rates or service. Benzinger v. Union Light, Heat, & Power Co., 293 Ky. 747, 170 S.W.2d 38 (1943), acknowledged the legislative intent of the act as to place the regulation of rates and service under the exclusive jurisdiction of the PSC. The aforementioned Carroll’s Code was revised and codified in 1942. The first paragraph resul-tantly appears in KRS 278.200, and the second paragraph reappears as KRS 278.040(2). Irrespective of subsequent codification, the effect and meaning of the rates and service exception continues to exist without modification. Simply put, both current sections of the statute are compatible.
The second sentence of KRS 278.040(2) is the “exception” to the general rule which exempts cities from PSC regulation. It provides:
The commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of rates and service of utilities, but with that exception nothing in this chapter is intended to limit or restrict the police jurisdiction, contract rights or powers of cities or political subdivisions. (Emphasis added).
Thus, when a city is involved, the sentence reflects unequivocally the legislature’s intent that the PSC exercise exclusive jurisdiction over utility rates and service.
Significantly, this sentence or subsection (2) of KRS 278.040 was addressed in Peoples Gas Co. of Kentucky v. City of Barbourville, 291 Ky. 805, 165 S.W.2d 567 (1942). As the initial sentence of KRS 278.040(2) directs that PSC jurisdiction extends to all utilities, there could be no reason to provide for the “exception” for the regulation of rates and service as pronounced in the second sentence of the statute if that exception were not intended to apply to cities which are otherwise plainly exempted from PSC jurisdiction by virtue of KRS 278.010(3) which has defined “utility” as “any person except a city.”
The rates and service exception to a city’s exemption from PSC regulatory jurisdiction is not avoidable by contract because of the following pi’ovisions of KRS 278.200:
The commission may, under the provisions of this chapter, originate, establish, change, promulgate and enforce any rate or service standard of any utility that has been or may be fixed by any contract, franchise or agreement between the utility and any city, and all rights, privileges and obligations arising out of any such contract, franchise or agreement, regulating any such rate or service standard, shall be subject to the jurisdiction and supervision of the commission, but no such rate or service standard shall be changed, nor any contract, franchise or agreement affecting it abrogated or changed, until a hearing has been had before the commission in the manner prescribed in this chapter. (Emphasis added).
We find that where contracts have been executed between a utility and a city, such as between the City of Franklin and Simpson County Water District, KRS 278.200 is applicable and requires that by so contracting the City relinquishes the exemption and is rendered subject to PSC rates and service regulation.
The City argues that the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to entertain the issues raised by appellee in this action. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Carter, 296 Ky. 30, 176 S.W.2d 81 (1943), and Louisville Extension Water Dist. v. Diehl Pump & Supply Co., Ky., 246 S.W.2d 585 (1952), are cited to demonstrate that there is no “exception to the exemption.” Such authority produces scant support for such reasoning as neither case concerned a rates and service issue for the supplying of a utilitarian product. To the contrary, one action involved unsatisfactory work arising from an oral contract, and the other arose from the execution of a contract for the furnishing of materials and the repair of pumps.
Neither do we accede to the City’s interpretation of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Louisville, 265 Ky. 286, 96 S.W.2d 695 (1936), but rather determine that there is nothing in the act intended or to be construed to limit police jurisdiction, contract rights, or powers of municipalities or political subdivisions, except as to the regulation of rates and service, exclusive jur*464isdiction over which is lodged in the Public Service Commission.
The City claims that rates charged by a municipality to its customers, including water districts, fall outside the PSC regulatory jurisdiction and offers McClellan v. Louisville Water Co., Ky., 351 S.W.2d 197 (1961), in support of its argument. This case and the additional cited authority involve the water rate charged by the municipally-owned utility to nonresident customers. The City’s argument is not supported by McClellan, supra, insofar as a municipality was not selling water to a PSC-regulated utility. At the time the McClellan opinion was rendered, water districts were exempt from PSC regulation. This court subsequently expressed the need for PSC regulation in cases dealing with city utilities, and the legislature, by its amendment of KRS 278.010(3), brought water districts within the PSC’s jurisdiction. Additionally, the legislature enacted KRS 278.015 which, of itself, removes any doubt that water districts were subject to PSC regulation.
The statutory exception applicable to rates and service as provided will prohibit cities from exercising control over rates charged and the service provided to customers of local utilities. Jurisdiction to regulate such rates and service has been exclusively vested in the PSC. The record in this case discloses a doubling of the wholesale water rates charged to the District within a two-year period, with a direct impact upon the District’s utility rates and service. Added to the force which the City sought to apply was a call to terminate sendee by declaring the parties’ contract null and void. It is apparent that the City, through its enhanced water sale ordinances, did not direct the setting of any particular rate schedule, but its action profoundly and directly impacts the District’s general revenue level, which is one of the first steps in rate making. The City’s action is an improper engagement in rate making and strongly supports PSC jurisdiction. The statutory definition of utility is not to serve as an impenetrable shield to afford the City immunity.
The City urges that the circuit court should bear the jurisdiction of this case for no other reason than it is one of contract interpretation. Were this the sole issue, we would state that matters of contract interpretation are well within the court’s expertise and not that of utility regulatory agencies. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 80 S.Ct. 1122, 4 L.Ed.2d 1208 (1960). But, again, the issue is whether Simpson Circuit Court has jurisdiction over the matters raised in the City’s complaint or whether jurisdiction was vested within the province of the PSC by the legislature and with the authority to do so flowing from the exercise of the police power of the state. See Southern Bell, supra.
The City’s unilateral adoption of the two water-rate ordinances doubled the water charge and, in no uncertain terms, was an act that directly related to the rate charged by the water district. The City’s declaration to hold the parties’ contracts null and void constitutes a practice relating to the service of the water district. The City’s analogy of comparing its sale of treated water to coal supplied to an electric utility bears little relationship to the issue herein. The manifest purpose of the Public Service Commission is to require and insure fair and uniform rates, prevent unjust discrimination, and prevent ruinous competition. City of Olive Hill v. Public Service Commission, 305 Ky. 249, 203 S.W.2d 68 (1947). Also, the service regulation over which the Commission was given jurisdiction refers clearly to the quantity and quality of the commodity furnished as contracted for with the facilities provided. Peoples Gas Co. of Kentucky v. City of Barbour-ville, supra.
While the city finds comfort in relying on City of Georgetown v. Public Service Commission, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 842 (1974), in its argument against the rates and service exception, we clearly discern that there is no existing support. The parties were engaged in a dispute of territorial jurisdiction, between a private utility and a city utility and the issue therein affected neither rates or service as it does in this case. Additionally, jurisdiction over the city was rejected because it was a “person” as defined by KRS 278.020(1). Thus, secondly, the rates and service exception had no relationship to the issue raised in City of Georgetown, supra.
*465The City candidly admits that the Public Service Commission has expertise in resolving disputes over rates and service but that construction of KRS 278.040(2) and KRS 278.200, as maintained by the District, creates a paradox and serves to illustrate that where no contract exists between a city and a regulated utility, the courts would be called upon to resolve rates and service disputes. However, from a practical point of view, there has always been a contract/agreement in place and in operation at the time a City supplied water to a utility. Once established by contract, such service can only be abrogated or changed after a hearing before the PSC. KRS 278.200. Fern Lake Co. v. Public Service Commission, Ky., 357 S.W.2d 701 (1962). The PSC acts as a quasi-judicial agency utilizing its authority to conduct hearings, render findings of fact and conclusions of law, and utilizing its expertise in the area and to the merits of rates and service issues.
The rates and service exception effectively insures, throughout the Commonwealth, that any water district consumer/customer that has contracted and become dependent for its supply of water from a city utility is not subject to either excessive rates or inadequate service.
The Court of Appeals’ opinion is reversed and the opinion and order of Simpson Circuit Court is affirmed.
STEPHENS, C.J., and LAMBERT and STUMBO, JJ., concur. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion in which LEIBSON and SPAIN, JJ., join.