IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1503
Filed October 6, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAYMES ANTHONY STARK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, John M. Wright,
Judge.
A defendant challenges his conviction for third-degree burglary as a habitual
offender. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Greer, J., and Doyle, S.J.*
* Senior judge assigned by order under Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2021).
2
TABOR, Presiding Judge.
A jury convicted Jaymes Stark of burglarizing an unoccupied vehicle. In
challenging that conviction, he contends the district court should have excluded
statements he made to investigating officers. Because we find Stark was in
custody when he confessed to being inside the vehicle, and the officers failed to
give Miranda warnings1 before questioning him, the court should have granted his
motion to suppress. We reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial.2
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
In March 2020, Heather McKannan was working as a certified nursing
assistant on the overnight shift at the River Hills Village retirement center in
Keokuk. When she went outside for a smoke break around 4 a.m., she realized
she might not have locked her car, a silver Chevy Impala. Looking across the back
parking lot, she saw a man standing next to the Impala. As she walked to her car,
he moved toward nearby dumpsters. Once inside her car, she noticed her pack of
Marlboro No. 27 cigarettes missing from the middle console and two checkbooks
gone from her purse. Fearing the intruder had taken her belongings, McKannan
called the police.
Keokuk police officers Tanner Walden, Zeth Baum, and Joshua Marroquin
responded to the call. Officer Walden discovered Jaymes Stark in the back parking
lot.3 Walden turned on the patrol car’s “white LED scene lights, and an individual
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Because the suppression issue is dispositive, we need not address Stark’s claim
that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his objection to alleged
burden-shifting during the trial.
3 Officer Marroquin first went to the front of the retirement center to speak with
McKannan but later joined the other two officers in the back.
3
came out from behind a large AC unit on the back of the building matching the
description given from the complainant.” Officer Baum’s body camera captured
their conversation with Stark. Baum had a long acquaintance with Stark, reflected
by the fact that they addressed each other by first name.
Officer Walden first confronted Stark about the report of a car burglary.
Stark denied entering the Impala or taking McKannan’s belongings. To verify his
denial, Walden asked Stark to empty his pockets. When Stark did so, he set down
an array of items on a retaining wall, including a marijuana pipe. Stark pleaded
with the officers not to take him to jail, explaining that he recently had neck surgery.
Officer Baum told Stark he was not going to take him to jail over drug
paraphernalia. Stark expressed embarrassment and admitted to the officer that
he was homeless.
Stark also worried that his actions would get his girlfriend Amber Swindler
into trouble. Swindler also worked at River Hills, and Stark said he stopped by to
see if she could give him a ride. Swindler drove a silver Kia Spectra. Stark claimed
he mistook the Impala for the Spectra in the River Hills parking lot.
When questioned by Officer Baum at the scene, Stark continued to deny
entering McKannan’s car or taking her checkbook or wallet.4 Another officer
searched under a nearby air-conditioning unit and found a bottle of pills prescribed
to Stark, along with a pack of Marlboro No. 27 cigarettes. Concerned Stark had
taken other items from McKannan’s car, Baum started this exchange.
Baum: I’m trying to help you avoid going up to the jail tonight
but you’re not helping me here.
4The officers asked about a missing wallet, though at trial McKannan described
having two checkbooks, one of which contained her credit cards and cash.
4
Stark: What do you need from me, man?
Baum: I need to know where that wallet and checkbook’s at.
Stark: Honestly, I didn’t take it, I promise man.
Officer Baum then told Stark that “somebody” saw him inside the vehicle,
though McKannan had not reported that fact to police. Stark asked again: “What
do you need from me?” The officer said: “I want to know where that stuff is.” Stark
insisted: “I did not take anything out of that car.” Officer Baum then told Stark he
understood he was in a tough spot, being homeless and having “a drug addiction
to try to feed.”
Eventually, Stark returned to the question: “What are you going to do for me
so I don’t have to go to jail tonight?” The officer repeated: “I told you I want to
know where that wallet and checkbook’s at. That’s where we’re at, man, I want
her to have her stuff back.”
It’s then that Stark appeared motivated to confess. He asked: “Can I say
something that’s not under Miranda?” Baum replied: “I haven’t given you a
Miranda warning. You’re not under arrest at this point.” Stark started to ask, “so
if I say something, are you going to . . .” but then paused, shook his head, and
returned to his denials. He said: “I didn’t see a checkbook, I didn’t rummage
through nothing.” The officer seized on Stark’s hesitancy, saying: “And you were
just about to tell me something, because you asked about Miranda and stuff like
that.” The officer then quipped, “Stuff doesn’t just disappear into thin air.”
Stark replied, “She has to know where it’s at, tell her to look in the whole
car.” Getting more and more emotional, Stark said: “It’s in there. It’s in the car.”
Baum asked: “Did you leave it in the car?” And Stark finally answered: “Yes.”
Baum followed up: “Where at in the car? Where did you leave it at?” Stark
5
confessed: “It’s in the boot.” Stark added that he thought he was in his girlfriend’s
car.
The officers then handcuffed Stark. When Stark asked if he was going to
jail, Officer Baum advised he was still not under arrest. Baum then went inside the
retirement center and accompanied McKannan to her car, now parked in front. At
Baum’s suggestion, she checked inside the boots that she left on the floorboard.
As Stark predicted, she found her checkbooks inside one of the boots. She denied
keeping her checkbooks there. McKannan also identified her pack of Marlboro No.
27 cigarettes among Stark’s belongings seized in the parking lot.
After completing their investigation, the officers transported Stark to the
police station. But rather than booking him into the jail that morning, Officer Baum
issued him a citation with a court date. The State later charged Stark with a class
“D” felony: burglary in the third degree of an unoccupied vehicle, second offense,
as a habitual offender. See Iowa Code §§ 713.1, .6A(2), 902.8, .9 (2019).
Stark moved to suppress his statements to the police. The motion alleged
he was taken into custody and interrogated by the officers. The motion also
asserted a promise of leniency induced his statements. The State resisted,
arguing Stark was not in custody when questioned. The resistance also disputed
that Officer Baum made an improper promise of leniency.
After a hearing, the district court denied the motion without analysis:
The Motion to Suppress is overruled. Without setting forth in greater
detail, the Court concludes that the Defendant’s statements were not
made while he was in custody. Therefore, no Miranda warning was
necessary. The Defendant’s statements to officers may be used in
the Plaintiff’s case in chief.
6
A jury convicted Stark as charged. The district court sentenced him to an
indeterminate fifteen-year prison term with a three-year mandatory minimum. He
now appeals.
II. Jurisdiction
We start our legal analysis by determining whether we can hear Stark’s
appeal. The district court entered judgment and sentence on November 9, 2020.
Stark filed a pro se notice of appeal three days later. That step was problematic
because he was still represented by his trial attorney. See Iowa Code § 814.6A
(2020) (prohibiting persons who are represented by counsel from filing “any pro se
document” in any Iowa court). Still, the district court certified the notice of appeal
on November 13. The next day, the court appointed the state appellate defender
to handle Stark’s appeal.
In August 2021, the appellate defender filed a second notice of appeal and
an application for delayed appeal. As his first line of defense, Stark argues his pro
se notice was adequate to confer jurisdiction on our court despite the prohibition
in section 814.6A. Yet he recognizes that we have dismissed an appeal when a
represented applicant for postconviction relief filed a pro se notice. See Boring v.
State, No. 20-0129, 2021 WL 2453045, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 16, 2021)
(addressing similar prohibition in Iowa Code section 822.3A). So Stark
alternatively seeks a delayed appeal. See State v. Anderson, 308 N.W.2d 42, 46
(Iowa 1981) (granting delayed appeal where party “made a good faith effort to
appeal and at all times clearly intended to appeal”).
7
We asked the State for a response. The State argues the pro se notice of
appeal was a nullity. But the State acknowledges Stark expressed his intent to
appeal and made a good faith effort to do so by filing a pro se notice. The State
admits the failure by Stark’s trial counsel to ensure the notice of appeal complied
with section 814.6A is the type of error that should be overcome by the grant of a
delayed appeal. We agree and grant Stark’s request for a delayed appeal.
III. Miranda Violation
On appeal, Stark contends his incriminating statements to the Keokuk
officers were inadmissible for two reasons: (1) he was subjected to custodial
interrogation without Miranda warnings and (2) his statements were involuntary
because Officer Baum made promises of leniency.
We can resolve this appeal on the alleged Miranda violation.5 We review
that constitutional claim de novo. State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676, 679–80 (Iowa
2009). That means we make an independent evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances, while deferring to any findings of fact offered by the district court.
State v. Miranda, 672 N.W.2d 753, 758 (Iowa 2003). Our deference is limited here
because the district court offered no fact findings in denying the motion to
suppress. And beyond the evidence from the suppression hearing, we may also
consider the evidence introduced at trial. State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553,
557 (Iowa 1997).
5 In its appellee’s brief, the State asserts, “Although the record is somewhat
unclear, arguably none of Defendant’s arguments are preserved for appeal.” We
disagree. Stark brought up custody in his suppression motion. Likewise, the
county attorney resisted, and the district court denied the motion on that ground.
8
At issue are the rights “now familiar to much of the American public.”
Miranda, 672 N.W.2d at 758–59. Suspects subjected to custodial interrogation
must first be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have an
attorney present during questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. They must
also be advised “anything [they say] can be used against [them] in a court of law.”
Id. And “if [they] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for [them] prior to
any questioning” if they wish. Id. If police do not carry out this prophylactic
measure, the evidence they obtain during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible.
Id.
The State concedes the police failed to inform Stark of his Miranda rights
before he confessed to entering McKannan’s car. So the question before us is
whether Stark was in custody and thus entitled to Miranda warnings before being
questioned.
The Miranda safeguards “become applicable as soon as a suspect’s
freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’”
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463
U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). The custody question is objective: how
would a reasonable person in the suspect’s position understand their situation?
Bogan, 774 N.W.2d at 680 (explaining custody determination does not depend on
the parties’ subjective beliefs). To answer that question, we focus on four factors:
(1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the purpose, place, and
manner of interrogation; (3) the extent to which the individual is confronted with
evidence of guilt; and (4) whether the individual is free to leave the place of
questioning. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 558.
9
Turning to the first factor, the record does not show the precise language
the police used to summon Stark. But Stark did not volunteer to talk to these
officers. Instead the police immediately took charge of his movement. See
Miranda, 672 N.W.2d at 759. Officer Walden testified that when he illuminated the
parking lot, Stark came out from behind an air-conditioning unit. In a show of
authority, Walden parked his patrol car a few feet away and left his lights flashing,
as he approached Stark on foot. Walden then told him to “stay where [he] was at
and speak to Officer Baum.” On this record, the first factor weighs toward custody.
As to the second factor, the police were there to determine whether Stark
took items from McKannan’s car. Even recognizing that purpose, the State
characterizes the situation as an investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968), and stresses that “the right to interrogate during a ‘stop’ is the essence
of Terry and its progeny.” See State v. Scott, 518 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa 1994).
Granted, “the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a
traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.” State v. Hillery,
956 N.W.2d 492, 501 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113
(2010)). But continued interactions may lead to a custodial interrogation requiring
a Miranda warning. Id. (remanding for an evidentiary record whether Hillery’s
street-side confession violated Miranda).
Here, the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation suggested a
custodial atmosphere. Stark was outnumbered: three uniformed officers arrived
to investigate a potential car burglary. During nearly twenty minutes of
questioning, Officer Baum asked over and over what Stark was doing in
10
McKannan’s car and where he put her checkbook. Police even asked Stark to
empty his pockets.
True, the questioning occurred outside, but Stark had nowhere to go. They
were in a secluded location behind River Hills. It was the middle of night and below
freezing. And Stark was visibly cold, wearing only two sweatshirts against the
twenty-degree chill. To quote Officer Baum: “It ain’t like we’re on Main Street.”
Granted, Officer Baum was professional and even somewhat empathetic toward
Stark. But Baum didn’t hide his disbelief of Stark’s story and encouraged him to
confess. Plus when Stark, likely hoping to avoid incrimination, asked to make a
statement “that’s not under Miranda,” Officer Baum did not dispel Stark’s
confusion.
Which brings us to the third factor—the extent to which Stark was
confronted with evidence of his guilt. Early in their encounter, the officer rejected
Stark’s claim that he was just waiting for a friend, saying: “Here’s the problem
Jaymes, we got a call saying a male matching your description was going through
her vehicle.”
Officer Baum also repeatedly confronted Stark with evidence of his guilt:
“Listen Jaymes, we’re past the point of you saying that you weren’t in the vehicle.
Somebody saw you in there. They saw you. Bro, they saw you in there. There’s
no getting around that. So we’re past that point.” But in actuality, McKannan
testified she saw a person matching Stark’s description “next” to her car, not inside
it. That nuance was lost on Officer Baum, who declared: “She said she saw you
in her car.” This line of confrontational questioning would lead a reasonable person
in Stark’s position to believe he was not free to go.
11
Finally, on the fourth factor, the officers never told Stark he was free to
leave. See Bogan, 774 N.W.2d at 681. After more than fifteen minutes of
questioning, Stark implored Officer Baum: “I just want to go home man, I’ll go home
and I’ll stay home.” The officer deflected: “Jaymes, they saw you in the car, now
there’s stuff missing out of the car.” Officer Baum acknowledged at the
suppression hearing that Stark was indeed not free to leave at that point.
A few minutes later, after Stark made his incriminating statements and was
being handcuffed, Baum still professed: “Like I said, you’re not under arrest at this
point, you’re just being detained.” As mentioned above, the officer’s subjective
view did not change the calculus. See Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 557. The
fourth factor supports the conclusion Stark was in custody.
In sum, considering the totality of circumstances and weighing the factors,
a reasonable person in Stark’s position would have felt their freedom was curtailed.
And this infringement rose to a degree associated with formal arrest. Because
Stark was in custody, officers should have given the Miranda advisory before
questioning him. As a result, his incriminating statements were inadmissible. So
he is entitled to a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.