2016 UT App 42
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ZACHARY RIGBY,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20140553-CA
Filed March 3, 2016
First District Court, Logan Department
The Honorable Brian G. Cannell
No. 135100370
Brandon J. Smith, Attorney for Appellant
James Swink and Aaron M. Jossie, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE
GREGORY K. ORME and SENIOR JUDGE JAMES Z. DAVIS concurred. 1
ROTH, Judge:
¶1 Zachary Rigby appeals his conviction for driving with a
measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or
use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors. Rigby
challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence that the police found during a warrantless search of his
vehicle. Rigby contends that the Utah Constitution provides its
1. Senior Judge James Z. Davis began his work on this case as a
member of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court,
but thereafter became a Senior Judge. He completed his work on
this case sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See
generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6).
State v. Rigby
citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches than
the United States Constitution because Utah courts have
required police officers to have both probable cause and exigent
circumstances when performing a warrantless search under the
automobile exception. He concedes the officers had probable
cause to search his automobile following the traffic stop but
asserts that they violated his constitutional rights by conducting
the search without a warrant in the absence of exigent
circumstances. Because we are reluctant to diverge from our
supreme court’s historical pattern of paralleling federal search
and seizure law, we conclude that law enforcement officers were
only required to have probable cause to justify the search of
Rigby’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Ordinarily, ‚*w+e recite the facts in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s findings from the suppression
hearing.‛ State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v.
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). But for purposes
of Rigby’s motion to suppress and, by extension, this appeal,
both parties have stipulated to the facts as presented in the
original police report. ‚A stipulation of fact filed with and
accepted by a court . . . is conclusive of all matters necessarily
included in the stipulation.‛ Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah
State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT 11, ¶ 20, 20 P.3d 287 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Prinsburg State Bank v.
Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ¶ 14, 296 P.3d 709 (‚*W]hen a court adopts a
stipulation of the parties, the issues to which the parties have
stipulated become settled . . . .‛ (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). Therefore, we recite the facts in accordance
with the parties’ stipulation.
20140553-CA 2 2016 UT App 42
State v. Rigby
¶3 On March 28, 2013, a police officer pulled Rigby’s
automobile over for a stop sign violation. Upon approaching the
vehicle, the police officer could ‚*i+immediately . . . detect[] the
odor of both burnt and fresh marijuana coming from the
vehicle.‛ Rigby and the two other occupants were ‚exhibiting
physical indicators of recent marijuana use, including bloodshot
eyes, droopy eyelids and a stoned look,‛ along with acting
‚extremely nervous‛ during the traffic stop. Additional officers,
including a K9 officer, were called to the location. The officer
who initiated the traffic stop then ‚explained *to Rigby+ that *he+
was going to be searching the vehicle, not only based on the fact
that [he] could smell the marijuana in the vehicle but because the
drug dog had given a positive indication as well.‛ Two officers
then searched Rigby’s vehicle; they recovered a small metal pipe
with marijuana residue and plastic bags containing fresh
marijuana. Rigby was arrested and charged with possession of
drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; driving with a
measurable controlled substance in the body and possession or
use of a controlled substance, both class B misdemeanors; and
failure to stop at a stop sign, a class C misdemeanor.
¶4 Rigby filed a motion to suppress ‚*a+ll evidence seized
and any statement obtained‛ ‚as a result of the unlawful
searches‛ conducted ‚in violation of the Utah Constitution.‛ At
the evidentiary hearing on Rigby’s motion, he conceded that the
‚odor of marijuana was sufficient‛ to establish probable cause
but argued that exigent circumstances were also ‚required in
order to justify a warrantless search‛ under the automobile
exception. The trial court denied Rigby’s motion to suppress,
finding that ‚the search was reasonable under the circumstances
and such evidence was lawfully obtained under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.‛
¶5 Rigby subsequently pled guilty to one count of driving
with a measurable controlled substance in the body, see Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis 2014), and one count of
possession or use of a controlled substance, see id. § 58-37-
20140553-CA 3 2016 UT App 42
State v. Rigby
8(2)(a)(i).2 In entering his pleas, Rigby reserved the right to
appeal the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. See State
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (describing how a
conditional plea ‚specifically preserves the suppression issue for
appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant’s
arguments in favor of suppression are accepted by the appellate
court‛) (citations omitted).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 On appeal, Rigby argues that although the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution contain nearly
identically phrased protections against unreasonable searches,
the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to its citizens
by requiring law enforcement officers to have both probable
cause and exigent circumstances before conducting a warrantless
search under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, even though the United States Supreme Court has
held that under the federal constitution the automobile exception
requires only probable cause. ‚Matters of constitutional
interpretation are questions of law that we review for
correctness, and we provide no deference to the district court’s
legal conclusions.‛ State v. Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366,
¶ 15, 293 P.3d 1121 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 27, 344 P.3d 581
(‛Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law that we review
for correctness . . . .‛ (first omission in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. Because the statutory provisions in effect at the relevant times
do not differ materially from the statutory provisions now in
effect, we cite the current version of the Utah Code for
convenience.
20140553-CA 4 2016 UT App 42
State v. Rigby
ANALYSIS
¶7 Both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution contain nearly identical provisions safeguarding an
individual’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures.3
Both protect ‚*t+he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures‛ by the government. U.S. Const. amend.
IV; see also Utah Const. art. I, § 14. Some time ago, the Utah
Supreme Court observed that ‚Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the fourth amendment,
and thus [the] Court has never drawn any distinctions between
the protections afforded by the respective constitutional
provisions. Rather, the Court has always considered the
protections afforded to be one and the same.‛ State v. Watts, 750
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988). The question presented here is
whether Utah courts should continue to follow this principle and
track the relatively recent evolution of the automobile exception
under federal law or chart its own path under the Utah
Constitution. To address this question, we first trace the history
of the automobile exception under both federal and state case
law. Next we examine the status of the automobile exception
under federal law in light of the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per
curiam). Finally, we consider whether Utah is likely to continue
to track federal law after Labron with regard to the automobile
exception or chart a new path under the Utah Constitution.
3. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
(continued<)
20140553-CA 5 2016 UT App 42
State v. Rigby
I. The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement
¶8 Because warrantless searches are ‚per se unreasonable,‛
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), ‚*p]olice officers
generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy,‛ State v. Boyles, 2015 UT
App 185, ¶ 10, 356 P.3d 687 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154, 164 (1978)); see also id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 164) (noting
that ‚*b+efore issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must
determine that probable cause exists to conduct the search‛).
‚There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule . . . one [of
which] is the so-called ‘automobile exception’ . . . .‛ California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). Historically, under the
automobile exception, police were permitted to search an
automobile without a warrant so long as both probable cause
and exigent circumstances existed. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 48–51 (1970); State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah
1978).
(