United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 23, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-70025
BOBBY WAYNE WOODS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas, Austin Division
(1:05-CV-00354)
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
In this successive habeas corpus appeal we must decide whether
Petitioner Bobby Wayne Woods is ineligible for execution because he
is mentally retarded. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the district court
that Woods has failed to show he is entitled to relief under the
deferential standards set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
I.
In 1998, a Texas state jury convicted Woods and sentenced him
to death for the murder of eleven-year-old Sarah Patterson during
the course of a kidnaping. The facts of Woods’ crime have been set
forth previously by this Court:1
In the early morning hours of April 30, 1997, Woods went
to the house of his former girlfriend, Schwana Patterson,
in Granbury, Texas. Though they had previously lived
together, the two had split up. Woods later admitted to
having used drugs before going to the house, including
“crank” and PCP. Schwana was not at home when Woods
arrived, but he found an open window into the bedroom
where Schwana's two children, Sarah, 11, and Cody, nine,
were sleeping. He grabbed Sarah by the foot; Cody awoke
to Sarah's screams as Woods beat her chest.
He forced the two children to leave through the window in
their nightclothes. Later investigation found Woods's
semen on Sarah's bedcover, indicating that he had had
sexual contact with her. This was borne out in other
evidence, including statements by Woods himself, Sarah's
friends, notes she had left in her diary indicating that
she hated Woods and wanted him gone, and that she had
contracted the sexually-transmitted disease Human
Papilloma Virus (“HPV”). Woods was also infected with
HPV. When Sarah's body was later found, forensic evidence
including larvae development in her traumatized genitals
also indicated that she had been sexually molested.
Woods took the children in his car to a cemetery.
Enroute, Cody, in the back seat, noticed a black-handled
knife in the back of the car. At the cemetery, Woods took
Cody out of the car and asked him if his mother was
seeing anyone else. He hit Cody and commenced strangling
him in front of the car. Cody later testified that he
thought he was going to die. He awoke later, crawled over
a fence, and attracted the attention of a horseback rider
who called the police.
The police later found Woods and told him that they had
the “whole story” from Cody. They asked him to tell them
1
We recognize that a recitation of the oft-grisly facts
involved in a death penalty case can, at times, be “irrelevant
and unnecessary.” See Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218, 2239
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, when the salient issue
is whether the Petitioner is mentally retarded, the circumstances
of his crime and his testimony at trial can be instructive in
evaluating the merits of his Atkins claim.
2
where to find Sarah, hoping that she was still alive.
Woods told them, “You will not find her alive. I cut her
throat.” He then led the police to Sarah's body and gave
them two written statements. In the statements, he
admitted to having had sexual contact with Sarah before
leaving the house, that he had taken drugs, and that
after Cody fell unconscious in the cemetery, Sarah had
started screaming. He left with her in the car toward a
bridge on highway 144. She continued to yell that she
would tell the police that he had hit Cody. He attempted
to quiet her by holding a knife to her throat. According
to his statement, Sarah jerked and the knife cut her
throat.
Her body was clothed in an inside-out shirt, a sports
bra, and a pair of shorts, without panties. Her throat
had been deeply cut, severing her larynx and several
major arteries and veins, causing massive external
bleeding that was the cause of her death.
In addition to finding Woods's semen on Sarah's blanket,
investigators found a large butcher knife, stained with
Sarah's blood, inside a trash bag that Woods had borrowed
from a neighbor the morning after he abducted Sarah and
Cody. The bag also contained a pawn ticket bearing
Woods's signature and address for items he admitted
stealing from the Patterson home. Sarah's blood was on
Woods's jersey, which was in the back of his car; her
panties were on the car's floorboard. There was evidence
that Woods had scratches on his face and arms on the day
after the murder that were not there the day before.
Woods was arrested and charged with, inter alia, capital
murder and was so indicted on June 4, 1997, in Hood
County, Texas. The indictment charged him with the murder
of Sarah Patterson in the course of committing or
attempting to commit the kidnaping of Sarah and Cody
Patterson, or in the alternative, the murder of Sarah in
the course of committing or attempting to commit the
aggravated sexual assault of Sarah. He was also indicted
for the attempted capital murder of Cody, arising out of
the same criminal transaction.
On Woods's motion, venue was changed to Llano County,
where he pleaded not guilty. At trial, Woods testified on
his own behalf and admitted to the general contours of
that morning's events, including the abductions, but not
to the murder. Instead, he offered a version which tended
3
to implicate his cousin. He was found guilty by the jury
on May 21, 1998. Following a punishment hearing, the jury
returned affirmative answers on May 28 on the issues
relating to Woods's future dangerousness and intent to
commit murder, and a negative answer on the existence of
mitigating circumstances to justify a life sentence. The
Llano County trial court sentenced Woods to death.
Woods v. Cockrell, 307 F.3d 353, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2002).
Woods appealed his conviction and sentence to the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals (TCCA), and the TCCA affirmed. Concurrent with
his direct appeal to the TCCA, Woods also filed a state application
for habeas corpus relief, which the state habeas court denied.
Woods then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with
the U.S. District Court, which it denied. Woods sought a
certificate of appealability (COA) from this Court, and we denied
his request in a published order. Woods v. Cockrell, 307 F.3d 353
(5th Cir. 2002). On April 8, 2003 Woods filed a successor petition
for habeas corpus relief in Texas state court raising two issues
for review, including his Atkins claim. The TCCA remanded the
Atkins claim to the state trial court and dismissed the second
claim as an abuse of the writ. On remand, the state trial court
conducted a full evidentiary hearing before entering findings of
fact and conclusions of law recommending relief be denied. The TCCA
adopted those findings and conclusions and denied relief.
Thereafter, Woods received permission from this Court to file
a successive federal habeas petition--although this Court only
authorized the petition on the issue “whether Woods is mentally
4
retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty according
to Atkins.” In re Woods, 155 F. App’x 132, 136 (5th Cir. 2005).
Woods filed the successive habeas petition with the district court,
and the district court (1) refused, for lack of jurisdiction, to
consider all claims not associated with Woods’ Atkins claim, and
(2) denied relief on Woods’s Atkins claim.
In reaching its conclusion, the district court first
considered whether Woods made a prima facie showing of an Atkins
claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C) (requiring a petitioner to
make a prima facie showing that he has met the requirements for
filing a successive habeas petition). Finding that Woods had
presented more than “minimally sufficient evidence” of mental
retardation, the district court agreed with this Court that Woods’
petition was proper and warranted fuller examination. The district
court then turned to the merits of Woods’ Atkins claim and denied
the petition because Woods failed to meet his “burden of proving,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the state court’s finding is
incorrect.” However, after denying relief, the district court
granted Woods a COA on his claim, concluding “the state court
record contained evidence on which some jurists would be willing to
conclude Woods is in fact mentally retarded.” See Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (discussing the requirements for
a COA to issue).
II.
5
In a habeas corpus appeal we review the federal district
court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law
de novo. Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 817 (5th Cir. 2006).
Further, we apply “the same standard of review to the state court’s
decision as the district court.” Coble v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 345, 349
(5th Cir. 2006). Woods filed his federal habeas petition after the
effective date of AEDPA, and consequently we apply the standards
set forth therein.
AEDPA provides that federal courts may only grant habeas
relief to a state prisoner if the state court’s adjudication on the
merits either: 1) “resulted in a decision contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or 2) “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1)-(2).
A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established
federal law under § 2254(d)(1) if “the state court applies a rule
that contradicts the governing law announced in Supreme Court
cases, or . . . the state court decides a case differently than the
Supreme Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”
Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A state court decision
constitutes an “unreasonable application” of clearly established
6
federal law under the same section if the court “identifies the
correct governing legal principle from Supreme Court precedent, but
applies that principle to the case in an objectively unreasonable
manner.” Id.
Under § 2254(d)(2), we also may grant a habeas corpus petition
if the state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). However, the state court’s factual
determinations are presumed to be correct, and Woods can only rebut
that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. §
2254(e)(1).
III.
Woods argues he is ineligible for the death penalty because he
is mentally retarded. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment protects against the execution of
mentally retarded individuals. 536 U.S. 304, 319-20 (2002)
(reasoning, in part, that mentally retarded offenders are less
culpable). The Supreme Court acknowledged that disagreement will
often arise “in determining which offenders are in fact retarded”
and it left to the states the task of defining mental retardation
and “developing appropriate ways to enforce th[is] constitutional
restriction.” Id. at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In response, TCCA held that defendants and petitioners must
establish their mental retardation, as defined by either the
7
American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR)2 or the Texas
Health and Safety Code, by a preponderance of the evidence. Ex
Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7-8, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).3 The
AAMR definition referenced in Atkins and Briseno has three
requirements:
1) subaverage general intellectual functioning, generally
defined as an IQ below 70;
2) accompanied by related limitations in adaptive
functioning defined as significant limitations in an
individual's effectiveness in meeting the standards of
maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or
social responsibility that are expected for his or her
age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical
assessment and, usually, standardized scales;4 and
3) onset prior to the age of 18.
Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 158, 163 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (referring to the definition in the ninth
edition of the AAMR’s Mental Retardation: Definition,
Classification, and Systems of Support).
2
The Supreme Court cited this definition in Atkins. 536 U.S.
at 309 n.3.
3
To the extent that Woods argues this allocation of the
burden of proof is inappropriate and that a jury should determine
his mental retardation, we have previously rejected that
argument. See In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2003).
4
The AAMR finds this prong satisfied when “limitations in
two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas [are
present]: communication, self-care, home living, social skills,
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional
academics, leisure, and work.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.3.
8
Alternatively, the Texas Health and Safety Code succinctly
defines mental retardation as “significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in
adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period.”
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 591.003(13).
The state habeas court held an evidentiary hearing on this
issue and we will summarize the evidence presented by both parties.
Woods relied primarily on the testimony and written report of Dr.
Richard C. Schmitt, who interviewed Woods and Woods’ grandmother
and reviewed Woods’ records before concluding that Woods was mildly
mentally retarded.
Regarding Woods’ general intellectual functioning (the first
AAMR prong), Schmitt conducted a full scale Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-III IQ test (WISC) and reported that Woods
scored a sixty-eight. Regarding Woods’ limitations in adaptive
functioning (the second AAMR prong), Schmitt administered the
Scales of Independent Behavior Test-Revised, using an interview
with Woods’ grandmother to gauge the limitations in Woods’ adaptive
functioning. Based on this test, Schmitt concluded that Woods was
functioning at or near his age level in every adaptive behavior
category and scale except for “Money and Value.” Despite these test
results, Schmitt testified that Woods suffered from significant
limitations in two of the nine adaptive functioning categories:
functional academics and work. See supra note 4 (listing the nine
9
adaptive skill areas). As to the third prong--onset before age
eighteen--Schmitt concluded that Woods’ significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning has been ongoing since he first entered
formal education.
The State also presented evidence on each of the three
required prongs. Regarding Woods’ general intellectual functioning,
the State introduced Woods’ childhood WISC IQ scores, attained
while he was in the first and fourth grades, of seventy-eight and
eighty. Also, the State introduced evidence that Woods received an
eighty-six on the California Short Form examination in 1972, and an
eighty-three on a short-form IQ test administered when Woods
entered the Texas prison system in 1998.
As to Woods’ limitations in adaptive functioning, the State
introduced affidavits from Woods’ former employers at the Round the
Clock Grill, where Woods worked as a short-order cook. The
affidavits indicate that Woods was a “good” cook who required
little training. The State also relied on Dr. John M. Pita’s
report, written after Pita examined Woods to determine his
competency to stand trial for the murder. Pita concluded that
Woods’ adaptive behavior was within the normal range.5
On the issue of whether Woods’ alleged mental retardation had
an onset before age eighteen, the State presented testimony from
several of Woods’ former teachers who stated they did not consider
5
Pita also ultimately opined that Woods “is not mentally
retarded.”
10
Woods to be mentally retarded when he was in their respective
classes.
Based on this evidence, the state habeas court concluded that
Woods failed to prove each required element by a preponderance of
the evidence. Regarding Woods’ general intellectual functioning,
the court noted, in part, the existence of four IQ test scores
placing Woods above the seventy-point cutoff. It also found
compelling the fact that Dr. Schmitt, the defense’s expert, was the
only person to test Woods’ IQ below seventy and the only expert who
has tested Woods and concluded that he is mentally retarded. The
court further noted that Woods’ lowest IQ score was attained when
he had an incentive to perform poorly, but Woods’ IQ scores were
higher when he had no such incentive.
Regarding Woods’ limitations in adaptive functioning, the
court found persuasive Dr. Pita’s conclusion that Woods’ adaptive
behaviors were within the normal range and Dr. Schmitt’s conclusion
that Woods was functioning at or near his age level in every
category except one. It was also influenced by the affidavits from
his former employers.
Lastly, regarding the third prong, the court found persuasive
the fact that “no record exists indicating that Woods was ever
diagnosed with mental retardation during his developmental years.”
The TCCA adopted the state habeas court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law and held that Woods “has not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded.” Our
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task, then, is to determine whether the state court’s determination
that Woods failed to satisfy the Atkins requirements is either (1)
contrary to or involves an unreasonable application of Atkins or
(2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
We agree that Woods has failed to make the required showing.
First, the state habeas court’s conclusion that Woods failed to
demonstrate that he suffered from subaverage general intellectual
functioning was not unreasonable. Woods presented expert testimony
to support his contention, but the state habeas court chose to give
more weight to Woods’ childhood IQ test scores than the score
attained in Dr. Schmitt’s testing. We find this reasonable in light
of the testimony that the childhood scores were more reliable, in
part because Woods’ recent scores could be the result of a
motivation to score poorly.
Second, Woods submitted very little evidence that he suffered
from significant limitations in adaptive functioning. Although Dr.
Schmitt testified that Woods had significant deficits in two
adaptive skill areas, Schmitt conceded in his report that Woods was
within the normal range in every category on the Scales of
Independent Behavior Test, except Money and Value. Dr. Schmitt
further admitted that Woods functioned at or above his age level
with respect to the Broad Independence test, which he stated was
similar to an IQ score for adaptive functioning. Lastly, any
12
evidence favoring Woods on this prong was significantly diminished
by the evidence of Woods’ job performance at the Round the Clock
Grill.
Third, in light of its findings on the first two prongs, it is
axiomatic that the state court’s conclusion that Woods failed to
prove onset of mental retardation before age eighteen was
reasonable.
In sum, the state court’s conclusion--that Woods failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally
retarded--is not contrary to Atkins because the state court did not
apply a rule that contradicted Atkins, and Woods can cite no
materially indistinguishable case decided differently by the
Supreme Court. See Nelson, 472 F.3d at 292. Woods argues that the
state habeas court merely found that Woods was “not mentally
retarded enough”--contrary to the rule in Atkins. This statement is
disingenuous at best. The state habeas court analyzed the evidence
under the proper AAMR framework and concluded that Woods was not
mentally retarded.6
Further, given the substantial evidence presented indicating
that Woods is not mentally retarded, we cannot say that the state
court applied Atkins in an objectively unreasonable manner. See id.
6
Woods also argues that Ex parte Briseno, relied on by the
state habeas court, is contrary to Atkins in the way it allows
courts to evaluate limitations in adaptive behavior. See 135
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We find nothing in Briseno that
is inconsistent with Atkins in this regard.
13
Lastly, to the extent Woods argues that the state court’s decision
was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2), he has failed to
rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption that the
state court’s factual findings are correct. See Clark v.
Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting a state
court’s determination under § 2254(d)(2) is a question of fact);
see also 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court denying federal habeas corpus relief.
AFFIRMED.
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