NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MITCHELL SIEGEL; DAWN SIEGEL, No. 20-16333
Plaintiffs-Appellees, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02561-SPL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DIGNITY HEALTH, DBA Chandler
Regional Medical Center, DBA Gilbert
Mercy Medical Center,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 15, 2021
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: CLIFTON, BRESS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Dignity Health appeals the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to the
Siegels, raising three arguments. First, Dignity Health claims that Appellees
Mitchell and Dawn Siegel do not qualify as “prevailing parties” for the purpose of
recovering attorney’s fees. Second, Dignity Health claims that the district court
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
erred in determining that Dignity Health was judicially estopped from arguing that
the Siegels do not qualify as “prevailing parties.” Third, it claims that the Siegels’
failure to comply with various provisions of Local Rule 54.2 should have precluded
some or all the fees awarded. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see also
Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1993), and we reverse
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.1
The district court erred in determining that the Siegels qualified as “prevailing
parties” for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees. See La Asociacion de
Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir.
2010) (a district court’s determination regarding the “prevailing party” status is
reviewed de novo). The Siegels do not qualify as “prevailing parties” because the
jury’s verdict did not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties by
modifying Dignity Health’s behavior in a way that directly benefitted the Siegels.
See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992). The only relief awarded by the
verdict was attorney’s fees, and the district court later vacated all of that award as
improper (a point on which both sides agreed). The Siegels’ failure to procure any
relief precludes them from qualifying as “prevailing parties” for the purpose of
recovering attorney’s fees. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam).
The Siegels’ argument to the contrary misinterprets 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) and ignores
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The parties are familiar with the facts, so we discuss them here only as necessary.
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precedent requiring more than mere favorable jury findings for a party to “prevail”
for the purpose of recovering attorney’s fees. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111–12.
The district court also erred in determining that Dignity Health was judicially
estopped from arguing that the Siegels do not qualify as “prevailing parties.” See
Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 992 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“a district court’s application of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse
of discretion”). Judicial estoppel generally bars a party from asserting a particular
position when: (1) that position is “clearly inconsistent” with its earlier position,
(2) the party successfully persuaded a court to accept its earlier position, and (3) the
party would “derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the
opposing party if not estopped.” Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1134 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001)).
Dignity Health’s positions were not clearly inconsistent: it first argued that
awarding attorney’s fees as damages was procedurally inappropriate and created the
potential for duplicative recovery given that Congress had already allowed
attorney’s fees as costs, and then it argued that the Siegels could not obtain attorney’s
fees as costs because they did not qualify as “prevailing parties” once they were
awarded no damages. Arguing that, as a matter of procedure, only one pathway
exists to obtain attorney’s fees does not necessarily, much less “clearly,” contradict
the later argument that a particular plaintiff is not eligible for fees even using that
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pathway. The Siegels’ arguments to the contrary misconstrue Dignity Health’s
earlier position and ignore the fact that simply because they could have potentially
received a double recovery of attorney’s fees as both damages and costs if the district
court had not vacated the jury’s erroneous damages award does not mean that
vacating an award of fees as damages means that the district court must award fees
as costs.
Because Dignity Health did not present clearly inconsistent positions, it also
did not receive any unfair advantage or impose any unfair detriment on the Siegels.
See Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012).
The district court’s errors on Dignity Health’s first two arguments provide
sufficient basis for reversing and remanding, and we therefore do not reach Dignity
Health’s third claim regarding the local rules.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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