FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 18 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEBRA LEGRIS; AVIANA LEGRIS, No. 20-56261
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.
8:19-cv-00837-DOC-ADS
v.
CAPISTRANO UNIFIED SCHOOL MEMORANDUM*
DISTRICT, a local educational agency,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, CHRISTEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Aviana Legris and her mother, Debra Legris, appeal the district court’s order
affirming the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision that Aviana did not qualify
for special-education services during high school pursuant to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The Legrises also
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
appeal the district court’s conclusion that Capistrano did not violate its Child Find
obligation or IDEA’s procedural requirements. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We review de novo the district court’s conclusions of law and its findings of
fact for clear error. L.J. v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th
Cir. 2017). We afford “due weight” to state administrative proceedings, Van Duyn
ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206
(1982)), with particular deference to an ALJ’s administrative findings when “they
are thorough and careful,” Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir.
1994).
1. The Legrises argue the district court impermissibly deferred to the
ALJ’s decision. A district court reviewing an IDEA due process hearing gives
“less deference than is conventional in review of other agency actions.” J.W. ex
rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993)). But
deference to the ALJ’s findings is due where the findings are “thorough and
careful.” Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting Union, 15 F.3d at 1524). We deem the ALJ’s findings “thorough
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and careful when the officer participates in the questioning of witnesses and writes
a decision containing a complete factual background as well as a discrete analysis
supporting the ultimate conclusions.” R.B., ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified
Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Park, ex rel. Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1031
(9th Cir. 2006)). Here, the ALJ’s decision was “thorough and careful”; it included
“a detailed factual background and analysis” and the ALJ “explain[ed] her legal
conclusions thoroughly.” See J.W., 626 F.3d at 441. And as the district court
found, the hearing transcripts reflect the ALJ’s active involvement at the hearing.
See id.
The Legrises further contend that “[t]he ALJ drastically misstated the issue
for the hearing.” Although the ALJ did not address whether Capistrano violated
IDEA’s procedural requirements, the district court did. The ALJ’s
“reorganization” of the issue was “inconsequential to the Student,” and there is no
reversible error. J.W., 626 F.3d at 442–43.
2. The Legrises also argue the district court did not afford Dr. Stephey’s
testimony “substantial deference under the treating physician rule” and that the
ALJ’s credibility finding was flawed. The Ninth Circuit has applied the “treating
physician rule” in Social Security appeals. See, e.g., Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,
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830–33 (9th Cir. 1995). But the Legrises offer no authority for the proposition that
we apply the rule to IDEA challenges, and we are aware of none. Even if we
applied the rule here, the ALJ carefully considered Dr. Stephey’s opinion and gave
clear and convincing reasons for disagreeing with it. Moreover, the ALJ based her
credibility finding on Dr. Stephey’s live testimony and demeanor, and her finding
was supported by the weight of other evidence questioning Dr. Stephey’s
conclusions. See Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d
877, 893 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that we give “due weight” to an ALJ’s credibility
findings “so long as they are supported by the record”). The district court
permissibly deferred to the ALJ’s credibility finding.
3. Next, the Legrises contend that Capistrano violated its Child Find
obligation and IDEA’s procedural requirements. “Child Find” encapsulates a
school district’s duty to assess whether a child is eligible for special education once
the school district is on notice of a suspected disability. See, e.g., Timothy O. v.
Paso Robles Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d 1105, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2016); see also
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56301 (incorporating Child Find
into California law). A school district must follow various IDEA procedural
requirements when assessing a child’s special-education eligibility, see, e.g., 20
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U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2), but “a procedural violation cannot qualify an otherwise
ineligible student for IDEA relief,” R.B., 496 F.3d at 942.
The Legrises first argue Capistrano did not act on notice of “Aviana’s visual
difficulties and their severe impact on her ability to read.” But the record lacks the
kind of warning signs that would trigger Capistrano’s obligation to assess Aviana
for an IEP before August 2017. The district court found that Capistrano
“conducted a thorough and multi-disciplinary assessment to address Aviana’s
ADHD” based on her parent’s request before she transferred to a Capistrano school
for her junior year. The court concluded that Capistrano “reasonably provided
Aviana with a Section 504 plan to address her diagnosed ADHD” and was not put
on notice of a “suspected disability.” The record supports this finding.
The Legrises also argue that Capistrano violated IDEA when it assessed
Aviana for an IEP in her senior year because it failed to assess her “in the area of
developmental vision.” IDEA requires a school district to “use a variety of
assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant . . . information,” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(b)(2)(A), and to “review existing evaluation data on the child,
including . . . current classroom-based, local, or State assessments” to “identify
what additional data, if any, are needed” to determine a child’s eligibility,
§ 1414(c)(1). Capistrano reviewed “existing evaluation data,” conducted new
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cognitive and standardized tests, consulted Aviana’s instructors, observed her in
class, and determined that a separate visual assessment was not necessary.
Capistrano also reviewed Aviana’s reports from evaluators retained by her family
and discussed this data at an IEP meeting with Aviana’s parents. We agree with
the district court that the Legrises did not demonstrate a procedural violation of
IDEA.
4. Last, the Legrises argue the district court erred because Aviana met
IDEA’s eligibility requirements for special-education services. “A child is
substantively eligible for special education and related services if [s]he is a ‘child
with a disability.’” L.J., 850 F.3d at 1003 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)). Here,
IDEA required a showing that by reason of a visual impairment, other health
impairment, or specific learning disability, Aviana “need[ed] special education and
related services.” Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)). Aviana could “not qualify
for special education services if support provided through the regular school
program [wa]s sufficient.” Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ.
Code § 56026(a)–(b).
The Legrises argue that Aviana progressed in high school only “through
parent-funded special education [at Fusion] and related services” and that this
established her eligibility because “one-to-one instruction . . . was clearly special
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education.” But as the ALJ and district court recognized, the record shows that
Aviana ably accessed the general curriculum with only Section 504 plan
accommodations. Aviana consistently earned As, Bs, and Cs at Capistrano’s
schools and her reading fluency and comprehension scores remained average or
better. The district court correctly concluded that Aviana’s one-to-one instruction
at a private school was not “special education” that qualified her for IDEA benefits
or that Capistrano was required to match.
The district court also found that Aviana was not substantively eligible for
IDEA benefits based on a vision impairment, other health impairment, or specific
learning disability. The Legrises argue that Aviana qualified for IDEA benefits
because Dr. Stephey diagnosed her with convergence insufficiency and treated her
with vision therapy. Aviana received vision therapy from Dr. Stephey, but the
parties dispute whether the convergence insufficiency diagnosis was credible.
Even if we assume a credible diagnosis, the district court correctly concluded that
the Legrises did not demonstrate that Aviana required services beyond
modification of the regular school program before or after she received vision
therapy and one-to-one instruction.
As for an “other health impairment” or “specific learning disability,” the
Legrises point to little evidence or legal authority supporting their contention that
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Aviana met the eligibility requirements for either category. See 34 C.F.R. §
300.8(a)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i). And the record supports the
district court’s conclusion that Aviana adequately accessed the curriculum in the
regular classroom with her Section 504 accommodations. We affirm the district
court’s conclusion that Aviana was not eligible for special education services.
AFFIRMED.
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Debra Legris v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.
Combined Opinion