Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 1 Filed: 10/12/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS OY, NOKIA
OF AMERICA CORPORATION, FKA NOKIA
SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS US LLC,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2020-1440, 2020-1443
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas in Nos. 2:17-cv-00042-RWS-RSP,
2:17-cv-00044-RWS-RSP, Judge Robert Schroeder, III.
______________________
Decided: October 12, 2021
______________________
WILLIAM PETERSON RAMEY, III, Ramey & Schwaller,
LLP, Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also rep-
resented by JOHN PIERRE LAHAD, Susman Godfrey LLP,
Houston, TX.
NATHAN HAMSTRA, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sulli-
van LLP, Chicago, IL, argued for defendants-appellees.
Also represented by MARC L. KAPLAN, DAVID A. NELSON.
______________________
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 2 Filed: 10/12/2021
2 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
Before PROST, O’MALLEY, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
PROST, Circuit Judge.
Traxcell 1 sued Nokia 2 for infringement of three patents
related to self-optimizing wireless networks. After claim
construction and discovery, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment of noninfringement for Nokia. Traxcell ap-
peals. For the reasons below, we agree with the district
court’s claim construction. We also agree that under that
construction there is no genuine dispute of material fact
that Nokia’s accused technology did not infringe. We there-
fore affirm.
BACKGROUND
I
This case involves three patents in the same family:
U.S. Patent Nos. 8,977,284 (“the ’284 patent”), 9,510,320
(“the ’320 patent”), and 9,642,024 (“the ’024 patent”). They
share a common 2001 priority claim and a substantially
common specification. All are related to self-optimizing
wireless network technology—namely, making “corrective
actions” to improve communications between a wireless de-
vice (for instance, a phone) and the network. They do so
using measurements of wireless-device performance and
location. The asserted claims (claims 1 and 12 of the
’284 patent, claims 1 and 4 of the ’320 patent, and claims
1, 6, 11, and 17 of the ’024 patent) are a mix of method
claims and apparatus claims.
Claim 4 of the ’320 patent is representative (emphasis
added to disputed terms):
1 Traxcell Technologies, LLC.
2 Nokia of America Corporation (f/k/a Nokia Solu-
tions and Networks US LLC) and Nokia Solutions & Net-
works Oy.
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 3 Filed: 10/12/2021
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. 3
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
4. A method of managing a wireless radio-fre-
quency (RF) network, the method comprising:
coupling in communication, at least one radio-fre-
quency transceiver and an associated at least one
antenna to which the radio-frequency transceiver
is coupled to at least one mobile wireless communi-
cation device;
at a first computer coupled to the at least one radio-
frequency transceiver, locating the at least one mo-
bile wireless device according to the radio-fre-
quency communications and generating an
indication of a location of the at least one mobile
wireless device;
at the first computer, receiving and storing perfor-
mance data of connections between the at least one
mobile wireless device and the radio-frequency
transceiver along with the indication of location;
at the first computer storing updated performance
data and an updated indication of location of the at
least one mobile wireless device while the mobile
wireless device is communicating with the at least
one radio-frequency transceiver;
referencing the performance data to expected per-
formance data;
determining at least one suggested corrective ac-
tion in conformity with differences between the
performance data and expected performance data
in conjunction with the indication of location;
coupling a second computer in communication with
the first computer;
at the first computer, responsive to a communica-
tion from the at least one mobile wireless commu-
nication device, setting a no access flag within a
memory of the first computer;
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 4 Filed: 10/12/2021
4 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
providing access from the first computer to the in-
dication of location to the second computer if the no
access flag is reset; and
the first computer denying access to the indication
of location to the second computer if the no access
flag is set.
II
Traxcell sued Nokia, accusing its product Eden-NET of
infringement. Broadly, Eden-NET consists of a suite of
software modules that allows a wireless network operator
to make adjustments to its network. For example, Eden-
NET can restart a malfunctioning base station (e.g., a cell
tower) or identify one that has lost power. Eden-NET can
also collect so-called key performance indicators (or “KPIs”)
that contain performance information for devices within
some area—an area such as a cell in a mobile network. In
general, everyone agrees that Eden-NET is a self-optimiz-
ing network product. The question is whether there is any
evidence that Eden-NET is the kind of self-optimizing net-
work product that these patents claim.
III
The magistrate judge issued a claim-construction order
on January 7, 2019. That order construed the terms “loca-
tion” and “first computer” (or “computer”), among others.
The order also determined that claim 1 of the ’284 patent
was indefinite. Traxcell did not object afterward to that
determination, nor does it appeal it now. Instead it sought
a certificate of correction from the PTO to fix what it viewed
as a typographical error—reasoning that the correction
would remedy the indefiniteness issue.
After claim construction, Nokia moved for summary
judgment of noninfringement. The district court adopted
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and
granted summary judgment for Nokia.
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 5 Filed: 10/12/2021
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. 5
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
Traxcell appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
The district court granted summary judgment for de-
fendant Nokia in light of its construction of several claim
terms. 3 Traxcell appeals both the claim constructions and
the noninfringement determinations that flow from them.
“We review claim construction based on intrinsic evi-
dence de novo and review any findings of fact regarding ex-
trinsic evidence for clear error.” SpeedTrack, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, 998 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021). And
we review the district court’s summary judgment de novo
under the law of the regional circuit—here the Fifth Cir-
cuit. Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd.,
955 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Summary judg-
ment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genu-
ine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). We “view[] all evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and draw[] all reasonable infer-
ences in that party’s favor.” Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d
495, 501 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pierce v. Dep’t of the Air
Force, 512 F.3d 184, 185 (5th Cir. 2007)). But “the non-
movant can’t defeat summary judgment with conclusory al-
legations, unsupported assertions, or only a scintilla of
evidence.” Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir.
2020).
The district court based its summary judgment on two
grounds. First, Eden-NET didn’t meet the “location”
3 For simplicity, and because the district judge
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations as the
opinion of the court, we refer to “the district court” in dis-
cussing the underlying determinations whether made by
the magistrate judge or the district judge.
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 6 Filed: 10/12/2021
6 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
limitation present in every asserted claim. Second, Eden-
NET didn’t meet the “first computer” or “computer” limita-
tions present in every asserted claim except claim 6 of the
’024 patent. Traxcell appeals not only the constructions of
“location” and “first computer” (or “computer”) but also the
resulting noninfringement determinations. We address
each issue in turn.
I
First, we address “location,” a term present in all as-
serted claims. That term was construed as a “location that
is not merely a position in a grid pattern.” And under that
construction, the court granted summary judgment of non-
infringement to Nokia. For the reasons below, we agree.
A
We turn to claim construction first. The district court
construed “location” to mean a “location that is not merely
a position in a grid pattern.” It did so mainly in view of
arguments that the applicant made during prosecution.
On appeal, Traxcell argues that “location” should instead
simply take its plain and ordinary meaning.
The dispute here is whether the applicant disclaimed
the grid-position sense of “location” during prosecution.
“The doctrine of prosecution disclaimer . . . preclud[es] pa-
tentees from recapturing through claim interpretation spe-
cific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.” Omega
Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2003). “Prosecution disclaimer can arise from both claim
amendments and arguments.” SpeedTrack, 998 F.3d
at 1379 (quoting Tech. Props. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co.,
849 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). And “[a]n applicant’s
argument that a prior art reference is distinguishable on a
particular ground can serve as a disclaimer of claim scope
even if the applicant distinguishes the reference on other
grounds as well.” Id. at 1380 (quoting Andersen Corp. v. Fi-
ber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 7 Filed: 10/12/2021
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. 7
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
The doctrine “ensures that claims are not construed one
way in order to obtain their allowance and in a different
way against accused infringers.” Id. (cleaned up). It at-
taches if a patentee “has unequivocally disavowed a certain
meaning to obtain [a] patent” in a way that is “clear and
unmistakable.” Omega, 334 F.3d at 1324–26. If so, it “nar-
rows the ordinary meaning of the claim congruent with the
scope of the surrender.” Id.
In its claim construction order, the court explained that
during prosecution the applicant had distinguished the
claims from prior art that used a position in a grid pattern
as the location. That prior art, “Steer,” 4 included a system
that suggested corrective action using “locations in a
roughly grid pattern.” J.A. 2092. But this “grid pattern,”
the applicant argued, “does not allow for fine tuning.”
J.A. 2021. The applicant added that, in this prior art, “all
wireless devices within the same grid pattern receive the
same tuning.” J.A. 2021. In contrast, the applicant argued
that its claimed invention (which it called “Reed,” after a
named inventor) operated “without the limitation of a ‘grid
pattern.’” J.A. 2021, 2092. The resulting system, it ex-
plained, was “more adaptable” and “more refined.”
J.A. 2021–22. Indeed, it argued this in a section titled
“Grid pattern not required in Reed et al. v. grid pattern re-
quired in Steer et al.” See J.A. 2021 (typeface normalized).
As appellee points out, Traxcell has also stipulated that
this construction is correct in two other cases. See Appel-
lee’s Br. 27.
In view of the prosecution history, the disclaimer here
was clear and unmistakable. Accordingly, we agree with
the court’s construction.
4 U.S. Patent No. 6,845,246.
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 8 Filed: 10/12/2021
8 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
B
Next, we move to infringement. Given its construction,
the district court concluded that Traxcell hadn’t created a
genuine dispute of material fact about whether the accused
technology uses a “location” as construed. J.A. 15. We
agree.
The claims require that the Eden-NET products use or
generate a “location” for wireless devices that is “not
merely a position in a grid pattern.” They also require that
an infringing system identify and store such a “location” for
a wireless device.
Nokia’s expert explained without contradiction that
the accused technology’s geolocation systems collect KPIs
from base stations—and that the KPIs are grouped into
50-meter-by-50-meter “bins.” J.A. 15–16. And none of the
KPIs, the expert explained, correspond to any particular
phone. J.A. 15. Rather, they are averages within a given
cell over a certain period—from a quarter-hour to a day.
J.A. 15.
It was these KPIs that Traxcell pointed to as meeting
the “location” limitation. But Traxcell did not provide evi-
dence to controvert Nokia’s expert’s description. See
J.A. 16 n.2. And its own expert stated that his “interpreta-
tion of the word ‘grid’” was “a defined geographic area
within a certain confine. For example, in a cell.” J.A. 16,
3601. He added that if “you have a 50-by-50 meter square
area within a particular cell,” then “that would be a partic-
ular grid.” J.A. 16, 3601. In view of the claim construction
and Traxcell’s expert’s statements, the court concluded
that this all amounted to simply a grid-based location—
whether a cell or to a 50-meter-by-50-meter bin within a
cell. We agree with the district court on that point.
But even if the accused technology weren’t using
“merely a position in a grid pattern,” there’s another prob-
lem, as the district court also noted: the claims require that
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 9 Filed: 10/12/2021
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. 9
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
each “location” be tied to a specific device. For instance,
the independent claims of the ’024 patent recite the “loca-
tion of the one or more mobile wireless communication de-
vices.” ’024 patent claims 1, 6, 11, 17. The independent
claims of the ’320 patent include the “location of the at least
one mobile wireless device.” ’320 patent claims 1, 4. And
the independent claims of the ’284 patent recite the “corre-
sponding location for said at least one wireless device” or
“location associated with said at least one wireless device”
(where the location is coupled with some other performance
data). ’284 patent claim 1; see also id. claim 12 (“location
for each of said at least two wireless devices”). Despite
some minor variability in claim language, in each claim it
is clear that the “location” must be of a device.
Compare this with the accused technology. As men-
tioned, the theory of infringement puts “location” as part of
Eden-NET’s KPIs. But the KPIs are aggregated over time,
over space, and over devices; they are not tied to specific
phones. Indeed, the performance information relates to an
entire area within a bin or cell—to all devices within that
grid. And Traxcell hasn’t provided any evidence to rebut
Nokia’s evidence on that point. J.A. 17; see Profectus Tech.
LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., 823 F.3d 1375, 1382–83
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment of nonin-
fringement in light of unrebutted evidence).
Traxcell first argues that the claims don’t require loca-
tion to be tied to specific devices. On this point, Traxcell
relies on the doctrine of claim differentiation. Because
some claims recite the “location for each . . . device,” it says,
the claims without “each” do not require per-device loca-
tions. But claim differentiation is “a guide, not a rigid
rule,” especially if the claim language is clearly to the con-
trary. Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1374, 1391
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Marine Polymer Techs., Inc.
v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
And Traxcell provides no adequate reason why the mere
presence of “each” should have this importance—especially
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 10 Filed: 10/12/2021
10 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
where the various claims all just seem to say the same
thing differently phrased. As we explained, each claim re-
cites the location of a device, or “locating” a device. See,
e.g., ’284 patent claim 1 (“locating at least one said wireless
device”). Not the average of many locations. The fact that
some claims require multiple device locations (i.e., loca-
tions for “each” device) does not mean that broader claims
only requiring a single device location need not be tied to a
specific device.
Traxcell also suggests that it just might happen that
one phone is alone in a cell or bin, by itself, for the averag-
ing period—meaning that, in theory, an averaged KPI for
that cell or bin would correspond to data for one device. But
that’s much too speculative. No evidence in the record sug-
gests that this is or ever was the case. See Ball Aerosol &
Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984,
995 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding summary judgment of nonin-
fringement to be appropriate where infringement required
a particular product configuration but where there was no
evidence that the infringing configuration had ever ex-
isted). And this evidentiary shortfall exists against abun-
dant evidence from Nokia’s expert—again, unrebutted—
that the system doesn’t know which devices generate the
data for any given geographic bin. See, e.g., J.A. 17, 2683,
2708, 3141, 3143, 3616, 3618–19.
We agree with the district court. On this record, there
is no genuine dispute of material fact that the accused tech-
nology’s geolocation systems do not employ a “location” as
claimed.
II
Next we address “first computer” and “computer,”
which are limitations in all asserted claims except claim 6
of the ’024 patent. Those terms are paired with various
functions throughout the claims. Construing those terms
to require that a single computer could perform the recited
functions, the district court concluded that Traxcell
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 11 Filed: 10/12/2021
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. 11
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
couldn’t show that the accused technology met those limi-
tations, and that summary judgment was proper. We
agree.
A
First, we address claim construction. The asserted
claims recite a “computer” or “first computer” capable of
taking certain actions. For example, claim 1 of the ’284 pa-
tent recites a “first computer programmed to perform the
steps” of “locating” a wireless device and “routinely storing
performance data and a corresponding location data,” and
being “further programmed” to “receive [an] error code”
and “selectively suggest a corrective action.” Similarly,
claim 1 of the ’024 patent recites “a computer . . . pro-
grammed to” perform a function, “wherein the computer
further” performs additional functions. The question is
whether these capabilities all belong to one computer or
can be spread among multiple. The district court construed
“first computer” and “computer” to mean a single computer
that can perform each function. See J.A. 5, 7, 2084–88.
We start with the claim language. See Immunex Corp.
v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 977 F.3d 1212, 1218 (Fed. Cir.
2020). As a matter of plain language, reciting “a computer”
(or a “first computer”) that performs a function, and then
further reciting that “the computer” (or “said first com-
puter”) performs multiple additional functions, suggests
that such “computer” must be tied to all those functions.
And it would make little sense—indeed, it would defy the
concept of antecedent basis—for the claims to recite “the
computer” or “said first computer” being “further” pro-
grammed to do a second set of tasks if a different computer
were to do those tasks instead.
The prosecution history confirms this understanding.
During prosecution, the applicant distinguished a prior-art
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 12 Filed: 10/12/2021
12 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
reference, “Andersson,” 5 in part because that reference
used multiple computers, whereas its claimed invention
(deemed “Reed”) used just one. A section of the applicant’s
arguments was titled “Single computer needed in Reed et
al. v. additional software needed in Andersson et al.”
J.A. 2007 (typeface normalized). There, the applicant ex-
plained that its claimed invention avoided the “extra steps,
equipment, and expense required by” the Andersson refer-
ence. J.A. 2007. Rather, its claimed solution taught “a first
computer . . . without the requirement of Andersson’s extra
equipment.” J.A. 2007 (typeface normalized). Namely, it
explained that “Reed’s invention for [its] functionality re-
quires only ‘a first computer.’ Andersson, on the other side,
cannot provide a location for the phone, without a second
computer in the phone.” J.A. 2007. And later it reiterated
that its invention “offers a single computer . . . without the
need for special hardware on the phone, second computers,
or a two way tuning communication with the wireless de-
vice.” J.A. 2008. Separately, distinguishing another prior-
art combination (Andersson and Steer), the applicant again
emphasized that its solution “requires only a first com-
puter,” unlike the asserted combination—which also
needed “a second computer requiring additional hardware
and software.” J.A. 1987–88. We agree with the district
court that the patentee clearly and unmistakably dis-
claimed the use of multiple computers.
Traxcell argues that we shouldn’t find a disclaimer this
broad because a narrower disclaimer would have been
enough to overcome the prior art. But the patentee is held
“to the actual arguments made, not the arguments that
could have been made.” Tech. Props., 849 F.3d at 1349;
Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1356, 1361–62
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[I]t frequently happens that patentees
5 U.S. Patent No. 6,334,047.
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 13 Filed: 10/12/2021
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. 13
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
surrender more through amendment than may have been
absolutely necessary to avoid particular prior art.”).
Consider also the specification. Figure 29—“the pre-
ferred embodiment”—pictures a lone computer, a “master
server” having “all [the] preferred embodiment[’]s software
and necessary hardware to operate.” ’284 patent Fig. 29;
id. at col. 48 ll. 36–49. This embodiment is consistent with
the single-computer construction based on the language
and the prosecution history, and Traxcell points to no em-
bodiment spreading functions among multiple computers.
Traxcell also suggests that a person of ordinary skill
would understand in general that the terms “first com-
puter” and “computer” would include multiple computers.
Set aside that Traxcell provides no extrinsic evidence on
this point. Even if it had, if the intrinsic record is to the
contrary, “the intrinsic record trumps.” Immunex, 977 F.3d
at 1222.
On the basis of the claim language, the prosecution his-
tory, and the specification, we agree with the district
court’s construction. The claims require a single computer
where a “first computer” or “computer” is mentioned.
B
Finally, we turn to the district court’s noninfringement
determination predicated on its construction of “first com-
puter” and “computer.” The court concluded that Traxcell
had not provided evidence that the limitation was satisfied.
First, Traxcell made no showing that a single Eden-NET
computer could perform the corresponding claimed func-
tions. And a multiple-computer infringement theory under
the doctrine of equivalents was doomed by prosecution-his-
tory estoppel. We discuss literal infringement and the doc-
trine of equivalents in turn.
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 14 Filed: 10/12/2021
14 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
1
The district court first concluded that Traxcell had not
presented the requisite evidence to show a genuine factual
dispute under a literal-infringement theory. We agree.
As explained above, Eden-NET is a distributed system
with various functions performed on various modules and
servers and processors. For its part, Nokia provided un-
controverted evidence from its corporate representative
that Eden-NET not only is installed on multiple computers
but that it must be. For instance, Eden-NET has “various
software functions” that “have to run on disparate com-
puter systems.” J.A. 2654. Eden-NET “run[s] on distinct
computers” to avoid “a single point of failure,” and its “size”
makes it impossible to run on just one. J.A. 2693; see also
J.A. 2692, 2694; Profectus Tech., 823 F.3d at 1382–83.
Traxcell didn’t dispute this evidence. Instead, it ex-
plained that all the functions are accessible to a user
through a graphical user interface (that is, a “GUI”) run by
a specialized GUI server. Traxcell argued that this GUI
server qualifies as a “single computer” that performs all the
claimed functions. But the GUI server is an interface—a
point of interaction. J.A. 19. It doesn’t (and can’t) perform
the functions itself. Indeed, Traxcell’s expert explained
that “the GUI server gets its information from the other
modules, from the other subroutines that are running on
different servers or different processors.” J.A. 19; see also
J.A. 3055–56 (providing unrebutted evidence that the GUI
is merely the “front end” that “collects the information from
all the other servers,” displays it, and lets the user control
them). As the district court observed, Traxcell “has not
shown that even its own expert considers the GUI server
to be a single computer.” J.A. 19. The court went on to
explain that Traxcell hadn’t shown how various specific
functions were performed by the GUI server. J.A. 19. Al-
ternatively, Traxcell argues that, by controlling other com-
puters that perform the claimed functions, the GUI server
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 15 Filed: 10/12/2021
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. 15
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
meets the limitations. This interpretation, however, would
nullify the single-versus-multiple-computer distinction in
claim construction.
We agree with the district court. Traxcell’s showing is
insufficient to withstand summary judgment.
2
We also agree with the district court that prosecution-
history estoppel forecloses Traxcell’s alternative multiple-
computer infringement theory.
If a patentee surrenders some scope during prosecu-
tion, that territory isn’t available later as a doctrine-of-
equivalents battleground. Amgen Inc. v. Coherus BioSci-
ences Inc., 931 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Scope sur-
render often occurs through a claim amendment, but it can
also result from arguments—that is, if the prosecution his-
tory “evince[s] a clear and unmistakable surrender of sub-
ject matter.” Id. The relevant inquiry is “whether a
competitor would reasonably believe that the applicant had
surrendered the relevant subject matter.” Id. at 1159–60
(quoting PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc., 484 F.3d 1359, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2007)). Whether prosecution-history estoppel ap-
plies is a question of law. Id. at 1159.
Traxcell’s first challenge to the application of prosecu-
tion-history estoppel is its contention that nothing was sur-
rendered at all. We disagree with Traxcell, as explained in
our claim-construction analysis.
Traxcell also insists that the district court didn’t ade-
quately parse out which equivalents were surrendered and
which weren’t. Traxcell essentially argues that, seeing
some surrender, the district court wielded prosecution-his-
tory estoppel as a crude categorical cudgel and ignored that
only the surrendered scope is excluded from recapture.
Again we disagree with Traxcell. The district court
properly concluded that multiple-computer equivalents, as
asserted, were surrendered—not that all equivalents were.
Case: 20-1440 Document: 68 Page: 16 Filed: 10/12/2021
16 TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS
We agree with the district court that Traxcell clearly
and unmistakably surrendered multiple-computer equiva-
lents during prosecution and that a competitor would rea-
sonably believe those equivalents to be fair game. Traxcell
cannot reclaim that lost territory now.
III
Finally, we note that Nokia has argued that many of
Traxcell’s arguments have been forfeited through failure to
timely raise them at the trial court, or for other reasons.
We need not reach the forfeiture issues, however, because
we agree with the district court and disagree with Traxcell
on the merits. See Immunex, 977 F.3d at 1216; TEK
Global, S.R.L. v. Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc., 920 F.3d 777, 787
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Traxcell’s remaining arguments
but find them unpersuasive. For the reasons we have ex-
plained, we affirm.
AFFIRMED