[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
January 10, 2007
No. 06-10091 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-02221-CV-T-27TBM
FELIX GOMEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN DOE, (Executive Administrator Name to
replace John Doe), DeSoto Memorial Hospital,
JOHN DOE, (Executive Administrator Name to
replace John Doe), DeSoto County Jail,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 10, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Felix Gomez, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In his November
2005 complaint, Gomez alleged that the Executive Administrator of DeSoto
Memorial Hospital and the Executive Administrator of the DeSoto County Jail
acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by denying him
medical treatment for the injuries that he suffered in a car accident in June 1987.
The district court concluded that Gomez’s claims were barred by the four-year
statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions arising in Florida and dismissed
his complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). On appeal, Gomez again argues that
the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, but fails to address the applicability of
the statute of limitations to his case. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Section 1915(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides, in
part, that any in forma pauperis action or appeal shall be dismissed at any time if it
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The running of the statute of limitations is sufficient grounds
for dismissing a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157,
1163 (11th Cir. 2003). “To dismiss a prisoner’s complaint as time-barred prior to
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service, it must appear beyond a doubt from the complaint itself that the prisoner
can prove no set of facts which would avoid a statute of limitations bar.” Id.
(internal quotations and brackets omitted).
Because § 1983 does not contain a specific statute of limitations provision,
courts apply the statute of limitations that governs personal-injury tort actions in
the state where the claim arose. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 280, 105
S.Ct. 1938, 1947, 1949, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Here, Gomez’s claim arose in
Florida. Questions of tolling also are governed by state law. Id. at 269, 105 S.Ct.
at 1943. In Florida, the applicable limitations period for personal-injury actions is
four years. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). That
period may be tolled, however, by the adjudicated incapacity, or previously
adjudicated incapacity, of the plaintiff, but, in either event, “the action must be
begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of
action.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.051(1)(d) & (h). A § 1983 cause of action accrues,
and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a plaintiff knows or has reason to
know: (1) “that he has been injured;” and (2) “who has inflicted the injury.”
Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987).
According to Gomez’s complaint, the events giving rise to this § 1983 action
happened between June 1987, when the accident occurred, and June 1988, when he
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was released from DCJ. Thus, at the very latest, his § 1983 cause of action accrued
in June 1988. Even assuming that Gomez is entitled to the maximum permissible
period of tolling, he was required to file his § 1983 action no later than June 1995,
but failed to do so until November 2005, over 10 years after the limitations period
had expired.
We thus conclude that the district court did not err by dismissing Gomez’s
complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as barred by the four-year statute of limitations
applicable to § 1983 actions brought in Florida. Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
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