Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 6, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-1809
Lower Tribunal No. 20-23864
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The State of Florida,
Appellant,
vs.
In Re: Forfeiture of $133,888.00 in U.S. Currency,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Eig,
Judge.
Katherine Fernandez Rundle, State Attorney, and Adam C. Korn,
Assistant State Attorney, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
Before LOGUE, SCALES and GORDO, JJ.
GORDO, J.
The State of Florida appeals the trial court’s order denying its
application for seizure pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. We
have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). The State argues the
trial court erred in denying its application as the evidence presented was
sufficient to establish probable cause based on the totality of the
circumstances. We agree, reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This seizure proceeding arose out of a Financial Crimes Strike Force
investigation involving narcotics trafficking, gold smuggling and money
laundering near the Seybold building in Downtown Miami. As part of the
investigation, detectives conducted surveillance on three individuals in a
black vehicle. Two of the vehicle’s occupants were seen entering and
leaving two businesses in the Seybold building, while handling bundles of
U.S. currency, which they retrieved from an Adidas bag located in the
vehicle.
A few hours later, the vehicle pulled into a condominium complex. The
driver, identified as Nicolas Forero, got out of the driver’s seat and retrieved
the Adidas bag from the trunk. Detectives walked towards Forero in an effort
to engage in a consensual encounter. As the detectives identified
themselves to Forero, he immediately placed the Adidas bag on the ground
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and voluntarily told detectives the bag contained cash. Forero stated the
bag contained “around $130,000” in cash, he did not own the currency and
was instructed by a friend named “Diego,” who lives in Colombia, to deliver
it to a person named “Angelica.” The detectives also interviewed the other
two occupants of the vehicle, who both stated the currency did not belong to
them and could not explain the purpose of the currency.
Shortly thereafter, a certified drug-detection canine was called to sniff
the bag. The canine alerted to the bag containing the currency, signaling it
had recently been in contact with narcotics. Despite not being its owner,
Forero consented to a physical search of the bag. The bag contained
$133,888.00 in U.S. currency comprised of bundles of twenty-dollar bills
wrapped in rubber bands. The currency was then impounded, and Forero
and the other passengers were served with notice of the seizure.
Pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, the State filed an
application for order determining probable cause and a sworn affidavit by
Investigator Joseph Guell, a twenty-eight-year veteran of the Miami-Dade
Police Department trained in money laundering and illegal narcotics
investigations. In his affidavit, the investigator described how the alert from
the certified drug-detection canine indicated that the currency had been in
close or actual proximity to a significant amount of narcotics. He further
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detailed the manner in which the currency was packaged is commonly used
in the narcotics trafficking trade as “quick count” bundles, which is a method
used by money launderers during money laundering and narcotics
transactions.
No response to the application was filed. The trial court denied the
application, stating the affidavit did not establish probable cause for the
seizure of the currency. 1
This appeal followed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A trial court’s order determining whether the facts presented are
“legally sufficient to support a finding of probable cause pursuant to the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act . . . is reviewed de novo.” Miami-Dade
Cnty. v. Forfeiture of $26,474.00 in U.S. Currency, 172 So. 3d 455, 457 (Fla.
3d DCA 2015). Under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, section
932.701, Florida Statutes, probable cause is established where the State can
show that under “the totality of the facts presented . . . [it had] probable cause
to believe that a nexus exists between the article seized and the narcotics
1
We note that the detectives’ interaction with the suspects involved in this
case began as a consensual encounter and at no time has anyone raised a
Fourth Amendment challenge related to the search of the bag or encounter
with the suspects in these forfeiture proceedings.
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activity, whether or not the use of the contraband article can be traced to a
specific narcotics transaction.” § 932.701(2)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. The State must
show, “the information relied upon . . . is adequate and sufficiently reliable to
warrant the belief by a reasonable person that a violation had occurred.”
Lobo v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t, 505 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987);
Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Frey, 965 So. 2d 199, 200–01
(Fla. 5th DCA 2007). The State’s reasonable belief must be “more than mere
suspicion, but it can be created by less than prima facia proof.” Lobo, 505
So. 2d at 623. Probable cause may also be established by circumstantial
evidence. See id.
In Lobo, this Court found that a “large amount of money . . . in
combination with . . . the method of packaging the money [in quick count
bundles]; the fact it was carried in a duffel bag; the conflicting statements by
the appellant and her passenger as to the source of the money; and the alert
by the drug detection dog” was sufficient to establish probable cause. Id.
Additionally, we have considered an owner’s inconsistent explanations as to
the source and use of the currency a persuasive factor in determining
probable cause exists. See Miami-Dade Police Dep’t v. Forfeiture of
$15,875.51, 54 So. 3d 595, 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (using an owner’s
explanation that the currency came from his lawn business, and he was
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using it to buy a car, as a factor for determining probable cause existed
because the owner could not describe the type of car or produce proof of the
lawn business); State Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Holguin,
909 So. 2d 956, 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (considering an owner’s
unsupported statement that he obtained the currency in a lawsuit, and was
on his way to purchase a condominium on Miami Beach a factor for finding
probable cause existed).
It is the State’s burden to prove probable cause, which may be
“satisfied by the aggregation of facts, even if each fact, standing alone, may
be insufficient to meet the government’s burden.” Holguin, 909 So. 2d at
959. The State argues that the facts here are enough to establish probable
cause of a nexus between the seized money and illegal narcotics activity.
We agree.
The facts attested to by the officer supporting the probable cause
application are as follows: (1) questioning conducted pursuant to an
investigation involving narcotics trafficking, gold smuggling and money
laundering; (2) the large amount of currency found in an Adidas bag, which
was previously kept in the trunk of a vehicle; (2) the currency was packaged
in “quick count” bundles commonly carried by drug dealers; (3) a certified
drug-detection canine alerted to the currency, indicating it had recently been
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in close or actual proximity to a significant amount of narcotics; (4) Forero
claimed that he was delivering the money to a woman for a Colombian friend
but could not provide any identifying information; (5) Forero failed to explain
why the money was being delivered to a residence rather than a business;
(6) all three of the vehicle’s passengers had inconsistent or non-existent
explanations for the source of the currency; and (7) all three of the vehicle’s
passengers denied ownership of the currency.
While each of these facts, standing alone, may be insufficient to meet
the State’s burden, we find the aggregation of these facts based on the
totality of the circumstances sufficient to satisfy the State’s burden.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the State’s application
for determining probable cause for seizure and remand the case for further
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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