[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
January 25, 2007
No. 06-13813 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00021-CV-CDL-4
LAURA PALMER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STEWART COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
BETTYE RAY, Dr., individually
and in her official capacity
as Superintendant of Stewart
County School District,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 25, 2007)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Laura Palmer, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order
dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1981 disparate pay claim against Bettye Ray as barred
by the statute of limitations. Palmer, a black woman, brought her initial suit
against Stewart County School District (“SCSD”) and Dr. Bettye Ray, individually
and in her official capacity. She alleged, among other things, racial discrimination
and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. During the bench trial,
the district court granted judgment as a matter of law on Palmer’s discriminatory
pay claims because the claims were time-barred. The court found in favor of
SCSD and Ray on all Palmer’s claims except her claim for back overtime pay
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Palmer appealed and we vacated solely as to the § 1981 pay discrimination
claims brought against Ray in her individual capacity. We asked the district court
to consider whether Palmer’s cause of action could have been brought under §
1981 prior to the 1991 amendments. Palmer v. Stewart County Sch. Dist., No. 05-
15721, slip op. at 6 (11th Cir. May 10, 2006). On remand, the district court found
that the plaintiff’s pay discrimination claim related to her initial terms of
employment, and therefore were actionable under § 1981 prior to the amendments
and now time-barred. Palmer appeals, arguing that her claim became actionable
only after the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments, and therefore should be
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658 and not time-barred.
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Standard of Review
We review the district court’s grant of a judgment as a matter of law de
novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2000). We review the district
court’s “interpretation and application of a statute of limitations de novo.” United
States v. Carrell, 252 F.3d 1193, 1198 (11th Cir. 2001).
Discussion
Palmer argues that the catch-all statute of limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 1658
applies to her claim, because her cause of action would not have been actionable
prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that amended § 1981. Specifically, she
alleges the salary modifications that were made during her first four months of
employment would not have been actionable under Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-82, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989).
In Patterson, the Supreme Court limited claims under § 1981 to those
alleging discrimination in the formation of new contracts or in the use of legal
processes to enforce existing contracts. 491 U.S. at 176-82. Congress quickly
amended the statute to provide coverage of a broader scope of claims, but prior to
doing so passed § 1658. Section 1658 created a “catch-all” statute of limitations
that applies a four year limitations period to causes of action that came available
after its passage. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). This statute of limitations applies to claims
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under § 1981 that were not actionable before amendments. Jones v. R.R. Donnelly
& Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382, 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1845, 158 L. Ed. 2d 645 (2004).
Actions which were available prior to the amendments are still subject to a
“borrowed” statute of limitations, which in Georgia is two years. Id.; Hill v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 841 F.2d 1533, 1545-1546 (11th
Cir. 1988).
In her complaint, Palmer alleged only that Ray discriminated against her
when she began her employment by not offering her the same pay and benefits as
the white employee who previously held her position received. She did not allege
any wrongdoing regarding salary modifications. At the bench trial on her other
claims, Palmer introduced evidence regarding the modifications that had occurred
in the first four months of her employment. Despite this later evidence, Palmer’s §
1981 claim was that she suffered discrimination at contract formation and Palmer
could have brought this claim prior to Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Because her claim was cognizable prior to the amendments, the system of
borrowed statute of limitations applies, and her claim is time barred. Therefore, we
affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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