NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 21a0594n.06
No. 21-5356
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
)
FILED
EDWARD PINCHON, Dec 21, 2021
)
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v.
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
RAYMOND BYRD, Warden,
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
Respondent-Appellee.
)
Before: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Edward Pinchon appeals the district court’s
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court
granted a certificate of appealability on Pinchon’s claim that his sentence is unconstitutional under
the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Finding that Pinchon
cannot prevail, we AFFIRM.
I.
In April 1997, then 17-year-old Pinchon shot and killed Leslie Handy. Prior to Handy’s
death, Pinchon and Handy shared an ongoing sexual relationship. At the time, Handy was a
middle-aged man in his forties with a criminal history of child assault and rape. Handy, taking
advantage of Pinchon’s youth and other vulnerabilities, would have Pinchon stay at his house most
nights during their relationship. Handy also provided food and clothing to Pinchon.
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On April 21, 1997, Pinchon went to Handy’s house with three friends to pick up clothes
that Handy had purchased for him. Handy preferred to keep the clothes that he purchased for
Pinchon at his house. Mary Jones, a key witness and Handy’s neighbor, was visiting with Handy
when Pinchon and his friends arrived. At some point, Pinchon grabbed Handy’s shotgun from
another room and told everyone to leave so that Handy and Pinchon could “make love.” Handy
told him to put the gun away. Eventually, Pinchon did and left Handy’s house. A few minutes
after he and his friends left, Pinchon called Handy’s phone. Jones answered and Pinchon told
Jones that he planned to kill Handy. About 15 minutes later, Pinchon and his friends returned to
Handy’s house. When Pinchon drew a handgun from his pants-pocket, Jones left. Seconds later,
Jones heard several gun shots and saw Pinchon and his friends flee the house. Jones called the
police and when they arrived, they found Handy dead from gunshot wounds.
The State of Tennessee charged Pinchon with first-degree murder. In September 1999,
Pinchon was tried to a jury and convicted of first-degree murder. Under Tennessee law, there are
three sentencing options for a defendant convicted of first-degree murder: (1) death; (2) life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and (3) imprisonment for life. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-13-202(b). The trial court sentenced Pinchon to imprisonment for life because
Pinchon’s youth precluded a death sentence, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(a)(1), and the State
of Tennessee did not seek a sentence for life in prison without the possibility of parole. For over
a decade following his trial, Pinchon made several attempts to challenge his conviction and
sentence. He filed a direct appeal, a petition for post-conviction relief in state court, and two
petitions for federal habeas relief, all without success.
But two later Supreme Court cases gave Pinchon another chance. In 2012, the Court held
unconstitutional “a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for
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juvenile offenders.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). While a juvenile offender
could still be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, any sentencing scheme must allow
the court to consider all relevant factors, including the juvenile offender’s youth, before imposing
such a sentence. Id. Then in 2016, the Court held that “state collateral review courts” must give
retroactive effect to controlling “new substantive rule[s] of constitutional law,” which included the
new rule handed down in Miller. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 200 (2016).
Seeking relief under Miller and Montgomery, Pinchon filed a motion to reopen his post-
conviction proceedings in Tennessee state court. Relying on Miller, he argued that the life
sentence that he received as a minor qualified as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. But the state trial court denied his motion, finding no violation under Miller
because Pinchon’s life sentence was for a “specific number of years” and reduction credits served
“the same purpose as eligibility for parole.” The trial court also concluded that Tennessee’s
sentencing scheme did not violate Miller because “Tennessee law not only allows, but requires
courts to give individualized consideration to a defendant in sentencing.” See Tenn. Code. Ann.
§ 39-13-204(i)-(j). In short, the state trial court held that Tennessee law does not mandate a life
sentence without the possibility of parole.
Pinchon applied to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) for permission to
appeal, but the TCCA denied Pinchon’s application because “[h]e did not receive a mandatory
sentence of life without possibility of parole, as contemplated by Miller.” The TCCA noted that
Pinchon could earn enough credits to secure release after 51 years, which would not be possible if
Pinchon had received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. The TCCA recognized that
while Miller’s logic could extend to sentences similar to Pinchon’s sentence, “that is not the
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precedent which now exists,” and it declined to expand Miller to Pinchon’s application. Pinchon
applied for permission to appeal further, but the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his application.
Finding no relief in state collateral-review proceedings, Pinchon turned to federal court. In
November 2016, Pinchon filed a § 2254 petition, claiming that his sentence was unconstitutional
under Miller and Montgomery. After the district court appointed counsel for Pinchon, he sought
permission from this Court to file a successive petition in the district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(A), and we granted that permission. See In re Pinchon, No. 17-5104, WL 11037420,
at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2017).
In the district court, the magistrate judge recommended denial of Pinchon’s petition. The
district court agreed, adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and denied the
petition. The district court held that the state court had adjudicated Pinchon’s claim on the merits
and that Pinchon had not met either of § 2254(d)’s requirements for habeas relief: namely, that the
state court’s adjudication has “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of” United States Supreme Court precedent—here, Miller or
Montgomery—or was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts.”
The district court granted Pinchon a certificate of appealability on two issues: whether
Miller should extend to Pinchon’s sentence and whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) bars Pinchon’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Pinchon timely appealed. He argues first that Miller prohibits
his being sentenced to life because a life sentence imposed upon a juvenile offender denies the
juvenile any meaningful opportunity to obtain release and thus violates the Eighth Amendment.
Second, he contends that his life sentence is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court
precedent because “such precedent required the Tennessee courts to fully enforce Miller by
granting relief if Pinchon’s sentence violates the Eighth Amendment in light of Miller’s
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No. 21-5356, Pinchon v. Byrd
principles,” and the state court failed to independently determine whether Miller could logically
be extended to Pinchon’s life sentence.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of Pinchon’s habeas petition. Post v.
Bradshaw, 621 F.3d 406, 413 (6th Cir. 2010). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides the standard of review for Pinchon’s habeas claim. The federal
habeas court may overturn a state court conviction if the last reasoned state court opinion on the
merits “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “This
statutory test is ‘difficult to meet.’” Atkins v. Crowell, 945 F.3d 476, 477 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014)). To obtain relief under the “contrary to” clause, the
petitioner must show either that the state court reached a “conclusion opposite to that reached by
[the Supreme] Court on a question of law,” or that the state court reached “a result opposite” of a
Supreme Court decision with “materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 405 (2000). To obtain relief under the “unreasonable application” clause, the petitioner must
show that the state court—while correctly identifying the applicable law from Supreme Court
precedent—unreasonably applied the law to the petitioner’s case. Id. at 413. Importantly, the
question is not whether the state court decision incorrectly applied federal law. Rather, the
petitioner must show that the state court decision was “objectively unreasonable,” Hall v. Mays,
7 F.4th 433, 444 (6th Cir. 2021), such that no reasonable person could agree with the state court’s
decision. Id. (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
Our precedent precludes granting relief to Pinchon. In Atkins, we held, on nearly identical
facts, that the petitioner was not entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(1). 945 F.3d at 478. There, a
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Tennessee state court sentenced 16-year-old Howard Atkins to imprisonment for life. Id. at 477.
Under this sentence, Atkins was eligible for release after 51 years. Id. Atkins sought post-
conviction relief in state court, relying on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Miller and
Montgomery. Id. But the state courts declined to extend Miller to Atkins’s sentence so he sought
habeas relief in federal court. Id. The district court denied relief, and we affirmed, explaining:
Whether read broadly or narrowly Miller creates a legal rule about life-without-
parole sentences. And, whether one looks at Atkins’s sentence formally or
functionally, he did not receive a life-without-parole sentence. He will be eligible
for release after at least 51 years’ imprisonment. Miller’s holding simply does not
cover a lengthy term of imprisonment that falls short of life without parole.
Id. A sentence that provides for the possibility of release, even after 51 years, we said, is materially
distinguishable from a sentence without the possibility of release, which was Miller’s sentence.
Hence, the state court’s decision was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Further, the state
court’s decision in Atkins was not an unreasonable application of the Miller holding. “A state
[court] decision cannot have unreasonably applied a Supreme Court precedent if a habeas
petitioner needs a federal court ‘to extend that precedent’ to obtain relief.” Id. at 479.
As in Atkins, so too here. Pinchon received the same sentence Atkins did, and the same
issue presented to us in Atkins presents itself here: whether the state court’s decision not to extend
Miller to a life-imprisonment sentence imposed on a minor is either contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent. In Atkins, we held that it was not. Pinchon offers nothing
to suggest that Atkins should not apply here. In fact, Pinchon concedes that Atkins forecloses relief
on this ground. We agree.
While conceding that Atkins forecloses relief, Pinchon takes another tack, arguing here, as
he argued to the district court, that the state court failed to exercise its independent judgment in
applying Miller and that this failure violated federal law as clearly established in Montgomery.
According to Pinchon, Montgomery requires that a state collateral-review court must review de
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novo a claim of a Miller violation. That is, a state court cannot apply the deferential standard of
review from § 2254(d) to its own review of the constitutional issues presented by the petitioner.
Instead, the state court must independently determine the scope of Miller and decide whether the
sentence falls within Miller’s scope, and failure to make this independent assessment violates
clearly established federal law under Montgomery. This, in turn, Pinchon contends, requires us to
review de novo the state court’s refusal to extend Miller to Pinchon’s sentence.
We are not persuaded. Montgomery did not clearly establish the federal law that Pinchon
claims it does. To be “clearly established” federal law, Supreme Court precedent must announce
a “controlling” legal principle. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). That controlling
legal principle must be “embodied in a holding of th[e] [Supreme] Court.” Pouncy v. Palmer, 846
F.3d 144, 161 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010) (per curiam))
(alterations in original). And courts should narrowly construe Supreme Court precedent so that
“clearly established federal law” refers only to “something akin to on-point holdings.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted).
None of Montgomery’s holdings clearly establishes Pinchon’s proffered standard of review
for state collateral-review courts. Two on-point holdings from Montgomery apply here. First,
state collateral-review courts must retroactively apply “a new substantive rule of constitutional
law” that “controls the outcome of [the] case.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 200. Second, Miller
applies retroactively in state collateral-review courts. Id. at 212. Absent from Montgomery’s
holdings is any clear statement of the standard of review that the state appellate court must apply
in its review of a prisoner’s retroactive Miller claim. Therefore, Montgomery did not clearly
establish as federal law that state appellate courts must review constitutional claims de novo.
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Even if Montgomery’s holdings clearly established an independent duty to determine
Miller’s scope, neither the state trial court nor the TCCA failed that duty on collateral review. The
state trial court denied relief to Pinchon because his “life sentence” differed from a “life sentence
without the possibility of parole” in two important respects. First, in contrast to a life sentence
that lasts as long as the defendant lives, Pinchon’s sentence was for a “specific number of years”
after which he would be eligible for release with no parole supervision. Second, under Tennessee
precedent, Pinchon’s sentence did not fall within the scope of Miller because “sentence reduction
credits serve[d] the same purpose as eligibility for parole.” See Lowe-Kelley v. State, No. M2015-
00138, 2016 WL 742180, at *8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Feb. 24, 2016). Thus, the state trial court
provided a thorough and independent analysis in determining whether Miller should apply to
Pinchon’s sentence.
The TCCA’s decision is no different. On collateral review, the TCCA correctly reviewed
the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion as required by state law. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-30-117(c). After a summary of the state trial court’s decision, the TCCA concluded—albeit
briefly—that there was no abuse of discretion because Pinchon’s sentence included the possibility
of release after 51 years and that this distinguished Pinchon’s sentence from the type of sentence
that Miller covered. As the district court put it, the TCCA’s “statements sound like an
interpretation of Miller’s scope.”
On appeal, Pinchon insists that the TCCA failed its duty to exercise independent judgment.
Pinchon relies on language from the TCCA’s decision that it did not feel “compelled” to extend
Miller to Pinchon’s sentence. But this myopic argument ignores the TCCA’s determination of
Miller’s scope that preceded the language that Pinchon relies on. The TCCA speculated that Miller
might extend to sentences like Pinchon’s in the future, but that it was not persuaded to extend
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Miller now. The TCCA nonetheless reviewed the state trial court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion as Tennessee law required. As already explained, the trial court provided a thorough
and independent analysis that demonstrated why Miller did not extend to Pinchon’s sentence.
Whatever the merits of these decisions, it would be incorrect to say that the Tennessee state courts
failed to adequately exercise their independent judgment in determining Miller’s scope on
collateral review. Therefore, because § 2254(d)(1)’s deferential standard applies, and for the same
reasons explained in Atkins, Pinchon is not entitled to relief.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of district court.
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HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join in the affirmance because I
agree that the Tennessee appellate court’s decision was not contrary to, and did not involve an
unreasonable application of, clearly established law as determined by the United States Supreme
Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). I write separately because I conclude that sentences like
Pinchon’s violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. See
Starks v. Easterling, 659 F. App’x 277, 282–83 (6th Cir. 2016) (White, J., concurring) (suggesting
that an identical sentence would violate the Eighth Amendment).
In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Supreme Court held that “the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders.” Id. at 479. The Court relied on Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010),
which explained that the prohibition of sentences of life without parole means that States “must
provide ‘some meaningful opportunity [for prisoners] to obtain release.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). Under Miller, prisoners like Pinchon “must be given the
opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope
for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.” See Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U.S. 190, 213 (2016).
Pinchon’s sentence deprives him of a meaningful opportunity to obtain release and a hope
for some years beyond prison walls. Pinchon was sentenced to “imprisonment for life,” which in
Tennessee is the equivalent of a sixty-year sentence. See Brown v. Jordan, 563 S.W.3d 196, 200
(Tenn. 2018) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(h)(1)). He can earn sentence-reduction credits
of up to 15% of his sentence, which would make him eligible for release after fifty-one years. See
id. at 202. If he were to earn the maximum sentence-reduction credits available, he would be
eligible for release at age sixty-eight. See id. Data from the Centers for Disease Control and
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Prevention (CDC) for 1998 show that Pinchon’s life expectancy was about 69.3 years when he was
sentenced. See Robert N. Anderson, United States Life Tables, 1998, 48 National Vital Statistics
Reports, No. 18, p. 21 (Feb. 7, 2001), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_18.pdf.1
And that projection did not account for any potential effect of Pinchon’s incarceration on his
lifespan. Because Pinchon’s minimum sentence approaches and may exceed his life expectancy,
it should be considered a de facto sentence of life without parole in contravention of the Eighth
Amendment. See Atkins v. Crowell, 945 F.3d 476, 481–82 (6th Cir. 2019) (Cole, J., concurring)
(collecting the “ever-increasing number” of cases vacating term-of-years sentences under Miller
and Graham because they amount to life without parole); Starks, 659 F. App’x at 283 (White, J.,
concurring) (same).
Nevertheless, I recognize that “fairminded jurists could disagree” that the Tennessee
appellate court violated Miller in upholding Pinchon’s sentence. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). The Supreme Court has not explicitly held that a long term-of-years
sentence violates Miller, let alone indicated how long a sentence must be to constitute a de facto
sentence of life without parole. To be sure, a term-of-years sentence beyond a certain length is the
clear functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole; such a sentence must violate Miller.
See Atkins, 945 F.3d at 482 (Cole, J., concurring) (suggesting that a sentence mandating 100 years’
imprisonment would violate Miller); Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1059–60 (10th Cir. 2017)
(holding on habeas review that a sentence of at least 131.75 years’ imprisonment violated the
Eighth Amendment under Graham); McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2016)
(concluding that “the logic of Miller applies” to a sentence of 100 years’ imprisonment without
1
More recent CDC data show that, when Pinchon was thirty-eight years old in 2018, his life expectancy was
about 74.9 years. See Elizabeth Arias and Jiaquan Xu, United States Life Tables, 2018, 69 National Vital Statistics
Report, No. 12, p. 30 (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr69/nvsr69-12-508.pdf.
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the possibility of early release); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding on
habeas review that a 254-year sentence violated Graham where the petitioner would not be eligible
for parole for 127 years). But because fairminded jurists could reasonably debate whether
sentencing a juvenile to a minimum of fifty-one years’ imprisonment violates Miller, AEDPA
requires us to affirm the district court’s denial of Pinchon’s petition.
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