Case: 20-30478 Document: 00516132892 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/15/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 20-30478
FILED
December 15, 2021
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Christopher M. K. Dumas,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 5:17-CR-215-1
Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Christopher M.K. Dumas appeals his convictions of five counts of
interference with commerce by robbery, one count of conspiracy to do the
same, five counts of carrying, using, and brandishing a firearm during those
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-30478
robberies, and one count of possession of ammunition following conviction
of a felony. He presents three issues for this court’s review.
Dumas first argues that the district court erred in refusing to allow him
to call an investigating officer whose testimony and supplemental
investigative reports would have impeached the testimony of one witness
who testified to seeing a six-pointed star tattoo on the robber who wore a
bandana on the lower half of his face, which was consistent with a tattoo that
Dumas has on his left cheek, and another who testified that he did not recall
seeing a distinguishing feature like a tattoo on the robber. He asserts that the
officer’s testimony was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b), as
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. See United States v. Hale,
685 F.3d 522, 539 (5th Cir. 2012). He further asserts that its exclusion
violated his constitutional rights.
A district court’s exclusion of evidence will be affirmed unless it
abused its discretion and a substantial right of the party was affected. See
United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1996). An error affects substantial rights
if there is a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the conviction.
United States v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 2007).
Assuming that the proposed testimony was admissible under Rule
613(b), an issue we do not reach, the exclusion of it did not affect Dumas’s
substantial rights, as the evidence could have been admitted only for
impeachment purposes. See United States v. Isiwele, 635 F.3d 196, 201 (5th
Cir. 2011). Notwithstanding Dumas’s arguments to the contrary, the
testimony could not have been used to establish a disputed fact, i.e., that a
different perpetrator committed the robberies. See United States v. Palacios,
556 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Here, one of the witnesses had already been impeached based on his
history of serving as a government informant and admission that he wished
to assist his son in a pending criminal matter. Even if the other witness’s
testimony had not been presented to the jury, there is no reasonable
probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict. See Sumlin,
489 F.3d at 688. As Dumas concedes, the evidence established that all six
robberies were committed by the same masked individual, and the depictions
of the robber in the surveillance videos, the matching attire and accessories
found in the Nissan Versa at the time of Dumas’s arrest, the fact that the car
belonged to Dumas’s girlfriend and was seen in some of the surveillance
videos, and Dumas’s fingerprints found on the grocery bag recovered with
the long-barreled handgun following one of the robberies all pointed to
Dumas’s identity as the robber. Further, cell tower information placed
Dumas in the vicinity of the second and fourth establishments that were
robbed around the time of the robberies, and Dumas sent incriminating text
messages to his girlfriend on the days that the third and fourth establishments
were robbed. Based on the foregoing, there is no reasonable probability that
the exclusion of the investigating officer’s testimony regarding the contents
of his supplemental reports contributed to the jury’s verdict. See United
States v. De Leon, 728 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 2013).
In addition, Dumas did not argue at trial that the investigating
officer’s testimony and the information in his reports regarding the
descriptions of the robber provided by the two witnesses should be admitted,
on constitutional grounds, as substantive proof that the real robber had an
“LA” tattoo. Indeed, Dumas’s brief concedes that he argued to the trial
court that he “was not offering the testimony of [the investigating officer] for
the ‘truth of the matter asserted,’” but instead only “as extrinsic evidence
of a prior inconsistent statement for the purpose of impeaching” the two
witnesses who supposedly contradicted themselves. Dumas’s argument
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(raised for the first time after the trial) that the officer’s testimony should
have been admitted as substantive evidence is therefore reviewed only for
plain error. See United States v. Jimenez, 256 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 2001).
Dumas’s conclusory and minimally briefed arguments that he was
constitutionally entitled to present the officer’s testimony as substantive
evidence of factual innocence under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
302 (1973), fail to demonstrate that the district court erred plainly or
otherwise. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
As his second ground for relief, Dumas argues that a new trial was
warranted because evidence adduced by the Government after the trial,
especially audio recordings of responding officers’ onsite interviews of
witnesses, establishes that two of the witnesses testified falsely about whether
they ever advised law enforcement that the robber had a tattoo of “LA”
under his eye and whether they had identified a star tattoo on the robber. He
asserts that the testimony concerned a material matter and that the
Government knew the testimony was false and failed to correct it, in violation
of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
The district “court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if
the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). However, such
motions are disfavored. United States v. Piazza, 647 F.3d 559, 565 (5th Cir.
2011). This court reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 564–65 & n.3. To obtain a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence that the defendant’s conviction was obtained in
violation of Napue, the defendant must show, inter alia, that there is “any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony affected the judgment of the
jury.” United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 473 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Piazza,
647 F.3d at 565.
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We need not determine whether Dumas has established a violation of
Napue because we are not persuaded that there is any reasonable likelihood
that the allegedly perjurious testimony affected the judgment of the jury
based on our review of the record. As set forth above, the circumstantial
evidence presented at trial all pointed to Dumas being the perpetrator of the
robberies, and the suggestion that someone else committed them is fanciful
at best. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Dumas’s motion for a new trial. See Piazza, 647 F.3d at 564–65 & n.3; Wall,
389 F.3d at 473.
As for Dumas’s claim under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), he
fails to establish that the district court’s finding that the Government
complied with its obligations under the statute was clearly erroneous. See
United States v. Montgomery, 210 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 2000). Regardless, a
district court may deny a motion for a new trial without holding an
evidentiary hearing, and its decision will only be reversed if it constitutes an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 248 (5th Cir.
2002). No abuse of discretion has been shown.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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