IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 16, 2021
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2020-SC-0218-WC
RAY HENRY PICKETT APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NOS. 2018-CA-0415 & 2018-CA-0551
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
NO. WC-15-01910
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (LAP); APPELLEES
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL.
DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL;
HONORABLE. R. ROLAND CASE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I. BACKGROUND
Ray Pickett began working on the assembly line for Ford Motor Company
in 2012. Pickett claimed the repetitive nature of his job caused him to become
occupationally disabled, which condition required a cervical fusion. After
returning to work from the neck surgery, Pickett asserts he sustained a second
work-related injury, this one to his left shoulder, when another employee
lowered the back hatch of a vehicle onto it.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the neck injury preexisted
Pickett’s employment at Ford but found the shoulder injury compensable and
awarded temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability
benefits in his July 2017 order. The ALJ limited the award to the version of
KRS 342.730(4) enacted in 1996, terminating Pickett’s benefits when he
qualified for normal old-age Social Security benefits. Both parties filed motions
for reconsideration, which the ALJ overruled, noting this Court’s opinion in
Parker v. Webster Cnty. Coal, LLC (Dotiki Mine), 529 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2017) had
yet to reach finality. In Parker, a majority of this Court held the 1996 version
of KRS 342.730 was unconstitutional.
Pickett and Ford both appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. By
the time the Board considered the appeal, the Parker opinion had become final.
The Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and order and remanded the matter,
directing the ALJ to apply the “tier down” provisions of the 1994 version of KRS
342.730(4). Both parties then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which vacated
and remanded Pickett’s claim to the ALJ, directing him to apply the current
version of KRS 342.730(4) pursuant to this Court’s opinion in Holcim v.
Swinford, 581 S.W.3d 37 (Ky. 2019), which held the 2018 amendment to KRS
342.730(4) was retroactive.
Pickett now appeals to this Court, arguing the retroactive application of
KRS 342.730(4) is unconstitutional, violating his rights to due process and
equal protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution. Pickett
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also contends the statute amounts to the state exercising absolute and
arbitrary power. Finally, he claims the fact that only certain statutes in the
House Bill containing the amendment to KRS 342.730(4) were deemed
retroactive amounts to “special legislation” in violation of Sections 59 and 60 of
the Kentucky Constitution.
II. ANALYSIS
KRS 342.730(4) concerns the termination of workers’ compensation
benefits. In Parker, 529 S.W.3d 759, this Court found the then-current 1996
version of KRS 342.730(4) unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The
1996 version of the statute tied the termination of workers’ compensation
benefits to the time at which the employee qualified for old-age Social Security
benefits. This Court held this was an arbitrary distinction with no rational
relation to a legitimate state interest.
In Holcim, 581 S.W.3d at 41, this Court considered whether a 2018
version of KRS 342.730(4) could be applied retroactively. Quoting a Legislative
Research Commission comment beneath the statute, we held in Holcim that the
amendment “applies to those cases which ‘have not been fully and finally
adjudicated, or are in the appellate process, or for which time to file an appeal
[h]as not lapsed, as of the effective date of this Act.’” Id. at 44.
Whereas the pre-Parker version of KRS 342.730(4) linked workers’
compensation benefit termination to the time at which the worker qualified for
old-age Social Security benefits (and thereby violated an individual’s right to
equal protection under the law by arbitrarily treating similarly-situated
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individuals differently), the 2018 version of the statutory subsection links the
termination of benefits to the injured employee attaining a particular age.
Under the amendment, a claimant’s benefits terminate on his or her seventieth
birthday or four years after his or her work injury or exposure, whichever
occurs later. Pickett argues this statute is constitutionally infirm on multiple
grounds.
A. Equal Protection
Pickett argues the amendment to KRS 342.730(4) violates his rights to
equal protection under the law, as guaranteed by the United States and
Kentucky Constitutions. The basis for his argument is that the amendment
treats older injured workers and younger injured workers differently.
The 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Sections 1,
2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution contain the respective federal and state
equal protection clauses. Their “goal . . . is to ‘keep[ ] governmental decision
makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.’”
Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner, 364 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Ky. 2011) (quoting
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Because “[w]orkers’ compensation
statutes concern matters of social and economic policy,” if a rational basis or
substantial and justifiable reason supports the classifications they create, we
must uphold it. Id. at 466 (citing Cain v. Lodestar Energy, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 39,
42 (Ky. 2009)). “In sum, we will uphold the age limitation here so long as it
rationally relates to a legitimate state objective.” Cates v. Kroger, 627 S.W.3d
864, 871 (Ky. 2021).
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As this Court has stated, “acts of the legislature carry a strong
presumption of constitutionality.” Wynn v. Ibold, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 695, 696
(Ky. 1998). “Doubts regarding constitutionality must be resolved in favor of
upholding the law.” Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 870. Furthermore, “the principle of
reducing workers’ compensation benefits at an age when workers typically
become eligible for alternative forms of income replacement is not new to
Kentucky.” Wynn, 969 S.W.2d at 696.
We took up the constitutionality of the 2018 amendment to KRS
342.730(4) in Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 871, holding, “the current version of KRS
342.730(4) is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause because the age
classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.” We do not
depart from that recent holding today.
As this Court held in Parker, “[t]he rational bases for treating younger
and older workers differently [are]: (1) it prevents duplication of benefits; and
(2) it results in savings for the workers’ compensation system.” 529 S.W.3d at
768. Four years later, we stated, “we remain convinced that preventing a
duplication of wage-loss protection programs and promoting the solvency of the
workers’ compensation system are legitimate state interests.” Cates, 627
S.W.3d at 870. We are unpersuaded to deviate from this position by Pickett’s
arguments that KRS 342.730(4) does not prevent duplicative income
replacement benefits, avoid duplicative governmental benefits, or provide a
savings for the workers’ compensation system; nor are we convinced that
savings to the workers’ compensation system is not a valid basis to uphold a
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statute in the face of an equal protection argument. Again, today, we hold the
statute passes the rational basis test as it “treats alike all those who receive
workers’ compensation benefits.” Id. at 871.
Pickett argues that even if the statutory amendment were constitutional
on equal protection grounds (as we have held), it is unconstitutional to apply
the statute retroactively to his claim, as his injury occurred before the effective
date of the amendment. However, “[t]he legislature ‘may amend the law and
make the change applicable to pending cases, even when the amendment is
outcome determinative.’” Id. (quoting Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212
(2016)). Here, this Court declared one version of the statutory subsection
unconstitutional and the legislature passed a new subsection, providing for
retroactive effect—and the legislature was within constitutional bounds in so
doing.
B. Due Process
Pickett next contends the retroactive application of KRS 342.730(4)
stripped him of his property right to workers’ compensation benefits in
violation of his due process rights, as he did not receive prior notice or a
hearing. We addressed this issue in Cates, holding the claimants had no
vested right in the duration and amount of their benefits “until they have
received a final judgment in their favor.” Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 873. The same
is true here. Because Pickett had no vested right in the duration of his
benefits, a statute terminating them at a specific age did not deny him due
process.
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C. Absolute and Arbitrary Power
Pickett also asserts KRS 342.730(4) amounts to an exercise of absolute
and arbitrary power in conflict with his rights pursuant to Sections 1, 2, and 3
of Kentucky’s Constitution. Specifically, Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution, reads, “[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and
property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest
majority.” Courts in this Commonwealth have recognized for half a century
that when a “legislative body acts in a purported policy-making or law-making
function . . . the concept of what is ‘arbitrary’ is much more narrowly
constricted . . . .” City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky.
1971). Such an action is only “arbitrary if there is no rational connection
between that action and the purpose for which the body’s power to act exists.
Where the existence of such rational connection is ‘fairly debatable’ the action
will not be disturbed by a court.” Id.
This Court has “consistently held that treating older injured workers
differently from younger injured workers is rationally related to the legitimate
government interests in preventing a duplication of benefits and saving money
for the workers’ compensation system.” Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 869. KRS
342.730(4) does not amount to an arbitrary exercise of power.
D. Special Legislation
Finally, Pickett argues KRS 342.730(4) violates Kentucky’s constitutional
provisions regarding special legislation found in Sections 59 and 60, as only
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certain statutes amended in House Bill 2 containing the legislation were made
retroactive. Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution states, in pertinent part:
The General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts
concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following
purposes, namely:
....
Fifth: To regulate the limitation of civil or criminal causes.
....
Twenty-fourth: To regulate labor, trade, mining or
manufacturing. . . .
Pickett links this argument to his equal protection argument—essentially
arguing the legislation’s retroactivity is arbitrary. He also makes the argument
that older injured workers are discriminated against because if they receive
permanent partial disability benefits, they will not receive the entirety of their
awards unlike younger injured workers. This is another attempt at making the
same argument under a different veil. We reject it, too, as all injured workers’
benefits terminate at age seventy under the amendment.
This Court addressed a similar special legislation argument in Cates, 627
S.W.3d at 872, holding the amended statutory subsection was not special
legislation as it did not apply “to a particular individual, object or locale.”
(Citing Calloway Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Woodall, 607 S.W.3d 557, 573 (Ky.
2020)). We held in Cates, “[t]he argument that the statute differentiates
between older and younger workers is a classification argument, which is
properly considered under sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution.”
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Id. And, just as in Cates, we reiterate: “KRS 342.730(4) is simply not special
legislation.” Id.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to
the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Ched Jennings
Jennings Law Offices
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, FORD MOTOR COMPANY (LAP):
George T. T. Kitchen, III
Sewell & Neal, PLLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL.
DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL:
Matthew F. Kuhn
Brett R. Nolan
Alexander Y. Magera
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
Hon. R. Roland Case
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:
Michael W. Alvey
Chairman
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