Case: 20-1852 Document: 99 Page: 1 Filed: 10/12/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY LP,
SPRINT SPECTRUM, LP, SPRINT SOLUTIONS,
INC., VERIZON WIRELESS PERSONAL
COMMUNICATIONS, LP,
Defendants-Appellees
TELENAV, INC., T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
Defendants
______________________
2020-1852, 2020-1854
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:17-cv-00718-RWS-RSP,
Judge Robert Schroeder, III.
______________________
Decided: October 12, 2021
______________________
WILLIAM PETERSON RAMEY, III, Ramey & Schwaller,
LLP, Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also rep-
resented by JOHN PIERRE LAHAD, Susman Godfrey LLP,
Houston, TX.
BRIAN DAVID SCHMALZBACH, McGuireWoods LLP,
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2 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
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Richmond, VA, argued for defendants-appellees Sprint
Communications Company LP, Sprint Spectrum, LP,
Sprint Solutions, Inc. Also represented by DAVID EVAN
FINKELSON; TYLER VANHOUTAN, Houston, TX.
JOSHUA C. KRUMHOLZ, Holland & Knight, LLP, Boston,
MA, argued for defendant-appellee Verizon Wireless Per-
sonal Communications, LP. Also represented by JACOB
KEVIN BARON; KEVIN PAUL ANDERSON, Duane Morris LLP,
Washington, DC.
______________________
Before PROST, O’MALLEY, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
PROST, Circuit Judge.
Traxcell 1 sued Sprint 2 and Verizon 3 for infringement of
four patents related to self-optimizing wireless networks
and to navigation technology. After claim construction and
discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for
Sprint and Verizon. Traxcell appeals. For the reasons be-
low, we agree with the district court’s claim construction.
We also agree that under that construction, Traxcell failed
to show a genuine issue of material fact as to infringement
and that several of Traxcell’s claims are indefinite. We
therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
I
This case involves four patents in the same family: U.S.
Patent Nos. 8,977,284 (“the ’284 patent”), 9,510,320 (“the
’320 patent”), 9,642,024 (“the ’024 patent”), and 9,549,388
1 Traxcell Technologies, LLC.
2 Sprint Communications Company LP; Sprint Spec-
trum, LP; and Sprint Solutions, Inc.
3 Verizon Wireless Personal Communications, LP.
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(“the ’388 patent”). All share a specification and a 2001
priority date.
A
The claims of three of the patents—the ’284, ’320, and
’024 patents—are related to self-optimizing network
(“SON”) technology for making “corrective actions” to im-
prove communications between a wireless device (for in-
stance, a phone) and a network. The parties call these the
“SON patents.” Claim 1 of the ’024 patent is representative
(relevant limitations emphasized):
1. A system including:
one or more radio-frequency transceivers and an
associated one or more antennas to which the ra-
dio-frequency transceiver is coupled, wherein the
one or more radio-frequency transceivers config-
ured for radio-frequency communication with at
least one mobile wireless communications device;
and
a computer coupled to the one or more radio-fre-
quency transceivers programmed to locate the one
or more mobile wireless communications devices
and generate an indication of a location of the one
or more mobile wireless communications devices,
wherein the computer further receives and stores
performance data of connections between the one
or more mobile wireless communications devices
and the radio-frequency transceiver along with the
indication of location, wherein the computer refer-
ences the performance data to expected perfor-
mance data, wherein the computer determines at
least one suggested corrective action in conformity
with differences between the performance data and
expected performance data in conjunction with the
indication of location, wherein the computer fur-
ther receives an error code from the radio-
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4 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
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frequency transceiver, determines whether the er-
ror code indicates a performance issue with respect
to the connection between the one or more mobile
wireless communications devices and the radio-fre-
quency transceiver, and wherein the computer de-
termines the at least one suggested corrective
action in response to the error code.
Claim 1 of the ’284 patent is similar but also includes a
means-plus-function limitation that was disputed in this
case (further emphasized):
1. A wireless network comprising:
a) at least two wireless devices, each said wireless
device communicating via radio frequency signals;
b) a first computer programmed to perform the
steps of:
1) locating at least one said wireless device
on said wireless network and referencing
performance of said at least one wireless
device with wireless network known pa-
rameters,
2) routinely storing performance data and
a corresponding location for said at least
one wireless device in a memory;
c) a radio tower adapted to receive radio frequency
signals from, and transmit radio frequency signals
to said at least one wireless device; wherein said
first computer further includes means for receiving
said performance data and suggest corrective ac-
tions obtained from a list of possible causes for said
radio tower based upon the performance data and
the corresponding location associated with said at
least one wireless device;
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d) wherein said radio tower generates an error code
based upon operation of said at least one wireless
device; and
e) wherein said first computer is further pro-
grammed to,
1) receive said error code from said radio
tower, and,
2) selectively suggest a corrective action of
said radio frequency signals of said radio
tower in order to restrict processing of ra-
dio frequency signals from at least one of
said at least two wireless devices based
upon said error code, and, whereby said
first computer suggests said corrective ac-
tion in order to improve communication
with at least one said wireless device.
B
Unlike the SON patents, the claims of the ’388 patent
are directed to network-based navigation—namely, having
the network, rather than a wireless device itself, determine
the device’s location. The parties call the ’388 patent the
“navigation patent.” Claim 1 is representative:
1. A wireless communications system including:
a first radio-frequency transceiver within a wire-
less mobile communications device and an associ-
ated first antenna to which the first radio-
frequency transceiver is coupled, wherein the first
radio-frequency transceiver is configured for radio-
frequency communication with a wireless commu-
nications network;
a first processor within the wireless mobile commu-
nications device coupled to the at least one first ra-
dio-frequency transceiver programmed to receive a
location of the wireless mobile communications
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6 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
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device from the wireless communications network
and generate an indication of a location of the wire-
less mobile communications device with respect to
geographic features according to mapping infor-
mation stored within the wireless mobile commu-
nications device, and wherein the processor
displays to the user navigation information accord-
ing to the location of the wireless mobile communi-
cations device with respect to the geographic
features and a destination specified by the user at
the wireless mobile communications device;
at least one second radio-frequency transceiver and
an associated at least one second antenna of the
wireless communications network to which the sec-
ond radio-frequency transceiver is coupled; and
a second processor coupled to the at least one sec-
ond radio-frequency transceiver programmed to de-
termine the location of the wireless mobile
communications device, wherein the second proces-
sor selectively determines the location of the wire-
less mobile communications device dependent on
the setting of preference flags, wherein the second
processor determines the location of the wireless
mobile communications device if the preference
flags are set to a state that permits tracking of the
user of the wireless mobile communications device
and communicates the location of the wireless mo-
bile communications device to the first processor
via the second radio-frequency transmitter, and
wherein the second processor does not determine
and communicate the location of the wireless mo-
bile communications device if the preference flags
are set to a state that prohibits tracking of the wire-
less mobile communications device.
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II
Traxcell asserted against Verizon the ’284, ’024, and
’388 patents. 4 For the ’284 and ’024 SON patents, Trax-
cell’s allegations involve Verizon’s implementation of Er-
icsson’s self-organizing network technology—the so-called
Ericsson C-SON. And for the ’388 patent, Traxcell points
to Verizon mobile devices using VZ Navigator or Google
Maps (made by Comtech and Google, respectively).
Traxcell also asserted these same patents, plus the
’320 patent, against Sprint. 5 For the asserted SON claims
of the ’284, ’024, and ’320 patents, Traxcell’s infringement
allegations involve Sprint’s use of Samsung’s distributed
self-optimizing network technology—the so-called Sam-
sung dSON. And for the ’388 patent, Traxcell’s infringe-
ment allegations concern Sprint mobile devices loaded with
Google Maps.
III
The magistrate judge entered a claim-construction or-
der on April 15, 2019, under which claims 1–11 of the
’284 patent were indefinite. After claim construction,
Sprint and Verizon separately moved for summary judg-
ment of noninfringement on the remaining claims.
4 Traxcell appeals determinations related to
claims 1–10 of the ’284 patent; claims 1, 6–11, and 17–22
of the ’024 patent; and claims 1–11 and 21 of the ’388 pa-
tent.
5 Traxcell appeals determinations related to
claims 1–12 of the ’284 patent; claims 1, 6–11, and 17–22
of the ’024 patent; claims 1–6 of the ’320 patent; and
claims 1–11 and 21 of the ’388 patent.
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Adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendations, the dis-
trict court granted both motions. 6
Traxcell appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
The district court granted summary judgment for de-
fendants Sprint and Verizon in light of its construction of
several claim terms. Traxcell appeals both the claim con-
structions and the noninfringement determinations that
flow from them.
“We review claim construction based on intrinsic evi-
dence de novo and review any findings of fact regarding ex-
trinsic evidence for clear error.” SpeedTrack, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, 998 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021). And
we review the district court’s summary judgment de novo
under the law of the regional circuit—here the Fifth Cir-
cuit. Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd.,
955 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Summary judg-
ment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genu-
ine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). We “view[] all evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and draw[] all reasonable infer-
ences in that party’s favor.” Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d
495, 501 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pierce v. Dep’t of the Air
Force, 512 F.3d 184, 185 (5th Cir. 2007)). But “the non-
movant can’t defeat summary judgment with conclusory al-
legations, unsupported assertions, or only a scintilla of
6 For simplicity, and because the district judge
adopted the magistrate judge’s orders and recommenda-
tions as the opinion of the court, we refer to “the district
court” in discussing the underlying determinations,
whether first made by the magistrate judge or the district
judge.
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evidence.” Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir.
2020).
Summary judgment was based on several grounds.
First, claim 12 of the ’284 patent was not infringed because
Traxcell hadn’t met the “way” prong of the function-way-
result test in asserting an infringing structural equivalent
to a means-plus-function limitation. Second, Traxcell
hadn’t shown a genuine dispute about either the “location”
limitation (present in every asserted SON patent claim) or
the “first computer” and “computer” limitations (present in
most asserted SON patent claims). As to claim 1 of the
’284 patent, the district court held it indefinite for failure
to disclose sufficient structure for a means-plus-function
limitation. And as to the ’388 patent, Traxcell couldn’t
show that the accused technology determined a wireless
device’s location on the network itself, as claimed, rather
than on the device. Traxcell appeals this all. We address
each issue in turn.
I
As to claim 12 of the ’284 patent, the district court
granted summary judgment of noninfringement because
there was no genuine dispute that Sprint’s accused system
did not meet that claim’s means-plus-function limitation. 7
That is, Traxcell asserted an infringing structural equiva-
lent but fell short under the “way” prong of the function-
way-result test. We agree with the district court.
A
First, we address claim construction. The parties
agreed that claim 12 includes a means-plus-function limi-
tation: a “means for receiving said performance data and
corresponding locations from said radio tower and correct-
ing radio frequency signals of said radio tower.” J.A. 37.
7 Traxcell did not assert claim 12 against Verizon.
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The corresponding function is “receiving said performance
data and corresponding locations from said radio tower and
correcting radio frequency signals of said radio tower.”
J.A. 37. And the corresponding structure is an algorithm
that Traxcell identified from the specification. J.A. 37 (cit-
ing ’284 patent Figs. 38-A, 38-B, 38-C; id. at col. 54 l. 21–
col. 55 l. 41). This construction is undisputed on appeal.
B
Next, we address infringement. Traxcell argues that
Sprint’s accused technology includes a structural equiva-
lent to the disclosed structure under the function-way-re-
sult test. The district court disagreed, reasoning that
Traxcell failed to establish that the accused technology op-
erates in substantially the same “way.”
Under the function-way-result test, “[l]iteral infringe-
ment of a means-plus-function claim limitation requires
that the relevant structure in the accused device perform
the identical function recited in the claim and be identical
or equivalent to the corresponding structure in the specifi-
cation.” Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
448 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “Once the relevant
structure in the accused device has been identified, a party
may prove it is equivalent to the disclosed structure by
showing that the two perform the identical function in sub-
stantially the same way, with substantially the same re-
sult.” Id.
The district court held that Traxcell had not offered
sufficient evidence that Sprint’s system contained the
structure required for the means-plus-function element.
J.A. 109, 119–23. As it observed, the identified structure
from the specification is a “very detailed” algorithm.
J.A. 120. That algorithm includes numerous steps neces-
sary for its function. J.A. 122. But Traxcell neglected to
address a significant fraction of that structure. Indeed,
Traxcell’s infringement expert instead discussed the ac-
cused technology at only a generalized level and didn’t at
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all discuss at least nine entire steps of the algorithm—fo-
cusing on function and results but eliding the way those
results are achieved. J.A. 121–22. Accordingly, Traxcell
didn’t provide enough evidence for a reasonable jury to con-
clude that the accused structure performs the claimed
function in “substantially the same way” as the disclosed
structure. See Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., Inc.,
208 F.3d 1352, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming sum-
mary judgment of noninfringement, both literally and un-
der doctrine of equivalents, where “way” and “result” were
not substantially the same as claimed means-plus-function
structure).
We agree with the district court’s thorough analysis.
Showing identical function is not enough for literal in-
fringement of a means-plus-function claim—Traxcell must
also provide evidence of identical or equivalent structure.
Here it did not, and so summary judgment was proper.
II
We move next to the “location” limitation. All asserted
claims of the ’284 and ’320 patents include the term “loca-
tion.” The parties stipulated that the term meant a “loca-
tion that is not merely a position in a grid pattern.” The
court granted summary judgment of noninfringement un-
der that construction to Sprint and Verizon. For the rea-
sons below, we agree.
A
First, we address claim construction. In the related
Nokia case, the construction of “location” in these claims
was disputed at the district court. See Traxcell Techs., LLC
v. Nokia Sols. & Networks Oy, No. 20-1440, slip op. at 6–7
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 12, 2021) (“Nokia”). Not so here. Instead,
the parties agreed that “location” means “location that is
not merely a position in a grid pattern.” J.A. 12–13, 68,
101. The district court accepted that construction; the
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12 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
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parties proceeded through discovery and briefing accord-
ingly. And under that construction, Traxcell lost.
Now Traxcell insists in retrospect that this construc-
tion was wrong. But having stipulated to it, Traxcell can-
not pull an about-face. Traxcell suggests that it preserved
the issue because it contested the term in the related Nokia
case and claim construction “should be applied consistently
between related cases.” Reply Br. 15 (capitalization nor-
malized). We are unconvinced. At any rate, for the reasons
we explained in the Nokia appeal, the stipulated-to con-
struction is correct. See Nokia, slip op. at 6–7.
B
Next, we address infringement. The independent
claims of the SON patents all require sending, receiving,
generating, storing, or using the “location” of a wireless de-
vice. The district court concluded that Traxcell hadn’t
shown that the accused technologies use a “location” as
construed by the court, such that summary judgment was
proper. See J.A. 117–19, 173–74, 176 (Sprint), 73–77,
163–64, 165 (Verizon). For the reasons below, we agree.
1
The district court found that Traxcell had failed to cre-
ate a genuine issue about whether Sprint’s accused tech-
nology (i.e., the Sprint LTE Service Manager, or “LSM”)
sends, receives, generates, stores, or uses “location” as con-
strued.
First, Traxcell had argued that the LSM used location
in the form of a device’s cell or sector to make adjustments.
But the district court concluded that using information
about a device’s “cell or sector” amounted to using merely
a position in a grid pattern. See J.A. 173–74; see also
J.A. 117. We agree.
Traxcell also insisted that the LSM generates a device’s
location through an alphabet soup of approaches, including
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“(1) receiving and collecting UE-referenced network and
device performance measurements from the Minimization
of Drive Tests (‘MDT’) Reports and UE Measurement Re-
ports[,] (2) Observed Time Distance of Arrival (‘OTDOA’),
(3) call trace analysis, (4) the GUI in the NV 4.0 Release,
(5) the collection of Cell ID, (6) throughput, and through
(7) Received Signal Strength Indication (‘RSSI’), Received
Signal Received Power (‘RSRP’), dropped calls, and the
like.” J.A. 118. The district court concluded, and we agree,
that Traxcell’s arguments on this front amounted to “con-
clusory statement[s] . . . without any analysis to support”
them. E.g., J.A. 118. That is, Traxcell didn’t explain how
any of these approaches match up to the court’s claim con-
struction, how the approaches are actually used in the ac-
cused technology, and how the approaches would meet
other limitations of the claims. See Novartis Corp. v. Ben
Venue Labs., Inc., 271 F.3d 1043, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (af-
firming summary judgment of noninfringement because
patentee did not meet “obligation to set forth the detailed
basis of its evidence such that the district court could eval-
uate whether it could support a finding of infringement”)
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The same is true of Traxcell on
appeal. Traxcell’s unexplained listing of accused elements
that purportedly send, receive, generate, store, or use a
wireless device’s location is insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact.
2
The district court also found that Traxcell had failed to
create a genuine issue of material fact about whether Ver-
izon’s accused technology (i.e., the Ericsson C-SON) uses
“location” as construed.
First, the court rejected Traxcell’s argument that the
accused technology uses “location” because it collects “in-
formation regarding the distance of devices from a base sta-
tion.” That is, according to Verizon’s unrebutted evidence,
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the Ericsson C-SON “doesn’t get location data,” but rather
simply gets information “to calculate distance” to base sta-
tions. E.g., J.A. 5572; see also J.A. 5560–61, 5571, 5577.
And location and distance from a point are different, the
court concluded. J.A. 73–74, 163–64. We agree.
Second, the court rejected Traxcell’s arguments that
the accused technology determines which sector or cell a
device falls within, thereby constituting a “location.” The
court found that the evidence only shows that the accused
technology determines a device’s position within a grid.
J.A. 164. And Verizon’s unrebutted evidence confirms
this—as the district court explained, the accused technol-
ogy “does not provide a specific location for any individual
device, but only places the device into a pre-defined area
and then makes decisions based on the area that the device
falls into.” J.A. 76. This was consistent with Traxcell’s ex-
pert’s statements, which likened the sector-and-cell “bins”
to a grid. See J.A. 5537. 8 Again, we agree with the district
court. See Profectus Tech. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co.,
823 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming sum-
mary judgment of noninfringement in light of unrebutted
evidence). Sectors and cells, as the parties use them, are
“merely a position within a grid pattern.” See J.A. 73–75.
And even if a “sector” (i.e., an angle-plus-distance subset of
a cell) were more than a grid-pattern position, the district
court observed that there is no evidence that the Ericsson
C-SON actually uses sector data in this way. See J.A. 76.
8 Traxcell points to other contrary statements by the
same expert, but, as Verizon points out, that evidence
seems to be from another case entirely (one not even involv-
ing the Ericsson C-SON). See Appellant’s Br. 60 & nn.242–
43; Verizon Br. 21–22. We agree with Verizon that it is
puzzling how it could be error for the district court not to
account for this evidence.
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Beyond all this, the court also rejected Traxcell’s reci-
tation of a “long list of various types of data that the ac-
cused products allegedly use without explaining how using
that . . . data would satisfy the claim construction.”
J.A. 164. That is, Traxcell didn’t link its citations to the
claims and left its evidence unexplained. Traxcell has done
the same on appeal—insisting in a conclusory fashion that
the district court overlooked various pieces of evidence but
not explaining the role of that evidence in its infringement
theory as to the Ericsson C-SON. Again, that is not enough
to meet Traxcell’s burden.
We agree with the district court. Traxcell did not cre-
ate a genuine dispute of material fact that Verizon’s ac-
cused technology uses “location.”
III
Next we move to the “first computer” and “computer”
limitations, which are in all the asserted claims of the SON
patents except claim 6 of the ’024 patent and those depend-
ing from it. These terms are paired throughout with vari-
ous functions. Construing those terms to require that a
single computer be capable of performing the recited func-
tions, the district court concluded that Traxcell hadn’t
shown that the accused technology met those limitations,
and that summary judgment for the defendants was
proper. For the reasons below, we agree.
A
First, we address claim construction. In short, we
agree with the district court. This construction was also at
issue in the parallel Nokia case. See Nokia, slip op. at 10–
13. And as we explained in that case, a “first computer” or
a “computer” means a single computer. Id. So too here.
B
Next, we turn to infringement. As explained above, the
“first computer” and “computer” terms are paired with
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various functions. For example, claim 1 of the ’024 patent
requires that “a computer” not only be “programmed to lo-
cate” one or more mobile devices but also to “further re-
ceive[] and store[] performance data,” to “reference[] the
performance data,” to “further receive[] an error code,” and
to “determine[]” “at least one suggested corrective action in
response to the error code.”
For both Sprint and Verizon, the district court deter-
mined that Traxcell hadn’t shown a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact that these limitations were met. For the reasons
below, we agree.
1
As to Sprint, the court concluded that Traxcell had
failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact that the
accused technology uses a single computer capable of meet-
ing each of the claim limitations. J.A. 110–14.
The accused Samsung dSON system operates with
Sprint’s wireless network across Sprint’s LSM, Operating
Support Systems (“OSSs”), and various base stations (or
“eNodeBs”). The LSM configures and manages network el-
ements—such as the eNodeBs—and works with other sys-
tems like the OSS to manage network functionality. The
OSSs are operating systems that interact with the
eNodeBs and work with both the LSM and the eNodeB to
execute the SON functionality. The Samsung dSON is
“distributed”: that is, its functions are spread among many
computers in the LSM, OSSs, and eNodeBs.
Traxcell didn’t generally dispute those facts. Instead,
Traxcell argued broadly that the LSM server and every
computer at an eNodeB each also constitutes a single com-
puter that would be able to meet all the limitations of the
claims. See J.A. 110. But Traxcell didn’t particularize
those conclusory assertions with specific evidence and ar-
guments. The district court concluded that Traxcell had
failed to show how either the LSM or the computer at the
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eNodeB could independently perform each of the claimed
functions. J.A. 110–11. To the contrary, the only reasona-
ble conclusion from the evidence was that the LSM and
eNodeBs must work together to conduct most operations,
requiring multiple computers. J.A. 110–11.
Traxcell argues that it “presented substantial evidence
that the LSM was capable of performing the required func-
tions.” See Appellant’s Br. 48. On appeal, it reproduces
four pages from its district-court briefing that it says
weren’t addressed on this point. See Appellant’s Br. 48
(quoting J.A. 8313–16); see also Reply Br. 18–21. To be
sure, those pages include an army of citation footnotes
crouching in a field of jargon. What they lack is explana-
tion. As an initial matter, we disagree that the district
court ignored this evidence. To the contrary, the district
court spent five pages discussing Traxcell’s evidence. See
J.A. 110–14. And Traxcell’s showing is simply too unex-
plained and too conclusory to meet the summary-judgment
standard.
2
As to Verizon, the district court again concluded that
Traxcell had failed to show a genuine dispute of material
fact about the “first computer” or “computer” limitation.
J.A. 71–72, 162–63.
The accused Ericsson C-SON system is, like the Sam-
sung dSON, distributed across many computers. Traxcell
doesn’t dispute this fundamental point. Instead, it points
to a part of the system—the so-called SON Portal—and ar-
gues that it is a single computer that satisfies the limita-
tions. See Appellant’s Br. 55–56.
But the SON Portal is only an interface. It doesn’t per-
form all the functions itself—rather, it collects their output
from other computers for the convenience of the user. Ver-
izon provided unrebutted evidence that the accused func-
tionalities were carried out by other computers within the
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18 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
Ericsson-CSON, being spread across the SON Data Gate-
way, the SON Application Server, and the SON Implemen-
tation Server. Traxcell argued to the district court that the
SON Portal “controls and displays the individual services”
of the other servers, and that through it a “user can control
and execute all SON functions.” See J.A. 72. But that isn’t
enough. That a user can execute all the functions through
the SON Portal doesn’t mean that the SON Portal itself is
capable of performing the claimed functions. What’s miss-
ing is a showing that the SON Portal is a single computer
that is capable of performing the claimed functions.
To be sure, Traxcell has cited swaths of documents. See
Appellant’s Br. 54–57 (arguing that “Traxcell’s briefing
was slammed full” of “volumes upon volumes” of evidence).
But it failed to link those documents to the SON Portal or
to explain how those documents support its infringement
theory. It didn’t do so at the trial court, and it didn’t do so
here. In conclusion, we agree that summary judgment of
noninfringement based on this limitation was proper.
3
Traxcell’s remaining infringement arguments on ap-
peal rely on the doctrine of equivalents. But as we con-
cluded in the Nokia case, Traxcell surrendered multiple-
computer equivalents during prosecution of these patents.
See Nokia, slip op. at 11–16. Accordingly, we agree with
the district court that the doctrine of equivalents is una-
vailable for Traxcell to assert infringement by the use of
multiple computers to meet the “first computer” or “com-
puter” limitations.
IV
Next, we turn to indefiniteness. Claim 1 of the ’284 pa-
tent was held to be indefinite on two grounds: (1) lack of
reasonable certainty about which “wireless device” the
term “at least one said wireless device” referred to,
J.A. 26–27, 143–44, and (2) lack of an adequate supporting
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structure in the specification for the claim’s means-plus-
function limitation, J.A. 32–37, 144–45, 154–55.
Claim 1 of the ’284 patent was previously held indefi-
nite in the Nokia case. See J.A. 966–67, 971 (Markman or-
der of January 2019). Traxcell did not appeal that
determination and is, of course, precluded from asserting
that original claim. But the indefiniteness issue also per-
tains to a purportedly corrected version of that claim,
which we address below.
After the Nokia claim construction order, Traxcell filed
a certificate of correction of claim 1 and sought leave to
amend its complaint to assert the corrected claim. See
J.A. 59, 2077–78. Traxcell argued that even if its original
claim 1 was indefinite, it had cured that problem with its
correction. Leave to amend, however, was denied as not
only prejudicial to Sprint and Verizon but also futile.
J.A. 59–61. That is, even if the certificate would correct the
first indefiniteness ground, it wouldn’t touch the second.
See J.A. 33–37, 60. As we discuss next, we agree that as-
serting the corrected claim would be futile because it would
remain indefinite for a reason unrelated to the correction.
Here, both the original and corrected claim 1 include a
“means for receiving said performance data and sug-
gest[ing] corrective actions obtained from a list of possible
causes for said radio tower based upon the performance
data and the corresponding location associated with said at
least one wireless device” (emphases added). Traxcell
agreed that this is a means-plus-function term. J.A. 32.
The district court identified the function to be suggesting
corrective actions that were based on location. J.A. 34–35.
As the corresponding structure in the specification, Trax-
cell pointed to the same algorithm that it did for the similar
means-plus-function limitation of claim 12. See supra p. 10.
A means-plus-function claim is indefinite if the specifi-
cation fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure to
perform the claimed function. Williamson v. Citrix Online,
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20 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2015). That was
the case here. After considering the algorithm that Trax-
cell identified, the district court concluded that none of the
cited passages of the specification disclose correction based
on location data, as claimed. J.A. 36–37, 144–45. It ob-
served that Traxcell had not explained how that structure
in the specification actually provides location-based correc-
tive actions but had instead offered speculation about how
location data might be used. J.A. 36–37, 144–45. And it
emphasized that “Traxcell’s explanation of the figure and
specification provide ‘nothing more than a restatement of
the function, as recited in the claim.’” J.A. 145 (quoting
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
Traxcell first argues that the claimed corrective action
need not be based on location at all but rather need only
“correspond” to it. Appellant’s Br. 33–35. We disagree in
view of the claim language: the correction is “based upon
. . . location.” Traxcell then argues that the specification
discloses location-based correction anyway. Appellant’s
Br. 35–36; Reply Br. 13–14. These arguments, like those
presented to the district court, are much too vague and
speculative. At most, Traxcell has shown that some soft-
ware in the identified structure receives some location data
as part of a larger “case file.” And although Traxcell
demonstrated that the structure makes corrections based
on other performance data, it hasn’t shown that any correc-
tions are made using location.
We agree with the district court. The specification
lacks the necessary structure for claim 1’s means-plus-
function limitation, and so the corrected claim remains in-
definite. Allowing Traxcell to assert the corrected claim
would be futile. The district court therefore did not abuse
its discretion in denying leave to amend.
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V
Last, we turn to the district court’s judgment of nonin-
fringement of the ’388 patent.
Although the ’388 patent shares a specification with
the SON patents, its claims are not about optimizing a
wireless network but are instead about providing naviga-
tion information from a wireless network to a mobile de-
vice. Specifically, the claims require that the device’s
location is (1) determined on the network, (2) communi-
cated to the device, and (3) used to display navigation in-
formation. J.A. 123–24.
The district court determined that, for each accused
technology, Traxcell had not shown that this limitation was
met under the summary-judgment standard. As explained
below, we agree with the district court.
A
As to Sprint, the relevant accused products are phones
sold by Sprint loaded with Google Maps and using Sprint’s
wireless network. The court concluded that Traxcell hadn’t
shown, for purposes of summary judgment, that the net-
work, as opposed to the device, determines a device’s loca-
tion. See J.A. 123–24, 129–32, 172.
For its part, Sprint offered evidence from Google’s cor-
porate representatives that Google Maps never receives a
mobile device’s location from the network—instead, the de-
vice determines its own location. E.g., J.A. 130, 6643,
6645–46, 6649. Traxcell identifies no evidence specifically
rebutting this point. Instead, it argues that Google Maps
needs to use data from the network (GPS information, cell
tower information, and the like) to determine location. But
it is not data from the network that the claims require. It
is that the network itself determines location and trans-
mits the location to the device. And Traxcell has not shown
that the network does so with anything but broad and con-
clusory scattershot assertions. See J.A. 130–31 (rejecting
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22 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
arguments as conclusory and unsupported). True, at vari-
ous points Traxcell includes footnotes citing documents or
other evidence. E.g., Appellant’s Br. 44. But, continually,
Traxcell fails to adequately explain the link between the
cited evidence and its infringement theory.
In part, Traxcell argues that Google’s evidence is only
about some ways of location determination—and that there
are other ways of finding a phone. But as observed by the
district court, Traxcell referenced these alternative ap-
proaches “without explaining within its briefing how those
approaches are actually utilized within the accused sys-
tems” and how the other limitations would be met “when
using the specified form of location.” J.A. 118.
We agree with the district court; this is not enough to
establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Traxcell has
not made the showing it needs to withstand summary judg-
ment.
B
As to Verizon, the relevant accused products are
phones using either VZ Navigator or Google Maps.
Traxcell’s proof problems for Verizon generally parallel
those for Sprint. As with the accused Sprint technology,
the district court found that Traxcell had failed to provide
evidence that the network itself determined the device’s lo-
cation. J.A. 81–82. In contrast, Verizon offered evidence
that the accused products determine location on the device
itself. E.g., J.A. 2137–38, 2171. And again, Traxcell points
to nothing specifically rebutting this evidence.
Instead, Traxcell argues that location is also deter-
mined by Verizon’s network through a handful of other
techniques. See Appellant’s Br. 37–40. In doing so, Trax-
cell serves up a platter of footnotes and insists that the dis-
trict court just didn’t consider all its evidence. E.g.,
Appellant’s Br. 37–41 & n.131. But again, Traxcell fails to
provide the critical link from evidence to infringement. As
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TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. 23
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the magistrate judge and district court explained, Trax-
cell’s conclusory efforts fell short. It “cite[d] to lengthy doc-
uments without specifying the specific portions of those
documents that were relevant and without explaining how
those documents actually showed that the network deter-
mines a location.” J.A. 94. And its “briefing consisted
largely of conclusory statements and included citations,
typically spanning hundreds of pages, to a large number of
documents without any explanation for how those docu-
ments supported its conclusory statements.” J.A. 166–67.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Trax-
cell has not made the showing needed to withstand sum-
mary judgment.
VI
Finally, we note that Sprint and Verizon have argued
that many of Traxcell’s arguments have been forfeited
through failure to timely raise them at the trial court, or
for other reasons. We need not reach the forfeiture issues,
however, because we agree with the district court and dis-
agree with Traxcell on the merits. See Immunex Corp.
v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 977 F.3d 1212, 1216 (Fed. Cir.
2020); TEK Glob., S.R.L. v. Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc., 920 F.3d
777, 787 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Traxcell’s remaining arguments
but find them unpersuasive. For the reasons we have ex-
plained, we affirm.
AFFIRMED