United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 25, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-20573
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GUADALUPE MENDOZA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(4:04-CR-108-2)
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In a bench trial held on stipulated evidence, Guadalupe
Mendoza was convicted of conspiracy to possess, and aiding and
abetting the possession, with intent to distribute, five kilograms
or more of cocaine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii). He challenges the district court’s
denial, following an evidentiary hearing, of his motion to suppress
evidence seized pursuant to a consented-to search. The evidentiary
hearing was held before a magistrate judge, who recommended
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
granting the motion. The district court instead denied it, in a
comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion.
On 20 February 2004, law enforcement personnel, having
initiated surveillance of Mendoza’s residence, observed, inter
alia, Mendoza’s accompanying a vehicle from his garage to a parking
lot, where it was picked up by another individual. After a traffic
stop of that vehicle, the individual consented to its being
searched, which revealed 23 bundles of cocaine concealed in a
hidden compartment.
In order to determine Mendoza’s involvement, Officers executed
an investigatory stop of his vehicle, obtaining his written consent
to search his residence and vehicles surrounding it. The search
revealed, inter alia: approximately $476,000; and packaging
material, including electrical tape, resembling that used for the
earlier-seized cocaine.
For the denial of a suppression motion, a district court’s
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; its conclusions of
law, de novo. E.g., United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147
(5th Cir. 1993). The evidence is reviewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party. E.g., id.
Mendoza first contends there was no reasonable suspicion
supporting stopping his vehicle. Of course, law-enforcement
officers may conduct a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle and
its occupants upon reasonable suspicion “criminal activity may be
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afoot”. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). “‘Reasonable
suspicion’ is considerably easier for the government to establish
than probable cause.” United States v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530, 532
(5th Cir. 1993). There need only be “some minimal level of
objective justification for the officer[s’] actions, measured in
[the] light of the totality of the circumstances”. United States
v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
Mendoza does not contest, inter alia: the association of his
residence, and a vehicle registered in his name, with previous
drug-trafficking investigations; prior to the vehicle drop-off, his
being observed purchasing, inter alia, electrical tape, and the
vehicle’s being moved into his garage, where it remained for
approximately four hours; and his presence at the drop-off. Based
on the totality of the circumstances, there was objective
justification for stopping Mendoza’s vehicle. See id.
Mendoza next maintains his consent was not voluntary. A
district court’s voluntariness-of-consent determination is reviewed
for clear error, in the light of: (1) the voluntariness of the
defendant’s custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant’s cooperation
with the police; (4) his awareness of his right to refuse consent;
(5) his education and intelligence; and (6) his belief no
incriminating evidence will be found. E.g., United States v.
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Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir. 1993). No single factor is
dispositive or controlling. E.g., id.
Although, upon effecting the investigatory stop, some Officers
approached Mendoza’s vehicle with their firearms drawn, the
evidence established, inter alia, Mendoza: was not physically
restrained prior to giving his initial consent; was calm and
appeared “relaxed” during the stop; cooperated with the Officers
and answered their questions; and was informed of his right to
refuse consent. Moreover, Mendoza did not present evidence of:
the Officers’ having pointed their firearms at him, or any
occupants of his vehicle; any Officer’s having displayed a firearm
while obtaining his consent; or his lack of understanding of the
written consent forms or his right to refuse such consent.
Accordingly, he fails to show the district court’s voluntariness-
of-consent determination was clearly erroneous. See United States
v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 934, 939 (5th Cir. 1997); Kelley, 981
F.2d at 1470 (“Where ... a finding of consent [is based] on the
oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous
standard is particularly strong [because] the judge had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED
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