NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 21a0477n.06
No. 20-4183
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DOMINGO JIMENEZ-LORENZO, ) FILED
) Oct 25, 2021
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Petitioner,
)
)
v. ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM
)
THE UNITED STATES BOARD OF
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, ) IMMIGRATION APPEALS
)
)
Respondent.
)
)
Before: DAUGHTREY, COLE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. Domingo Jimenez-Lorenzo, a native
and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) denying his request for asylum and withholding of removal. He argues that he offered
sufficient evidence both of past persecution and of fear of future persecution to justify a grant of
relief. As did the immigration judge and the BIA, we hold that, even if Jimenez-Lorenzo could
establish that he has been or will be persecuted in Guatemala, he has not shown that such
persecution was based upon a protected ground. We thus deny the petition for review.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As an unaccompanied fifteen-year-old, Jimenez-Lorenzo traveled from Guatemala to enter
the United States without inspection in August 2014. He then filed a timely application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT)
Case No. 20-4183, Jimenez-Lorenzo v. Garland
in April 2015. Jimenez-Lorenzo subsequently conceded removability after admitting that he
entered the country without inspection.
At a later evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, Jimenez-Lorenzo claimed that
he had suffered past persecution and feared future persecution both because of his religion and
because of his membership in a particular social group, which he defined as indigenous
Guatemalan youth church members. In support of his claim, Jimenez-Lorenzo recounted how, in
June 2014, he was walking to his Seventh-Day Adventist church in his Guatemalan hometown
when four members of the 18th Street Gang approached him and tried to convince him to join the
group. Despite the gang members’ assertion that he would “have a bunch of good things” if he
joined them, Jimenez-Lorenzo declined their offer because he “assume[d] that these individuals
w[ould] ask [him] or force [him] to steal if [he] bec[a]me part of the group, or even more, maybe
kidnap someone.” In response, the gang members told Jimenez-Lorenzo, “[I]f we ever see you
again and you are refusing to join us, we have to hit you.”
Two weeks later, Jimenez-Lorenzo was walking to a neighborhood convenience store
when three of the gang members who had previously accosted him—together with three other gang
members—confronted him, pushed him to the ground, and threatened more severe actions if he
still refused to join the gang the next time they saw him. Even though his attackers offered no
reason for their actions other than their desire to increase gang membership, Jimenez-Lorenzo felt
that the confrontation was precipitated by the gang’s dislike of his church attendance. As he
testified, “They want me to join them. They don’t like that I am doing good things at church. They
don’t like that I do not do the horrible things that they are doing. That’s why they don’t like me.
That’s why they want me to become part of their group.”
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In early August 2014, Jimenez-Lorenzo visited the same convenience store once again. On
that occasion, he was accosted by gang members who referred to his prior refusals to join the
group. They hit him in the face and kicked him in the stomach and back. As a result of that attack,
Jimenez-Lorenzo suffered bruises and swelling that were treated with medication at a local hospital
to ease inflammation and pain.
Jimenez-Lorenzo saw members of the 18th Street Gang once more after he was beaten and
kicked, but the gang did not bother him at that time because he was with his parents in a crowded,
busy section of town. Nevertheless, he made the decision to leave Guatemala on August 12, 2014,
and, like three of his siblings, he traveled to the United States to work and to send money back to
Guatemala to help his parents and a younger sibling.
Jimenez-Lorenzo further testified regarding his belief that if he were to return to
Guatemala, gang members would find him, kidnap him, beat him, and eventually kill him.
Moreover, he claimed that the local police would not save him from physical attack because law
enforcement officials demand large sums of money for such protection—money that he and his
Guatemalan relatives do not have.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the immigration judge found Jimenez-Lorenzo to be a
credible witness. Nevertheless, the immigration judge denied the request for asylum because she
did not believe that Jimenez-Lorenzo was targeted for his religion or his membership in a particular
social group. She explained:
There was no evidence that the gang members who harmed him or whom he feared
were interested in his religion. There was more evidence that they simply were
trying to recruit new members, which unfortunately is a common problem in
Guatemala. The court further finds there’s no evidence the asserted particular social
group is socially distinct within the society of Guatemala. Again, unfortunately,
Guatemalan gangs do try to recruit many young men, but gang recruitment is not a
basis for an asylum claim which is a well-established fact.
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(Citing Matter of E-A-G- 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008)) (emphasis added). The immigration judge
also found no basis for granting Jimenez-Lorenzo withholding of removal or relief under the CAT.
In reviewing the immigration judge’s denials of asylum and withholding of removal,1 the
BIA concluded that Jimenez-Lorenzo’s mere perceptions and beliefs regarding the motivation for
the 18th Street Gang’s encounters with him were insufficient to establish that any protected
characteristic—rather than a mere desire to increase gang membership—was the basis for the
alleged persecution and feared future persecution. In the absence of any relevant evidence to
support Jimenez-Lorenzo’s claims, the BIA dismissed the appeal of the denials of asylum and
withholding of removal.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
When the BIA issues its own decision in a matter before it, we review that decision “as the
final agency determination.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009). When the BIA
simply adopts the reasoning of the immigration judge, however, we also review the immigration
judge’s decision. Id. We review questions of law de novo, but factual findings under a substantial-
evidence standard. Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, 959 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2020). Under that
substantial-evidence standard, findings of fact made by an agency “must be upheld if supported
by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We may
reverse those factual findings only if the evidence in the record “not only supports a contrary
1
In his appeal of the immigration judge’s determination to the BIA, Jimenez-Lorenzo made no mention or argument
regarding his claim under the CAT. The BIA thus found that portion of the claim for relief to have been waived.
Furthermore, Jimenez-Lorenzo makes no effort to revive that claim in his petition for review in this court.
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conclusion, but indeed compels it.” Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1).
Request for Asylum
To establish his entitlement to asylum, Jimenez-Lorenzo must satisfy both prongs of a two-
step inquiry. Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2007). First, he must qualify as a
“refugee” as that term is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), and second, he must show that his
application “merits a favorable exercise of discretion by the Attorney General.” Id. (citations
omitted).
In pertinent part, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) provides:
The term “refugee” means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
An asylum applicant bears the burden of proving that he or she is a refugee, “within the meaning
of section 1101(a)(42)(A) . . . . To establish that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of
such section, the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the
applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added). See also Bonilla-Morales v. Holder,
607 F.3d 1132, 1136 (6th Cir. 2010).
Regardless of whether Jimenez-Lorenzo would merit “a favorable exercise of discretion
by the Attorney General,” the evidence in the record before us does not support a determination
that Jimenez-Lorenzo meets the statutory definition of a “refugee.” Even presuming that the
threats to, and physical attacks on, Jimenez-Lorenzo constitute “persecution”—and that
indigenous Guatemalan youth church members can be considered a “particular social group”—
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absolutely no evidence offered by Jimenez-Lorenzo indicates that “at least one central reason” for
such persecution was his religion or membership in a recognizable, particular social group.
At his evidentiary hearing, Jimenez-Lorenzo did offer an exhibit entitled “Interface of
Churches and Organised Crime in Latin America.” In that article, the author posited that criminal
organizations’ persecution of Christians generally is motivated by two elements:
The primary reason for persecution is that organised crime sees Christians as a
threat when they openly oppose their activities, especially when they get involved
in social programmes or in politics.
The second reason, that often inspires the first one, is the view that Christian faith
is not compatible with their ideals, and that they fear Christians will influence
members of the community or even members of their own organisations to oppose
their activities.
In his own testimony before the immigration judge, Jimenez-Lorenzo echoed those same reasons
for why he thought that the gang members were attacking him.
Importantly, though, the only evidence that can be gleaned from the administrative record
in this case is that the 18th Street Gang targeted, attacked, and injured Jimenez-Lorenzo, not
because his Christian ideals were incompatible with the goals of the gang, but rather because the
gang members were upset that Jimenez-Lorenzo would not join their organization. In fact,
Jimenez-Lorenzo himself testified that, while he was being attacked, and later, when he was
threatened with future violence, the gang members spoke only of his recalcitrance in joining forces
with them—not of any opposition to religion, a particular religious denomination, or religious
values. Consequently, Jimenez-Lorenzo has failed to establish the necessary nexus between a
protected status and any past or potential persecution. See Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d
491, 500 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[F]orced recruitment alone does not establish the nexus of persecution
‘on account of’ a protected statutory ground.” (citing Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482)). In the
absence of any proof whatsoever that either Jimenez-Lorenzo’s religion or his particular-social-
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group membership was “at least one central reason” for the alleged persecution he suffered, we
conclude that Jimenez-Lorenzo cannot establish his entitlement to a grant of asylum.
Request for Withholding of Removal
Pursuant to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) governing withholding of removal,
“the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that
the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” To justify a grant of
withholding of removal under that statutory provision, therefore, a petitioner “must establish that
there is a clear probability that he will be subject to persecution if forced to return to the country
of removal.” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 951 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Additionally, individuals seeking withholding of removal “must demonstrate that a protected
ground was at least one reason for their persecution.” Guzman-Vazquez, 959 F.3d at 274
(emphasis added).
In Guzman-Vazquez, we held that applicants for withholding of removal did not, like
individuals seeking asylum, need to prove that the protected ground was one of the central reasons
for the persecution; instead, a petitioner need show only that a protected ground was one such
reason. Id. That somewhat lesser burden of proof is of no help to Jimenez-Lorenzo, however.
Because the immigration judge correctly found that the administrative record contains no evidence
that the 18th Street Gang targeted Jimenez-Lorenzo because of his religion or his status as an
indigenous Guatemalan youth church member, Jimenez-Lorenzo cannot establish the necessary
nexus between a protected ground and past persecution or fear of future persecution that would
justify a grant of withholding of removal.
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CONCLUSION
Any persecution that Jimenez-Lorenzo suffered was due to his refusal to join the 18th
Street gang, not because of a statutorily protected ground. Although gang violence and retaliation
for refusal to join gangs are terrifying and tragic realities in many parts of the world, until Congress
exhibits the courage to reform our nation’s immigration laws to promote the compassion and
humanity that our nation purports to exemplify, people like Jimenez-Lorenzo will continue to
suffer and be forced to live lives marked by fear and brutal violence. Under the laws as they now
exist, we are constrained to conclude that Jimenez-Lorenzo has failed to establish the required
nexus to justify a grant either of asylum or withholding of removal. We therefore DENY his
petition for review.
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