J-A22001-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SHELLENE WYRICK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES DAVID CAPERELLI AND JOHN :
CAPERELLI :
: No. 1557 MDA 2020
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 17, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at
No(s): CI-17-00402
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 10, 2021
James David Caperelli (“James”) and his father, John Caperelli (“John”)
(collectively, “the Caperellis”), appeal from the judgment entered in favor of
Shellene Wyrick (“Wyrick”) and against the Caperellis. Specifically, the
Caperellis challenge the trial court’s ruling that they were not entitled to a jury
trial on their counterclaims. After careful review, we vacate the judgment,
reverse the order denying the Caperellis’ post-trial motion, and remand for a
jury trial.
Given our disposition, we do not recite the facts at length. Briefly, this
case involves a pet care business, Jungle Jim’s Total Pet Care (“JJTPC”), which
the Caperellis opened in 2015. John provided the start-up capital and
managed the bookkeeping while James ran the day-to-day operations. In
April 2016, James and Wyrick began a romantic relationship. Wyrick
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suggested opening a franchise of JJTPC in Delaware, where she and James
planned to move. On July 25, 2016, Wyrick wrote a check to John for $12,000,
with the notation “Jungle Jim’s Total Pet Care purchase/buyout.” Upon
receiving the check, John used it to pay off several of JJTPC’s debts and ceased
all participation in JJTPC. Three days later, Wyrick wrote a $4,000 check to
JJTPC for repairs to the building. Thereafter, Wyrick and James, inter alia,
were issued an EIN number for JJTPC, organized JJTPC as an LLC in
Pennsylvania listing Wyrick and James as the two members, and signed an
agreement concerning Wyrick’s $16,000 investment. The agreement stated
that Wyrick would “retain 50% ownership in all businesses affiliated with
[JJTPC] from dates of transfer of the funds mentioned above until such
investment is paid back fully along with 5% interest.” Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3.
In the meantime, on September 25, 2016, Wyrick signed a real estate
agreement for a home in Delaware, for which James provided the down
payment. However, on October 23, 2016, James assaulted Wyrick, and she
immediately ended their relationship. Thereafter, Wyrick cancelled the real
estate contract and James sold JJTPC for $55,000.
On January 20, 2017, Wyrick filed a complaint against James for one
count of violating the Partnership Code, one count of unjust enrichment, and
two counts of breach of contract, as well as one claim of unjust enrichment
against John. She sought relief in the form of $16,000 plus interest (return
of her investment) or $27,500 (50% of the sale of JJTPC). James and John
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filed individual answers and counterclaims for breach of contract related to
the move to Delaware and sale of JJTPC. Thereafter, the matter proceeded to
compulsory arbitration and an award was entered in favor of Wyrick.
The Caperellis appealed to the trial court, demanding a jury trial
consistent with Pa.R.C.P. 1007.1(b). In accordance with their jury demand,
the case was listed for a jury trial the week of March 23, 2020. Thereafter, it
was rescheduled to August 31, 2020. On July 15, 2020, Wyrick filed a motion
for a bench trial.1 Therein, she withdrew her unjust enrichment and breach
of contract claims against James relating to a joint credit account that had
been settled, and also withdrew her second breach of contract claim against
James so the action could proceed via a bench trial. The Caperellis filed an
answer and brief objecting to Wyrick’s motion. Specifically, they argued that
Wyrick initiated the matter as a legal action and they were entitled to a jury
trial based on their counterclaim. Nonetheless, the trial court scheduled the
matter for a bench trial. On September 30, 2020, the Caperellis filed a motion
to amend their counterclaim, this time to include a second count of promissory
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1 We observe that in Wyrick’s statement of the case, she contends that “[a]s
a result of the COVID pandemic, the jury trial was repeatedly continued” and
“[w]ith no end in sight to the judicial emergency, and thus no realistic date to
try this matter before a jury,” she filed the motion for a bench trial. Wyrick’s
brief at 6. However, her motion only mentions the pandemic in explaining
that the case had previously been postponed. Neither she nor the trial court
suggested that the motion was sought or granted because of the pandemic or
the judicial emergency. Accordingly, we do not address the implications of
the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying judicial emergency on the
Caperellis’ right to a jury trial.
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estoppel in response to the case proceeding in equity. The trial court denied
the motion and a bench trial was held on November 16, 2020. Wyrick, John,
and James testified. The trial court found in favor of Wyrick and against the
Caperellis in the amount of $19,440.49.
This appeal followed the denial of the Caperellis’ post-trial motion and
entry of judgment on the verdict. The Caperellis and the trial court complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The Caperellis raise five contentions on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court’s determination that defendants were
not entitled to a jury trial on their breach of contract
counterclaim was reversible error.
2. Whether the trial court’s finding that a partnership agreement
existed between appellee and each defendant separately is
reversible error.
3. The trial court’s finding of fact that John Caperelli was unjustly
enriched is reversible error unsupported by material evidence
on the record.
4. Whether the trial court erred and/or committed a manifest
abuse of discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to amend
counterclaim . . .
5. Whether Judge Sponaugle’s witness credibility determination
was a manifest abuse of discretion.
The Caperellis’ brief at 12.
The Caperellis first argue that the trial court erred in concluding they
waived their right to a jury trial. The Caperellis’ brief at 22. The following
principles guide our review.
Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is
to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported
by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed
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error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial
judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the
verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court
only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence
in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law.
However, [where] the issue . . . concerns a question of law, our
scope of review is plenary.
The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal originating from a
non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because it is
the appellate court’s duty to determine if the trial court correctly
applied the law to the facts of the case.
Stephan v. Waldron Elec. Heating & Cooling LLC, 100 A.3d 660, 664–65
(Pa.Super. 2014).
The applicable constitutional provision provides, in relevant part,
that “trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof
remain inviolate.” Pa. Const. art. 1, § 6. In construing this
section, this Court has consistently held that the right to
a jury trial as preserved by our Constitution extends to all causes
of action that existed at the time the Constitution was adopted.
Advanced Tel. Sys., Inc. v. Com-Net Pro. Mobile Radio, LLC, 846 A.2d
1264, 1274 (Pa.Super. 2004) (cleaned up).
[O]ur Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded that the
Pennsylvania analysis of whether there is a right to
a jury trial [follows a] three-prong test: Initially, the court is to
determine whether there is a statutory basis for a jury trial. If no
statutory basis exists, the next inquiry is whether the particular
cause of action existed at the time the Pennsylvania Constitution
was adopted. Finally, if the cause of action and a right to jury
existed at that time, then the inquiry is whether a common law
basis existed for the claim.
Id. at 1275–76. Of relevance here, Article I, Section 6 “does not permit a
jury trial in an ordinary equity action.” Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 419 A.2d
167, 168 (Pa.Super. 1980) (citation omitted).
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Rule 1007.1 details the requirements for demanding a jury trial in a civil
action as follows:
(a) In any action in which the right to jury trial exists, that right
shall be deemed waived unless a party files and serves a written
demand for a jury trial not later than twenty days after service of
the last permissible pleading. The demand shall be made by
endorsement on a pleading or by a separate writing.
(b) Where an appeal is taken from an award in compulsory
arbitration and jury trial has not theretofore been demanded, the
right to a jury trial shall be deemed waived unless the appellant
endorses a demand for a jury trial on the appeal, or unless the
appellee files and serves a written demand for a jury trial not later
than ten days after being served with the notice of appeal.
(c)(1) A demand for trial by jury may not be withdrawn without
the consent of all parties who have appeared in the action.
(2) A demand for a trial by jury on behalf of a party shall be
deemed withdrawn if at the time a case is called for trial that
party, without satisfactory excuse, fails to appear or
appears but is not ready. Any other party appearing and
ready who has not already demanded a trial by jury shall
forthwith demand a trial by jury or shall be deemed to have
waived the same.
Pa.R.C.P. 1007.1.
Wyrick initiated the instant civil action based upon violations of the
Partnership Code, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract; the Caperellis
filed a breach of contract counterclaim. All parties sought monetary relief. As
correctly observed by the parties and the trial court, the right to a jury trial
only attached to the breach of contract claims. See Wilson v. Parker, 227
A.3d 343, 349 n.5 (Pa.Super. 2020) (noting that unjust enrichment is an
equitable doctrine); Petrecca v. Allstate Ins. Co., 797 A.2d 322, 325
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(Pa.Super. 2002) (cleaned up) (“It is axiomatic that the right to a jury trial
applies to breach of contract claims requesting only monetary damages.”); 15
Pa.C.S. § 8101 (Partnership Code effective 1989). Although the Caperellis
could have filed a demand at the outset, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1007.1(b),
they did not waive their right to a jury trial because they endorsed a demand
for a jury trial upon their appeal from the arbitration award.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court states that it granted Wyrick’s
motion for a bench trial because Wyrick withdrew her breach of contract claims
and since the Caperellis “raised a counterclaim for breach of contract rather
than asserting a separate action of law . . . , they [we]re not entitled to a jury
trial.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/21, at unnumbered 4 (citing Rosenberg,
supra).
In Rosenberg, Wife initiated an action in equity against Husband.
Husband brought legal counterclaims, to which Wife alleged she had a right
to a jury trial. Pursuant to then-effective Rule of Civil Procedure 1510(b), a
counterclaim to an equity action must “be pleaded and tried as an action in
equity.” The court found that rule violated Article I, Section 6 of the
Constitution of Pennsylvania, and therefore held that Wife was entitled to a
jury trial on Husband’s counterclaim. Husband appealed to this Court. We
began by observing that Article I, Section 6 “does not permit a jury trial in an
ordinary equity action.” Rosenberg, 419 A.2d at 168 (citation omitted).
We hold that when a litigant chooses to initiate an action in equity
that he has assented to have all matters arising out of the same
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occurrence or transaction decided by the equity court and has,
therefore, waived the right to a jury trial with respect to the case
in chief or any properly maintained counterclaim. Likewise, a
defendant who files a legal counterclaim to an equitable action,
rather than asserting it as a separate action at law, has waived
any right to have the issues of fact thus raised tried by a jury. We
are not unmindful of the fact that other jurisdictions have been
divided over this issue. We feel, however, that justice will best be
served by adhering to the less confusing and burdensome
procedure as set forth in Rule 1510(b) and having all of the issues
relative to the same occurrence or transaction resolved in one
proceeding as has been the practice in this Commonwealth in the
past. The cause of judicial expediency and the timely resolution
of conflicts will also be advanced by adhering to this procedure.
Because we have held that the plaintiff in the instant case chose
to waive any right to a jury trial when she initiated the original
action in equity we hold that no conflict exists between Rule
1510(b) and Article I, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Rosenberg, supra at 169.
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court’s reliance on Rosenberg
is inapposite. First, the portion of the holding pertaining to a defendant’s right
to a jury trial on a counterclaim to an equity action was dicta. Second, the
distinction between equity and legal pleadings at the time Rosenberg was
decided has since been abolished. Rule 1510, relied upon in Rosenberg, has
been replaced by Rule 1031, which provides as follows:
(a) The defendant may set forth in the answer under the heading
“Counterclaim” any cause of action cognizable in a civil action
which the defendant has against the plaintiff at the time of filing
the answer.
(b) A counterclaim need not diminish or defeat the relief
demanded by the plaintiff. It may demand relief exceeding in
amount or different in kind from that demanded by the plaintiff.
Pa.R.C.P. 1031. As our Supreme Court recently noted,
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[T][he Rules of Civil Procedure eliminate the pleading distinctions
within the consolidated “civil action.” However, this does not alter
the distinctions in entitlement to relief.
The separate action in equity has been abolished and
the rules governing the civil action have been
amended to include equitable relief. The consolidated
civil action allows the court in a “unified judicial
system” to grant the relief to which the parties are
entitled, whether legal or equitable.
The amendments address the concept of form of
action, not cause of action. In merging the action in
equity into the civil action, the action in equity as a
separate form of action has been abolished but the
cause of action in equity remains. The amendments
have no effect upon a party’s entitlement to equitable
relief. Stated another way, a court may grant
equitable relief only if a party is entitled to such relief
as a matter of law.
Pa.R.C.P., Equitable Relief- Explanatory Cmt.-2003.
SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., No. 6 WAP 2020, 2021 WL
1676362, at *2 n.4 (Pa. Apr. 29, 2021).
Instantly, unlike the plaintiff in Rosenberg, Wyrick brought an action
seeking legal, not solely equitable, relief. In response, the Caperellis filed a
counterclaim also seeking legal relief, which was permissible under Rule 1031.
Thereafter, the Caperellis properly invoked their demand for a jury trial
following their arbitration appeal. It was not until approximately one month
before trial that Wyrick withdrew her claims entitling her to a jury trial in an
attempt to proceed via a bench trial. Since the Caperellis’ counterclaim
remained and they did not waive or withdraw their demand for a jury trial in
accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1007.1(c), the trial court erred in granting Wyrick’s
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motion for a bench trial. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment, reverse the
order denying the Caperellis’ post-trial motion, and remand for a jury trial.2
Judgment vacated. Order reversed. Remanded for jury trial.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/10/2021
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2 Given our disposition, we do not reach the Caperellis’ remaining claims.
Regarding the Caperellis’ issue challenging the denial of their motion to amend
their counterclaim pleading, we note that the amendment was only sought in
response to the trial court’s granting of Wyrick’s motion for a bench trial.
Since we conclude that the Caperellis are entitled to a jury trial and the case
will no longer be proceeding in equity, this issue is moot.
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