RENDERED: OCTOBER 15, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2018-CA-0866-MR
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA, INC.,
F/K/A SQUARE D COMPANY APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT
2019-SC-0537-DG
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JOHN E. REYNOLDS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CI-01842
PAUL WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY;
COLBY WILLIAMS BY AND
THROUGH HIS PARENT,
GUARDIAN, AND NEXT FRIEND
PAUL WILLIAMS; UNION CARBIDE
CORPORATION; AND PAUL WILLIAMS,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF VICKIE WILLIAMS APPELLEES
OPINION
DISMISSING AND
REMANDING
BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
GOODWINE, JUDGE: This matter is on remand from the Kentucky Supreme
Court instructing us to reconsider our prior Opinion in light of its recent decision in
Sheets v. Ford Motor Company, 626 S.W.3d 594 (Ky. 2021). After careful review
in conformity with Sheets, we dismiss this appeal as interlocutory and remand to
the trial court.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Vickie Williams’s (“Williams”) father worked for Schneider Electric
USA, Inc. (f/k/a Square D Company) (“Square D”) for many years, during which
time she purportedly encountered asbestos brought home on her father’s clothing.
Williams also worked for Square D for a few months as a teenager in 1978. In her
May 2016 unverified complaint, Williams asserted that she was directly exposed to
asbestos when working at Square D’s facility in 1978 and was indirectly exposed
to asbestos fibers from her father’s clothing1 which led to her mesothelioma.
Square D’s answer invoked the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Kentucky Workers’ Compensation statutes whereby Williams’s only potential
recourse is via a workers’ compensation claim. Specifically, KRS2 342.690(1)
provides in relevant part that “[i]f an employer secures payment of compensation
as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee[.]”
1
Williams also sued sundry manufacturers and sellers of products containing asbestos, including
Appellee Union Carbide Corporation.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-
Williams died in February 2017, and her husband/executor was
substituted as named plaintiff. Square D moved for summary judgment initially
and after the close of discovery. The trial court denied the motion, concluding
KRS 342.690 applied only to workplace injuries and there was no evidence that
Williams’s mesothelioma was caused by her having worked for Square D. 3 This
appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Williams’s first argument on appeal is that it should be dismissed as
interlocutory.4 We previously ruled that Williams’s argument runs contrary to our
holding in Ervin Cable Construction, LLC v. Lay, 461 S.W.3d 422, 423 (Ky. App.
2015), that “the denial of a substantial claim of immunity is an exception to the
finality rule that interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable.” However,
the Kentucky Supreme Court recently overruled Ervin and held in Sheets that an
appellate court does not have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to
review a trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment based on up-the-
3
Briefly, we reject Square D’s argument that the trial court’s decision must be reversed because
it adopted a proposed order tendered by Williams. The court asked both Williams and Square D
for proposed orders and later adopted Williams’s tendered draft. Such a procedure is not
impermissible. See, e.g., Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Commonwealth of Kentucky,
954 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. 1997).
4
A motion panel of this Court has already summarily rejected this argument, but a merits panel
generally may revisit a motion panel’s decision. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Young,
361 S.W.3d 344, 350 (Ky. App. 2012).
-3-
ladder immunity pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act. Sheets, 626 S.W.3d
594.
Specifically, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that “merely being
denied a claimed ‘immunity’ was not necessarily sufficient to invoke the [collateral
order] doctrine as an exception to the final order rule.” Id. at 598 (citing
Commonwealth v. Farmer, 423 S.W.3d 690 (Ky. 2014)). The Court explained that
“the collateral order doctrine requires an order that (1) conclusively decides an
important issue separate from the merits of the case; (2) is effectively unreviewable
following final judgment; and (3) involves a substantial public interest that would
be imperiled absent an immediate appeal.” Id.
We conclude that the trial court’s denial of up-the-ladder immunity in
this case does not meet the three-element test articulated in Farmer as it does not
involve a substantial public interest that would be imperiled absent an immediate
appeal. The parties are not governmental entities or officials. Therefore, there is
no concern with government efficiency, the disruption of government services due
to the costs and burden of litigation or public coffers placed at risk. The interests
at stake in this case are purely personal to Williams and Square D without an
impact on the greater public interest. Because the interlocutory order at issue in
this case does not meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine set forth in
Farmer, and reiterated in Sheets, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
-4-
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings without addressing the parties’ remaining arguments.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE PAUL
WILLIAMS INDIVIDUALLY AND
Palmer G. Vance II AS EXECUTOR OF ESTATE OF
Todd S. Page VICKIE WILLIAMS AND AS
Matthew R. Parsons GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND
Lexington, Kentucky OF COLBY WILLIAMS:
Joseph D. Satterly
Paul J. Kelley
Paul J. Ivie
J. Eric Kiser
J. Garrett Cambron
Louisville, Kentucky
-5-