IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–0971
Submitted October 21, 2021—Filed December 3, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL JAMES JONES,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Nancy L.
Whittenburg, Judge.
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions
of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of
marijuana. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
Pamela Wingert (argued) of Wingert Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
2
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
3
McDONALD, Justice.
Michael Jones was charged with possession of methamphetamine with
intent to deliver, in violation of Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2016), and
possession of marijuana, in violation of Iowa Code § 124.401(5). At trial, Jones
contended he was merely in the wrong place at the wrong time and that there
was insufficient evidence to establish he had possession of the controlled
substances. The jury disagreed and found Jones guilty as charged. Jones
reiterated his argument on appeal, and the court of appeals agreed with Jones
and reversed his convictions. We granted the State’s application for further
review.
This court reviews sufficiency of evidence claims for the correction of errors
at law. State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). In conducting that
review, we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. The jury’s verdict binds this
court if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Tipton, 897
N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to
convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. In determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial
evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including
all “legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be
deduced from the record evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d
23, 27 (Iowa 2005)). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw
different conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the
finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different
4
finding.” Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 386, 393
(Iowa 2010) (quoting Raper v. State, 688 N.W.2d 29, 36 (Iowa 2004)).
The evidence is largely undisputed. At approximately 10:15 p.m. on the
night of December 27, 2016, Clay County Deputy Sheriff Josh Long was driving
northbound on a highway outside of Spencer. He observed a Dodge Durango
sport utility vehicle approximately one mile in front of him pull over, activate its
emergency flashers, and park in the gravel on the shoulder of the road. As
Deputy Long approached the parked vehicle, he noticed a second vehicle in the
ditch on the side of the road. He also noticed someone, later identified as Jones,
in the ditch shining a flashlight.
Deputy Long activated his emergency lights and pulled in behind the
parked Dodge, which was later identified as Jones’s vehicle. As Deputy Long was
coming to a stop, Jones exited the ditch, walked past the front of the parked
Dodge (moving from the passenger side to the driver side), turned to his left on
reaching the driver’s side front corner, and then walked along the driver’s side of
his vehicle back toward Deputy Long’s vehicle. Although Deputy Long did not
notice it at the time, video from Deputy Long’s dashcam showed that as Jones
was passing the driver’s side front fender of his vehicle, he turned and looked
back at the ground in front of his vehicle and then kept walking toward Deputy
Long’s vehicle.
Deputy Long asked Jones what happened. According to Jones, his friend
Heidi Smith had contacted him to help pull Smith’s friend’s vehicle out of the
ditch. Jones stated the vehicle in the ditch had struck a deer and went off the
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road. The driver of the vehicle and her child had left with someone so the child
could get out of the cold. Deputy Long asked where the deer was, and Jones
pointed north. They walked north in front of Jones’s vehicle and observed a large
buck on the side of the road. As they were walking back towards their vehicles,
Deputy Long asked Jones for his driver’s license. Jones went into his vehicle to
get his license. As Jones was retrieving the license, Deputy Long observed a small
black drawstring bag under the front bumper of the vehicle approximately twelve
to eighteen inches in front of the passenger side tire. Deputy Long shined his
flashlight on the bag and observed a glass bulb, which he believed to be a
methamphetamine pipe. He did not say anything about the bag at the time.
Deputy Long took Jones’s driver’s license and asked Jones to wait in the
Dodge while Long verified the license information. Deputy Long returned to his
vehicle, verified the license information, and called for backup. In response to
Deputy Long’s call, Deputy Spencer Taylor arrived at the scene. As Long was
apprising Taylor of the situation, Jones exited his vehicle and approached the
two deputies. The deputies asked Jones to step to the front of Jones’s vehicle.
Deputy Long asked Jones about the bag on the ground, and Jones denied any
knowledge of it. Jones said it looked like a sunglasses case. Deputy Long asked
what was in the bag, and Jones responded, “I don’t know. Probably nothing
good.” Deputy Taylor picked up the bag and could see drug paraphernalia. The
deputies then detained Jones and placed him in Long’s vehicle.
The deputies searched through the bag and found seven individually
wrapped baggies of methamphetamine inside a larger baggie. Subsequent testing
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showed the total weight of methamphetamine was approximately 8.5 grams. The
deputies also found a methamphetamine pipe, .27 grams of marijuana, a
marijuana pipe, a false battery, a scrap of paper with writing on it, and a fuel
saver card. The bottom of the false battery screwed off, and the deputies found
additional methamphetamine inside the battery. Subsequent investigation
revealed the fuel saver card belonged to someone named Danny Titus. Deputy
Taylor later did independent internet research and found Jones was Facebook
friends with Titus. Titus was known to law enforcement as a methamphetamine
user.
Before leaving the scene, the deputies continued to search the area. They
found a key ring approximately ten to fifteen feet in front of Jones’s vehicle.
Attached to the key ring were two keys and another fuel saver card. Subsequent
investigation showed the fuel saver card belonged to someone from Minnesota
named Angela Riviera. Law enforcement did not find any connection between
Riviera and the persons involved in this case.
The deputies placed Jones under arrest and transported him to the jail
where they questioned him. Jones denied knowledge of the baggie or its contents.
He suggested the baggie belonged to whoever had been there before him. The
deputies seized two $100 dollar bills from Jones. They field tested the bills, and
both tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine. The deputies also
seized Jones’s driver’s license. They field tested the license, and it tested positive
for the presence of methamphetamine.
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While the evidence was largely undisputed, the inferences to be drawn
from the evidence were greatly disputed. At trial, the State contended that Jones
had the bag containing the methamphetamine in his possession as he was
walking out of the ditch, observed Deputy Long’s vehicle approaching the scene,
and dropped the bag on the ground near the tire to get it off his person and out
sight. Jones contended that he was merely in the wrong place at the wrong time.
He contended the bag could have been abandoned on the roadside by somebody
else. The jury considered the evidence and arguments and found the defendant
guilty of all charges.
The court of appeals made three legal errors in reviewing the jury’s verdict.
First, the court of appeals misstated the law of possession. Possession may be
actual or constructive. State v. Thomas, 847 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 2014).
Relying on State v. Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 2000) (en banc), the court of
appeals stated “actual possession occurs when the controlled substance is found
on the defendant’s person.” The court of appeals concluded that because “the
deputy did not find the controlled substances on [Jones’s] person,” this case
necessarily was a constructive possession case. The court of appeals then went
on to hold there was insufficient evidence to prove Jones was in constructive
possession of controlled substances.
The court of appeals statement regarding actual possession was an
incomplete statement of the law. In decisions subsequent to Atkinson, our
appellate courts have clarified a defendant can be in actual possession of a
controlled substance when the controlled substance is found on the defendant’s
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person or “when substantial evidence supports a finding it was on [the
defendant’s] person ‘at one time.’ ” Thomas, 847 N.W.2d at 442 (quoting State v.
Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 784 (Iowa 2010)); see Vance, 790 N.W.2d at 784
(“Although the pseudoephedrine was not found on Vance’s person at the time of
the stop, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that at one time Vance
had actual possession of the pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine.” (emphasis added)); State v. Eubanks, No. 13–0602, 2014
WL 2346793, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2014) (noting “[t]he statute
criminalizes ‘possession’ ” and “the State can prove past possession, whether
actual or constructive”). In other words, a jury can find a defendant was in actual
possession of a controlled substance even when the defendant was not “caught
red-handed and in physical possession at the time of the stop or arrest.”
Eubanks, 2014 WL 2346793, at *3. Other courts have reached the same
conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Cantrell, 530 F.3d 684, 693 (8th Cir. 2008)
(“A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given
time, is then in actual possession of it.”); People v. McDaniel, 316 P.2d 660, 664
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (stating possession does not require proof of possession
“at the very time of arrest” (citing People v. Belli, 15 P.2d 809, 810 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1932))); Womack v. State, 738 N.E.2d 320, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“The
state was not required to show that Womack possessed the bag of marijuana at
the time of Womack’s apprehension, or at the time the officers discovered the
bag.”).
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Second, in concluding there was insufficient evidence to establish Jones
was in constructive possession of controlled substances, the court of appeals
relied upon a long-rejected distinction between direct-evidence and
circumstantial-evidence cases. The court of appeals applied State v. Schurman,
205 N.W.2d 732 (Iowa 1973). In that case we said that in a circumstantial-
evidence case, a conviction can stand only where the evidence is “entirely
consistent with defendant’s guilt, [and] wholly inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis of his innocence.” Id. at 734. The court of appeals concluded the
evidence in this case was not “wholly inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
of [Jones’s] innocence” and thus the conviction was not supported by substantial
evidence.
But the legal distinction between direct-evidence and circumstantial-
evidence cases was overruled long ago. See State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 57
(Iowa 2021) (explaining the distinction was rejected in, and Schurman was
overruled by, State v. O’Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1979) (en banc)). The
court of appeals erred in relying on Schurman and in requiring the State to
disprove all rational hypotheses of Jones’s innocence. Whether the State’s
evidence is direct, circumstantial, or some combination of the two, the State is
not required to negate any and all rational hypotheses of the defendant’s
innocence. See id. What the State is required to do is convince the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Direct and circumstantial evidence
are equally probative in that regard. Id.; Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(p).
10
Third, the court of appeals reasoned that the convictions in this case were
the result of an impermissible stacking of inferences. As we recently explained
in State v. Ernst, however, “a strict prohibition against stacking inferences to be
drawn from circumstantial evidence is inconsistent” with substantial-evidence
review. 954 N.W.2d at 59. “The relevant inquiry is not whether a fact finding is
based on an inference drawn from another inference. Rather, the relevant inquiry
is whether a fact finding is a legitimate inference ‘that may fairly and reasonably
be deduced from the record evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Tipton, 897 N.W.2d at 692).
The “stacking” of inferences is problematic only when the jury’s finding crosses
from logical inference to impermissible speculation.
With that understanding, when the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we conclude the jury’s verdict is supported by logical
inferences drawn from the record and not from impermissible speculation.
The evidence shows the bag containing the pipe and controlled substances
likely was placed or dropped on the ground by someone who had recently been
at the scene of the accident where the deputies found Jones. The
methamphetamine pipe found in the bag was made of glass. The pipe was
completely intact, unbroken, and unchipped. Deputy Long testified this showed
the bag was not tossed out of a moving vehicle by a passing motorist because
the pipe would not have survived the impact of hitting the ground at highway
speed. Further, the bag had been on the shoulder of the road only a brief time
before the Deputy Long discovered it. Deputy Long testified the winter had been
unusually warm and it had been raining. The roadside gravel was damp, but the
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black suede bag was relatively dry and clean. The paper inside the bag was dry.
There was no water damage to anything in the bag. Based on these facts, Deputy
Long testified it was his opinion the bag was recently placed on the ground. See,
e.g., Light v. State, Nos. 04–18–00802–CR, 04–18–00803–CR, 2019 WL 5773670,
at *3 (Tex. App. Nov. 6, 2019) (“Despite the weather conditions, the box was dry,
indicating it was recently discarded.”), discretionary review refused (Sept. 16,
2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1745 (2021).
Among the small, limited universe of suspects, the evidence supports the
jury’s verdict that Jones possessed the controlled substances. Jones was the
only person present at the scene when Deputy Long arrived. Deputy Long
observed the bag only inches in front of the passenger tire of Jones’s vehicle.
Video from Deputy Long’s dashcam video showed Jones passed by the exact spot
where the drugs were found. From this the jury could have inferred Jones
dropped the drugs on the ground. See, e.g., Sheppard v. State, 03–10–00868–
CR, 2012 WL 6698963, at *4 (Tex. App. Dec. 21, 2012) (affirming conviction for
possession of a controlled substance where cocaine was found on the ground in
front of defendant’s truck and the defendant’s path “took him around his truck,
up the passenger side, across the front of his truck—the exact location where
the cocaine was later discovered”).
Other evidence showing Jones had actual knowledge the bag was on the
ground even before the deputies brought the bag to Jones’s attention supports
the inference that Jones actually possessed the controlled substances and
dropped them on the ground. Deputy Long’s dashcam video showed that after
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Jones had walked past the front of the Dodge, he turned and looked back at the
area in front of the truck. From this, the jury was free to infer Jones was aware
the drugs were on the ground and he turned to make sure the drugs were not
readily visible. See, e.g., State v. Brown, No. 14–0588, 2015 WL 2089400, at *3
(Iowa Ct. App. May 6, 2015) (holding there was sufficient evidence of actual
possession where video revealed movement showing drugs could have been
dropped on the ground beside stopped vehicle when combined with evidence the
drugs were recently placed there); State v. Keys, No. 11–2089, 2013 WL 1457044,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2013) (holding evidence was sufficient to show
defendant was in possession of cocaine where officer observed defendant pause
during flight and subsequently found a baggie of cocaine on the ground where
defendant paused). In addition to the video evidence showing Jones looked back
to make sure the bag was not readily visible, the video also showed Jones was
trying to engage the deputies and shepherd them away from the front of the
Dodge. From this, the jury was free to infer Jones was engaged in conduct to
minimize the risk the deputies would find the recently dropped bag of drugs.
Finally, the evidence showed Jones had actual knowledge of the contents
of the bag and had handled the contents of the bag. When the deputies asked
Jones if he knew what was in the bag, he stated “nothing good.” In addition to
this incriminating response, the deputies obtained physical evidence linking
Jones to the bag of drugs. The deputies seized two $100 dollar bills in Jones’s
possession, and each of the bills field-tested positive for the presence of
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methamphetamine. The deputies also seized Jones’s driver’s license, and it field-
tested positive for methamphetamine.
While the defendant has an alternative explanation for the evidence, “[t]he
jury [was] not required to accept the defendant’s version of the events.” State v.
Helm, 504 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); see Patton v. Commonwealth,
Record No. 1494-19-2, 2020 WL 3690307, at *4 (Va. Ct. App. July 7, 2020)
(“Appellant contends that the evidence did not exclude the ‘very real possibility’
that the drugs were there prior to appellant being near the trashcan. However,
‘[t]he Commonwealth is not required to prove that there is no possibility that
someone else may have planted, discarded, abandoned or placed the drugs’ on
the ground.” (alteration in original) (quoting Langston v. Commonwealth, 504
S.E.2d 380, 384 (Va. Ct. App. 1998))). “[T]he jury was free to reject certain
evidence, and credit other evidence.” State v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 849
(Iowa 2001) (en banc). And it was for the jury “to weigh the evidence” and “to
determine the plausibility of explanations” of the case. State v. Musser, 721
N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Williams, 695 N.W.2d at 28). “[I]t is not
for us to interfere with the finding made when supported by substantial evidence,
even though the evidence may have also supported a finding favorable to the
defendant.” State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Iowa 2006).
In sum, the totality of the evidence in this case raises a “fair inference of
guilt” and generates “more than suspicion, speculation, or conjecture.” State v.
DeWitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 475 (Iowa 2012). The jury’s verdict is thus supported
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by substantial evidence and is binding on this court, and we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
State of Iowa v. Michael James Jones
Combined Opinion