United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 13, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-10829
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TYNICE NICOLE HALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:06-CR-20-2
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Before DEMOSS, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Tynice Nicole Hall appeals her conviction following a jury
trial for conspiracy and substantive drug offenses involving
powder and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and 846; possession of firearms in furtherance of drug
trafficking crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and
receipt of firearms by a person under felony indictment, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(1)(D) and 922(n). She first
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 06-10829
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Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence at trial showed that Hall’s residence was used as a
stash house for drugs by her boyfriend, who was the main target
of the investigation. Police surveillance revealed that Hall’s
boyfriend visited her residence before providing drugs to
cooperating individuals. Police found large quantities of crack
and powder cocaine inside Hall’s bedroom, where Hall was found
alone on the day of the arrest. Two loaded firearms, one in
Hall’s dresser and one in a bag near the bed, were also found in
the bedroom in close proximity to the drugs.
Inside Hall’s kitchen trash bag police found 12 one-kilogram
wrappers and numerous baggies with cocaine residue. They also
discovered a large quantity of baking soda in the kitchen.
Hall’s clothing tested positive for the presence of cocaine.
Hall showed police several hiding places in the house used to
store cocaine and told the officers how many wrappers were in her
trash and how many rounds were loaded in one of the firearms.
She further gave several incriminating statements to police after
her arrest, admitting that her boyfriend used her home to store
and cook his drugs and conduct drug transactions.
Based on the evidence presented a rational jury could
conclude that Hall agreed to allow her boyfriend to use her home
as a base of operation for his drug business and knowingly
participated in the conspiracy. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Paul, 142 F.3d 836, 840
No. 06-10829
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(5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jaramillo, 42 F.3d 920, 923
(5th Cir. 1995). The same evidence supporting the conspiracy
conviction is also sufficient to support the conviction for the
underlying substantive drug offenses. See United States v.
Pompa, 434 F.3d 800, 807 (5th Cir. 2005). A rational jury could
also conclude that Hall possessed the two loaded firearms in
furtherance of the drug trafficking offenses. See United States
v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414-15 (5th Cir. 2000).
Because Hall has not briefed the sufficiency of the evidence with
respect to the offense of receipt of firearms by a person under
felony indictment, that issue is deemed abandoned. See Yohey v.
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
Hall next argues that her 360-month sentence for the drug
offenses is unreasonable because it does not comport with the
sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). After United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), district courts must consider the
Sentencing Guidelines along with the sentencing factors set forth
in § 3553(a) before imposing a sentence. United States v. Mares,
402 F.3d 511, 518-19 (5th Cir. 2005). The district court here
sentenced Hall at the bottom of the guideline range for the drug
offenses and expressly indicated that the sentence was meant to
provide adequate deterrence and promote respect for the law. The
court also indicated that it had considered all the § 3553(a)
factors. The court heard numerous witnesses at sentencing and
argument from defense counsel. The court’s sentencing colloquy
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indicate that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and
exercised its discretion to impose a sentence at the bottom of
the guideline range. Hall has not shown that the sentence is
unreasonable. See Mares, 402 F.3d at 518-19.
Finally, Hall argues that the district court failed to make
sufficient findings at sentencing to support an adjustment for
obstruction of justice. The district court found that Hall had
testified falsely at trial concerning material facts, and it
applied the enhancement due to Hall’s perjury. Although the
court did not explicitly address each element of perjury, its
finding in light of the immediately preceding discussion with
counsel for the Government and for Hall sufficiently encompassed
the factual findings necessary for perjury. See United States v.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1993); United States v. Creech, 408
F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 2005); U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
AFFIRMED.