UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-7740
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONNIE GENE STUCKEY, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 21-6212
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONNIE GENE STUCKEY, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (4:07-cr-00095-RGD-JEB-1)
Submitted: September 14, 2021 Decided: October 1, 2021
Before AGEE, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Donnie Gene Stuckey, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Donnie Gene Stuckey, Jr., challenges the district
court’s orders denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,
§ 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239, and his subsequent motion for reconsideration of that
denial. In his motions, Stuckey raised several arguments, including that his serious medical
conditions made him particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 and that his post-sentencing
rehabilitation established that release was appropriate. The district court determined that
Stuckey’s medical conditions did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons for his
release even though some of those conditions—particularly his obesity and atrial
fibrillation—placed him at higher risk of complications from COVID-19. The court also
found that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not weigh in favor of Stuckey’s release,
given the serious nature of his underlying narcotics and firearms offenses and his extensive
criminal history. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district court’s orders and
remand for further proceedings.
The district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) if
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” The court must also
consider the § 3553(a) factors “‘to the extent that they are applicable.’” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329
(4th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally,
fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies
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on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.” United States v.
Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
While there is no “categorical . . . requirement” that a district court explicitly address
each of the defendant’s arguments in support of his compassionate-release motion, a court
“must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review”
in light of the circumstances of the particular case. United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181,
187-88 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a case is “relative[ly]
simpl[e],” this requirement is satisfied if the court’s order shows that it “was aware of the
arguments, considered the relevant sentencing factors, and had an intuitive reason” for
denying the motion. Id. at 190-91 (emphases and internal quotation marks omitted).
However, when a defendant “present[s] a ‘significant amount of post-sentencing mitigation
evidence,’ . . . ‘a more robust and detailed explanation’” is required. Id. at 190 (quoting
United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 396 (4th Cir. 2019)) (brackets omitted).
Here, the district court’s explanation does not reflect that it considered Stuckey’s
immunocompromised status due to his Vogt-Koyanagi-Harada disease and his use of
corticosteroids to treat that condition. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
COVID-19: People with Certain Medical Conditions, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/
2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (last visited
Sept. 30, 2021) (explaining that an immunocompromised state, as well as “[p]rolonged use
of corticosteroids,” can increase the risk of severe illness from COVID-19). Moreover, in
reaching its conclusion that Stuckey had not shown a particularized susceptibility to
COVID-19, the district court relied in part on statements in his medical records that he felt
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“safe in his environment”; however, these statements were made in February 2019 and
January 2020 and were not related to Stuckey’s concerns regarding his susceptibility to
COVID-19. Moreover, the fact that Stuckey had not previously suffered many
complications from his medical conditions does not mean that he would not be at more
serious risk than a person without those conditions if he were to contract COVID-19.
Finally, Stuckey presented a “mountain of new mitigating evidence” that the district court
did not address, including a letter from his prison counselor praising Stuckey’s
“dependable,” “conscientious,” and “consistent” behavior and noting that inmates came to
him “for positive guidance and advice”; evidence of Stuckey’s employment as the “head
orderly” in his housing unit, “a ‘trusted’ job position for inmates”; his prison counselor’s
opinion that he was “more than prepared for society”; and documentary evidence that he
had completed his GED and had successfully completed nineteen educational courses. See
Martin, 916 F.3d at 396-97 (remanding for district court to provide an “individualized
explanation for why Martin’s steps toward rehabilitation” did not warrant relief when she
presented a “mountain of new mitigating evidence that the sentencing court never
evaluated”). We are therefore unable to conduct a “meaningful appellate review” in light
of the particular circumstances of this case. See High, 997 F.3d at 189.
We thus vacate the district court’s orders and remand for further proceedings. We
express no view as to the merits of Stuckey’s compassionate release motion. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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