IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–1509
Submitted September 16, 2021—Filed October 22, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JAMEESHA RENAE ALLEN,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.
The defendant appeals from her conviction of assault while using or
displaying a dangerous weapon, claiming the district court impermissibly
permitted the State to amend the trial information filed against her. DECISION
OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED, CONVICTION VACATED, AND REMANDED.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Appel, Oxley,
and McDermott, JJ., joined. Mansfield, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., joined.
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Gary Dickey (argued) of Dickey, Campbell, and Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des
Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
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McDONALD, Justice.
Jameesha Allen was convicted of assault while using or displaying a
dangerous weapon. In this direct appeal, Allen contends the district court erred
in three respects. First, the district court erred in allowing the State to amend
the trial information on the day of trial. Second, the district court erred in
admitting certain surveillance videos into evidence. Third, the district court erred
in denying her motion for new trial based on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
We conclude the district court erred in allowing the amendment to the trial
information, and we vacate Allen’s conviction.
Desean Waldrip called 911 from the parking lot of a Dollar General store
and requested police assistance. He told the operator that somebody had
scratched his car and stabbed him. He then told the operator that five people in
two cars were chasing him. He said, “They’re trying to kill me,” and reported he
was being run over by one of the cars. When the 911 operator asked about the
extent of his injuries, Waldrip said that he had “a lot.” While still on the phone,
Waldrip fled to a nearby Hy-Vee grocery store. The store manager noticed
Waldrip’s left hand was bleeding. Police responded to the store within a few
minutes, but Waldrip declined medical attention and left the scene. Police saw a
blue car registered to Allen leave the grocery store. Surveillance video taken from
a nearby fast food restaurant shows a blue car jumping over a curb and grazing
Waldrip. Police interviewed Allen the next day at her residence. The interview
was recorded on the officer’s body camera. During the interview, Allen admitted
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she was driving the blue car that struck Waldrip as recorded in the restaurant
surveillance video.
The State filed a trial information charging Allen with assault causing
bodily injury, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2(2)
(2019), and third-degree criminal mischief, an aggravated misdemeanor, in
violation of Iowa Code section 716.5. On the first day of trial, the State dismissed
the criminal mischief count and moved to amend the charge of assault causing
bodily injury to assault while using or displaying a dangerous weapon, an
aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(c) and
708.2(3). Over Allen’s objection, the district court allowed the amendment,
finding that the elements of the original and amended charge were “substantially
similar.”
A jury found Allen guilty of the amended charge, and the district court
sentenced her to a two-year suspended sentence, two years’ probation, and a
$625 fine.
Allen timely appealed her conviction, and this court transferred the matter
to the court of appeals. Allen argued on appeal that the difference in elements
between the original and amended charges rendered the amended charge wholly
new and different, and thus prohibited under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
2.4(8)(a). The court of appeals agreed and reversed Allen’s conviction. Applying
State v. Sharpe, 304 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Iowa 1981), the court of appeals held the
district court should have disallowed the amendment because the amended
charge increased the level of punishment and because the amended charge
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contained different elements. Finding the issue dispositive, the court of appeals
did not address Allen’s remaining assignments of error.
We granted the State’s application for further review. “On further review,
we have the discretion to review any issue raised on appeal.” Burton v. Hilltop
Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Marin, 788 N.W.2d
833, 836 (Iowa 2010), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,
880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)). We exercise our discretion in this case to address
only Allen’s contentions regarding the amendment to the trial information.
Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.4(8)(a),1 a district court may
allow the State to amend a trial information “so as to correct errors or omissions
in matters of form or substance.” The district court must deny the State’s motion
to amend a trial information if the amendment charges a “wholly new and
different offense” or if the amendment prejudices the “substantial rights of the
defendant.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.4(8)(a). Whether an amendment charges a wholly
new and different offense or prejudices the substantial rights of the defendant
are questions of law, and our review is for the correction of legal error. State v.
Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997).
Under Sharpe, as reaffirmed today in our decision in State v. Vandermark,
an amended trial information charges a wholly new and different offense when
the new offense has different or additional elements and increases the potential
punishment. State v. Vandermark, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2021); Sharpe, 304
1Although the rule refers solely to indictments, it is equally applicable to trial
informations. State v. Brothern, 832 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Iowa 2013) (citing Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.5(5)).
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N.W.2d at 223. An offense is not wholly new and different if the amendment
charges a “different means” of committing the same base offense. Sharpe, 304
N.W.2d at 223; see, e.g., State v. Schertz, 330 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1983) (allowing
amendment to charge a different means of committing kidnapping in the first
degree). As we explained in Vandermark, this bright-line rule for determining
whether an offense is wholly new and different “protect[s] the role of the agency
that screened the charge,” promotes consistency in the administration of justice,
and is consistent with the approach taken by the majority of jurisdictions.
Vandermark, ___ N.W.2d at ___ (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Wayne R.
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 19.5(b) (4th ed. 2020)). Further, the Sharpe
standard has not proved unworkable in the four decades since it was
pronounced, and stare decisis dictates that we should not disturb it.
Vandermark, ___ N.W.2d at ___.
The amended trial information here charged a wholly new and different
offense within the meaning of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.4(8)(a), and the
district court erred in allowing the amendment. First, the charges include
different elements. To convict Allen of assault causing bodily injury (the original
charge), the State would have had to prove that she committed assault against
Waldrip and caused him bodily injury or mental illness. Iowa Code § 708.2(2).
To convict Allen of assault while using or displaying a dangerous weapon (the
amended charge), the State had to prove that she committed assault while
displaying a dangerous weapon towards Waldrip in a threatening manner. Id.
§§ 708.1(2)(c), .2(3). The elements of the two offenses are plainly different as each
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requires proof of an element not found in the other. See Mathis v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016) (“At a trial, [elements] are what the jury must find
beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant.”). Second, the amendment
increased the range of punishment from one year of imprisonment to two years,
and the maximum fine from $1,875 to $6,250. Compare Iowa Code § 903.1(1)(b)
(maximum sentence for serious misdemeanors), with id. § 903.1(2) (maximum
sentence for aggravated misdemeanors).
The State argues that both the original and amended informations charged
Allen with the base offense of assault and thus the amendment merely alleged a
different means of committing the same base offense. This argument is
unavailing. Assault is defined in section 708.1 of the Code, and different degrees
of assault are identified in section 708.2 of the Code. Each of the degrees of
assault require proof of different or additional facts. We have held each of the
assault offenses are separate and distinct offenses. See State v. Finnel, 515
N.W.2d 41, 43 (Iowa 1994) (holding serious assault under Iowa Code section
708.2(2) (1991) is not a lesser included offense of assault while participating in
a felony under Iowa Code section 708.3 because of the difference in elements);
see also State v. Swanson, 423 N.W.2d 560, 562 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (holding
assault causing bodily injury under Iowa Code section 708.2(2) (1987) is not a
lesser included offense of assault with intent to inflict serious injury under Iowa
Code section 708.2(1)). Further, outside the context of drug trafficking and
recidivist statutes, we have disallowed amendments that increase the range of
potential punishment. See, e.g., Maghee, 573 N.W.2d at 5; State v. Berney, 378
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N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 1985), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bruce, 795
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2011).
Since we hold that the amendment of the trial information from assault
causing bodily injury to assault while using or displaying a dangerous weapon
resulted in Allen being charged with a wholly new and different offense and was
improper, we need not reach the question of whether Allen suffered prejudice
because of the amendment. See Maghee, 573 N.W.2d at 6; State v. Williams, 305
N.W.2d 428, 431–32 (Iowa 1981). We vacate Allen’s conviction and remand the
matter to the district court for further proceedings. We decline to address Allen’s
remaining contentions on appeal. See State v. Wright, 961 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Iowa
2021).
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED, CONVICTION VACATED, AND REMANDED.
Appel, Oxley, and McDermott, JJ., join this opinion. Mansfield, J., files a
dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join.
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#19–1509, State v. Allen
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in State v. Vandermark,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2021) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
Substantial evidence, including surveillance video and a 911 call,
supported a finding that the defendant Jameesha Allen intentionally drove her
vehicle into the victim. The defendant admitted at the time she was “completely
pissed off” and was “chasing him” although she said she “didn’t think” she had
hit him. The district court found “overwhelming evidence” of the defendant’s
guilt.
Originally, the State charged assault causing bodily injury in violation of
Iowa Code section 708.2(2), a serious misdemeanor. At the outset of trial, the
State was permitted to amend the information to charge assault while using or
displaying a dangerous weapon in violation of section 708.2(3), an aggravated
misdemeanor. It is not clear when the amended trial information was submitted,
as opposed to formally filed with the approval of the court. However, defense
counsel conceded that she filed jury instructions on the amended information
the previous week, so it had been submitted at least some time the week before
trial.
Not mentioned in the majority opinion is the fact that the State tried to,
but was not allowed to, amend the information to add a charge of willful injury
in violation of section 708.4(2). The district court reasoned that the two assault
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charges were substantially similar but the willful injury charge, a class “D”
felony, was not.
The majority’s concern about “protect[ing] the role of the agency that
screened the charge” is unfounded here. The “agency” that screened the original
charge was the district court, and the district court had to—and did—approve
the amended trial information under the same screening standard that it applied
to the original trial information. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.5(4).
I would affirm Allen’s conviction and sentence. The charged incident didn’t
change. The evidence didn’t change. The amendment simply modified the version
of assault charged. Our precedent, as I’ve discussed in Vandermark, clearly
allows amendments for different versions of “drug trafficking” even if the new
version has different elements and carries a more serious penalty. See State v.
Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 4–5 (Iowa 1997); State v. Williams, 305 N.W.2d 428, 430–
31 (Iowa 1981). There is no logical reason to distinguish drug trafficking from
other offenses. Here the amendment elevated the status of the offense only from
a serious to an aggravated misdemeanor.2 See Iowa Code § 708.2(2)–(3). The
amended assault charge was not a “wholly new and different” charge.
Nor was there prejudice to the defendant, who did not seek a continuance.
Allen’s implausible trial defense was that (1) she had been asleep that morning,
(2) someone else had used her car to chase down the victim, and (3) her prior
admissions had been a “miscommunication.”
2The defendant received a suspended sentence and probation.
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Restarting this case back in 2019 when the State sought leave to amend
would have served no useful purpose. And assuming the State refiles the charges
here, it will serve no useful purpose now.
I would affirm the district court’s ruling and vacate the decision of the
court of appeals.
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join this dissent.