United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 14, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 07-50009
Summary Calendar
JOHANNA WHITE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(1:05-CV-945)
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Johanna White contests the district court’s affirming the
Social Security Administration’s (SSA) determination that she is
not disabled. Our review is limited to: whether the
administrative law judge (ALJ) used the proper legal standard to
evaluate the evidence; and whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the record. E.g., Greenspan v. Shalala, 38
F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
White’s impairments include diabetes, hearing loss, and an arm
injury. She applied for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental social security income, pursuant to Titles II and XVI
of the Social Security Act. Applying the requisite five-step
sequential disability evaluation, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and
416.920, the ALJ found, inter alia: White had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability;
she did not have an impairment presumed to create disability; she
retained “the residual functional capacity to perform a significant
range of sedentary work” (RFC determination); and, along that line,
she was capable of performing a number of alternative sedentary
occupations (alternative-occupation determination). Accordingly,
the ALJ concluded White was not disabled and denied benefits. The
district court affirmed.
White maintains the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported
by substantial evidence. In reviewing for substantial evidence,
our court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the SSA. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236. A finding of
insubstantial evidence is proper only if no credible evidence or
medical findings exist to support the decision. Johnson v. Bowen,
864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988).
Based on our review of the record, the RFC determination is
adequately supported by objective medical evidence, including
examination results, physician reports, and medical expert
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testimony. In this regard, the post-hearing form submitted by one
of White’s physicians, which was explicitly considered by the ALJ,
is not inconsistent with this determination.
Relatedly, White contends the ALJ’s alternative-occupation
determination is inconsistent with both its RFC determination and
the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).
In making the alternative-occupation determination, the ALJ relied
on vocational expert (VE) testimony identifying a number of
relevant alternative occupations, all of which were classified as
“sedentary” by the DOT. Because the VE’s testimony, which White
did not challenge through cross-examination, was elicited by
hypothetical questions incorporating the RFC determination, such
reliance was proper. See Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 436 (5th
Cir. 1994); see also Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146-47 (5th Cir.
2000) (“claimants should not be permitted to scan the record for
implied or unexplained conflicts between the specific testimony of
an expert witness and the voluminous provisions of the DOT, and
then present that conflict as reversible error, when the conflict
was not deemed sufficient to merit adversarial development in the
administrative hearing”).
AFFIRMED
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