NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 8 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAMON TORRES RUELAS, No. 20-35899
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01222-SU
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TROY BOWSER, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 5, 2021
Portland, Oregon
Before: W. FLETCHER, IKUTA, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Ramon Torres Ruelas appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We review de novo the district court’s denial of § 2254
relief. Carter v. Davis, 946 F.3d 489, 501 (9th Cir. 2019). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Under the Antiterrorism Act and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), we may only grant habeas relief if the state court’s decision (1) “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). When, as here, the decision of
the highest state court is unreasoned, we “‘look through’ the unexplained decision
to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale . . . [and]
then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v.
Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). Here, the last reasoned decision is the decision
of the Oregon circuit court that denied Ruelas’s petition for post-conviction relief in
May 2016.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Ruelas must show that (1) his
counsel performed deficiently and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced
him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under AEDPA, however,
“it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment,
the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, [Ruelas] must show
that the [Oregon circuit court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an
objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–99 (2002)
(citation omitted).
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In this case, the state court’s conclusion that Ruelas had not carried his burden
under either Strickland prong with respect to counsel’s investigation and use of lay
and expert testimony was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. In reaching
this conclusion, the state court did not make an unreasonable determination of facts.
As to additional lay witnesses, the state court’s factual determinations that some of
these witnesses were not made known to trial counsel before the trial, and that trial
counsel was not provided contact information for others, was not an unreasonable
determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). The record also
supports the state court’s reasonable factual determinations that testimony from
other lay witnesses would have been largely duplicative or else was likely to carry
little weight because the trial judge focused on the victims’ credibility. Trial counsel
sought to undermine the victims’ credibility and constructed a defense that Ruelas
was not alone with the victims. While that strategy was unsuccessful, the state court
reasonably concluded that trial counsel was not deficient.
For substantially the same reasons, it was not objectively unreasonable for the
state court to conclude that there was no “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different” if trial counsel had put forward additional lay testimony at trial.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The victims gave graphic and consistent testimony
about Ruelas’s abuse and provided descriptions of sexual content in pornographic
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videos that matched videos located at Ruelas’s residence. The state court could
reasonably conclude that the additional lay witness testimony Ruelas claims should
have been presented would not have changed the result.
The state court also reasonably concluded that Ruelas had not established
deficient performance or prejudice as to trial counsel’s decision not to use expert
testimony to attack the victims’ credibility. While Ruelas suggests that an expert
could have testified about the “risk that [the victims] were offering implanted
memories or [were] otherwise unreliable,” the state court reasonably determined that
Ruelas’s expert on state habeas review had not identified problems with the victims’
testimony or their memories. Under AEDPA, Ruelas has not shown that the state
court’s determinations are “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
AFFIRMED.
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