RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1113-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LUIS F. PACHECO-LOJA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted November 17, 2021 – Decided December 8, 2021
Before Judges Hoffman and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 18-08-0131.
The Law Offices of Michael P. McGuire, LLC, attorney
for appellant (Michael P. McGuire, on the briefs).
Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Daniel Finkelstein, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Luis F. Pacheco-Loja appeals from a judgment of conviction
following a jury trial where the judge allowed the State to briefly play portions
of child pornography videos recovered from his laptop computer. Defendant
argues he was denied a fair trial because the videos were inherently
inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial, and he had already stipulated that the
videos found on the laptop depicted children engaging in sexual acts. We
disagree and affirm his conviction.
After investigation revealed an IP address roughly in the Belleville area
sharing video files containing child pornography on peer-to-peer software with
another IP address in the Belleville area, lead Detective Charles Pusloski of the
New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice subpoenaed Verizon to ascertain who
had been sharing the video files by tracing the IP address. Verizon's response
to the subpoena indicated the IP address was associated with a woman living in
an apartment Belleville. A search warrant was obtained for the apartment.
On the morning of September 6, 2017, Detective Pusloski and other law
enforcement officers executed the search warrant. Defendant lived with the
woman at the apartment. A forensic preview revealed evidence of child
pornography on an Acer laptop found inside the apartment. The laptop was
seized. The female tenant's laptop was also searched but no child pornography
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was found on it. On the same day, defendant was arrested and charged with
possession and distribution of child pornography.
A forensic examination of the laptop's hard drive revealed a desktop
wallpaper picture of defendant; defendant's Facebook profile; defendant's Skype
profile; a self-recorded video of defendant; a peer-to-peer file sharing program
with a search history for child pornography; and thirty files containing child
pornography, twenty-six of which were downloadable on the peer-to-peer
network. Law enforcement discovered that the laptop had been used to share
248 files on peer-to-peer software, and at least 31 of those files were child
pornography.
A State Grand Jury issued an indictment charging defendant with second-
degree endangering the welfare of a child (distribution of child pornography,
twenty-five or more items), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(a)(i) (count one); second-
degree endangering the welfare of a child (storing or maintaining child
pornography using a file-sharing program, twenty-five or more items) (count
two), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(a)(iii); and third-degree endangering the welfare of
a child (possession of child pornography), N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b) (count
three).
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The State requested defendant to stipulate that all the videos identified by
the State represent real children under the age of eighteen who are engaged in
prohibited sexual acts as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b, and thus meet the
definition of child pornography. Defendant stipulated, in part:
The Acer . . . laptop seized by police on September 6,
2017 from [the apartment in] Belleville, New Jersey
contain[ed] [thirty] videos depicting a real child or
children under the age of eighteen engaging in
prohibited sexual acts or in the simulation of such acts
as defined by law and the screen shot printouts
identified as State's Exhibits S-13 through S-42
represent still images from those videos.
Defendant gave a statement to the police. The State's motion to admit
defendant's statement was denied.
The case proceeded to trial. On the first day of trial, the judge gave the
jury the following general instruction regarding stipulations:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, before [the State]
starts, there are certain stipulations that . . . both [the]
State and defense have agreed upon.
Stipulations are certain facts that are agreed upon
by both the defense and the State. The jury should treat
these facts as undisputed; i.e., the parties agree that
these facts are true.
As with all evidence, undisputed facts can be
accepted or rejected by the jury in reaching a verdict.
As the case progresses, I will read you what those
stipulated facts are.
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During the trial, the State sought to play a few minutes of the videos
shared on the peer-to-peer software recovered from defendant's laptop to prove
defendant knowingly distributed or maintained videos depicting children
engaged in sexual acts. Defense counsel objected, arguing that playing the
videos would be prejudicial and unnecessary because the parties stipulated to
the contents of the videos as child pornography. Defendant contended the videos
had no probative value and were prejudicial. The court overruled the objection,
noting that the State had the burden of proof, and the jury had no obligation to
accept the stipulation.
The State then played a few seconds of two videos recovered from
defendant's laptop, with Pusloski briefly describing the portion of the videos that
were played. The first video clip was only fifteen seconds long. The record
does not reflect the length of the second video clip. Immediately after the jury
watched the videos clips, the court then instructed the jury that "State's Exhibit
S-1 contains two videos of a real child or children under the age of 18. Children
engaging in prohibited sexual acts which were downloaded by Detective
Pusloski on August [22], 2016."
After the State rested, defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal was
denied. Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses in his defense.
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During its final jury instructions, the court again addressed the
stipulations, stating:
The parties have agreed to certain facts, the jury
should treat these facts as undisputed; i.e., the parties
agree that these facts are true. As with all evidence,
undisputed facts can be accepted or rejected by the jury
in reaching a verdict. The State and the defense
stipulate to the following facts:
One, the Acer . . . laptop seized by police on
September [6], 2017 from . . . [an] Apartment . . . [in]
Belleville, New Jersey contains [thirty] videos
depicting a real child or children under the age of
[eighteen] engaging in prohibited sexual acts or in the
simulation of such acts as defined by law in the
screenshot printouts identified as State’s Exhibit S-13
through S-42 represent still images from those videos.
Two, the State’s Exhibit S-1 consists of two
videos of a real child or children under the age of
[eighteen] engaging in prohibited sexual acts which
were downloaded by Detective Pusloski on August
[22], 2016.
Three, [the] IP address . . . was serviced by
Verizon. The account was subscribed to [a female
tenant residing at the same apartment in] Belleville . . .
on February [4], 2016 and was active through October
[25], 2016.
Four, all physical evidence has been within the
custody and control of the State since its seizure and
has an appropriate chain of custody.
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The jury found defendant guilty of all three counts. The court granted the
State's motion to impose a special sentence of parole supervision for life
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a). On counts one and two, defendant was
sentenced to concurrent six-year terms, subject to five years of parole
ineligibility; the registration requirements of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to
-23; parole supervision for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4; and applicable fines and
penalties. Count three was merged into count two for sentencing purposes. This
appeal followed.
Defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN
THE PROSECUTION WAS PERMITTED TO SHOW
INHERENT[]LY INFLAMM[A]TORY AND
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY TO THE JURY DESPITE THE
FACT THAT DEFENDANT HAD ALREADY
STIPULATED TO THE FACT OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY FOUND IN THE LAPTOP.
POINT TWO
WHEN NON-INFLAMMATORY ALTERNATIVE
EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE TO THE
PROSECUTION THEN THE INFLAMMATORY
EVIDENCE'S PROABTIVE VALUE IS
ATTENUATED AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE
EXCLUDED UNDER N.J.R.E. 403.
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Defendant argues that the court erred in allowing the State to play the
videos because defendant had already stipulated to possession of child
pornography. He relies on United States v. Merino-Balderrama, 146 F.3d 758,
762-63 (9th Cir. 1998), where the circuit court of appeals determined the district
court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to view more than ten minutes
of films portraying child pornography. Defendant argues that the State could
have presented the stipulation as evidence instead of the inflammatory videos.
Defendant argues that when the State has the "option to satisfy its burden
through non-inflammatory evidence, then the [S]tate should rely on the same
non-inflammatory evidence unless the state feels that it cannot effectively
satisfy its burden to prove the guilt of defendant beyond reasonable doubt."
We are guided by well-established legal principles. "Evidentiary rulings
made by the trial court are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard."
State v. Scharf, 225 N.J. 547, 572 (2016) (citing Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J.
6, 12 (2008)). We "will reverse an evidentiary ruling only if it 'was so wide of f
the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" State v. Mauti, 448 N.J.
Super. 275, 307 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J.
400, 413 (2016)). When "the trial court fails to apply the proper legal standard
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in determining the admissibility of proffered evidence," we review the
evidentiary rulings de novo. State v. Williams, 240 N.J. 225, 234 (2019).
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove
or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action." N.J.R.E.
401. "[R]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the risk of" undue prejudice. N.J.R.E. 403. "The trial court is
granted broad discretion in determining both the relevance of the evidence to be
presented and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial nature." Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999). See
also State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015) ("The trial judge has broad
discretion to exclude evidence as unduly prejudicial pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403 .").
"Even when evidence is 'highly damaging' to a defendant's case, 'this cannot by
itself be a reason to exclude otherwise admissible and probative evidence." State
v. Brockington, 439 N.J. Super. 311, 333 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v.
Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601, 620-21 (App. Div. 1990)).
When determining whether to exclude or permit evidence under this
standard, a trial court "should include some elaboration on the substantial danger
of undue prejudice, or the absence thereof, that would accrue to the objecting
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party if the pro[ffered] evidence were introduced." State v. Balthrop, 92 N.J.
542, 546 (1983).
"In this weighing process, evidence that has overwhelmingly probative
worth may be admitted even if highly prejudicial" when that evidence is central
to the case. Green, 160 N.J. at 496. The question then becomes "whether the
undeniable prejudicial effect of this evidence substantially outweighed its
probative worth." Id. at 500. In making that determination, "courts should look
not only to the close nexus between the evidence and a central issue in the case,
but also to the availability of other evidence [that could] shed light on that
issue." Ibid. "Inflammatory evidence 'must be excluded if other probative, non-
inflammatory evidence exists.'" State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390,406 (2019)
(quoting Green, 160 N.J. at 500).
The State was required to prove that defendant knowingly distributed
child pornography (count one), stored or maintained child pornography using a
file-sharing program (count two), and possessed child pornography (count
three). It sought to prove those elements by playing two short videos recovered
from the defendant's laptop. The videos were relevant evidence that defendant
knowingly distributed, stored or maintained, and possessed the child
pornography.
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Defendant's stipulations did not satisfy the mens rea element that
defendant knowingly distributed, stored or maintained, and possessed the child
pornography. Defendant has not pointed to any other admissible evidence that
satisfied this element. We are mindful that defendant's statement was
suppressed.
In addition, as explained by the judge, the jury was free to reject the
stipulated facts. See State v. Wesner, 372 N.J. Super. 489, 494 (App. Div. 2004)
(explaining that "in a criminal case, the jury is not bound by stipulated facts").
The State must prove each element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 558 (2009). Without seeing the videos, the jury may
have found the State failed to satisfy its burden of proof. See United States v.
Caldwell, 586 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that a stipulation "does not
have the same evidentiary value as actually seeing the particular explicit
conduct").
"[A] criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full
evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it." Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1997). Federal courts "have
consistently found no abuse of discretion where a court admits relevant
pornographic images." United States v. Fechner, 952 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir.
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11
2020) (citations omitted). In Caldwell, the court affirmed the admission of child
pornography videos even though the defendant stipulated the videos contained
child pornography. 586 F.3d at 342-43.
Although the judge made no reference to N.J.R.E. 403 when overruling
defendant's objection, the court considered the probative value of the videos by
recognizing the obvious nexus between the evidence and the State's burden of
proving defendant knowingly committed the offenses. The State showed the
jury only two videos. The videos were not lengthy; one was only fifteen seconds
long.
We conclude that the probative value of the evidence offered was not
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice to defendant. N.J.R.E.
403. Although the images depicted may have been disturbing, the video
evidence did not unfairly prejudice defendant. Accordingly, the judge did not
abuse her discretion by permitting the State to briefly play the videos recovered
from defendant's laptop. The admission of the videos did not result in a
"manifest denial of justice." Mauti, 448 N.J. Super. at 307 (quoting Griffin, 225
N.J. at 413).
Affirmed.
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