Case: 20-2345 Document: 52 Page: 1 Filed: 12/16/2021
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
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KOM SOFTWARE, INC.,
Appellant
v.
NETAPP, INC.,
Appellee
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2020-2345, 2020-2346
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Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2019-
00591, IPR2019-00592.
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Decided: December 16, 2021
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DAVID FARNUM, Anova Law Group, PLLC, Sterling,
VA, argued for appellant. Also represented by WENYE TAN.
JASON E. STACH, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Gar-
rett & Dunner, LLP, Atlanta, GA, argued for appellee. Also
represented by ERIKA ARNER, JOSHUA GOLDBERG,
YONGYUAN GAO RICE, Washington, DC; CORY C. BELL, Bos-
ton, MA; JACOB ADAM SCHROEDER, Palo Alto, CA.
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Case: 20-2345 Document: 52 Page: 2 Filed: 12/16/2021
2 KOM SOFTWARE, INC. v. NETAPP, INC.
Before PROST, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
KOM Software, Inc. (“KOM”) appeals two inter partes
review final written decisions. In IPR2019-00592
(“the Dibble IPR”), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(“Board”) determined that claims 1–7, 10, 12–17, and 20 of
U.S. Patent No. 6,438,642 were unpatentable as obvious
over two prior-art references, Dibble and Cannon. 1 In
IPR2019-00591 (“the Carter IPR”), the Board separately
determined that a subset of those claims was unpatentable
as obvious over other prior-art references.
As to the Dibble IPR, KOM argues that, contrary to the
Board’s finding, Dibble fails to disclose the “different com-
puter systems” limitation of claim 16 (and other claims).
Although KOM presents this issue as one of claim construc-
tion, we agree with NetApp, Inc. (“NetApp”) that the perti-
nent inquiry is whether the “supercomputer” of Dibble
teaches the “different computer systems” limitation. In-
deed, it appears that neither side sought construction of
this term and, as KOM acknowledges, the question is
whether the Local File System (“LFS”) nodes of Dibble’s su-
percomputer “are, or are treated like, different computer
systems.” Appellant’s Br. 42. On this point, the Board’s
finding that “Dibble teaches that its LFSs are different
computer systems,” J.A. 69, is supported by substantial ev-
idence, namely, Dibble itself and testimony from NetApp’s
expert, Dr. Long. For example, Dr. Long testified that a
person of ordinary skill would consider each LFS to be “a
different computer system” because “[e]ach LFS operates
1 The Board found that claims 1–6, 12–14, and 16
were unpatentable as obvious over the teachings of Dibble
alone and that claims 7, 10, 15, 17, and 20 were unpatent-
able as obvious over the combined teachings of Dibble and
Cannon. J.A. 105.
Case: 20-2345 Document: 52 Page: 3 Filed: 12/16/2021
KOM SOFTWARE, INC. v. NETAPP, INC. 3
independently, having its own processor and disk drive.”
J.A. 1895. As another example, Dibble describes its LFSs
as “self-sufficient.” J.A 2210; see J.A. 2222, 2262.
We have considered KOM’s remaining arguments with
respect to the Dibble IPR but find them unpersuasive. Be-
cause we affirm the Board’s unpatentability determina-
tions in the Dibble IPR, we need not and do not reach the
issues raised with respect to the Carter IPR.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
The parties shall bear their own costs.