[Cite as State v. Baker, 2021-Ohio-4544.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
MADISON COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NO. CA2021-03-006
Appellee, : OPINION
12/27/2021
:
- vs -
:
RONDEY D. BAKER, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CRI20200103
Nicholas A. Adkins, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel M. Price, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Shannon M. Treynor, for appellant.
M. POWELL, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Rondey Baker, appeals his conviction and sentence in the Madison
County Court of Common Pleas for attempted murder.
{¶2} Appellant was indicted in August 2020 on one count of attempted murder and
two counts of felonious assault. Each count was accompanied by a repeat violent offender
specification. On January 16, 2021, appellant agreed to plead guilty to one count of
Madison CA2021-03-006
attempted murder, a first-degree felony, in exchange for the state dismissing the felonious
assault offenses and the repeat violent offender specifications. On March 3, 2021, the trial
court sentenced appellant to a minimum mandatory prison term of ten years with a
maximum mandatory prison term of 15 years. The record shows that the trial court never
advised appellant of his duty to register as a violent offender under R.C. 2903.42 prior to
sentencing him.
{¶3} R.C. 2903.41 through 2903.44, commonly known as "Sierah's Law," became
effective on March 20, 2019. Sierah's Law created a statewide violent offender database,
sets forth a rebuttable presumption that violent offenders, as defined in R.C. 2903.41(A),
register in person annually for ten years, and subjects violent offenders to criminal
prosecution for failing to comply with Sierah's Law. Appellant is a violent offender under
R.C. 2903.41(A)(1)(b) based on his guilty plea to attempted murder.
{¶4} R.C. 2903.42 governs enrollment in the violent offender database and places
certain notification obligations on the trial court before sentencing. In particular, it is
presumed that each person classified as a violent offender "shall be required to enroll in the
violent offender database with respect to the offense that so classifies the person and shall
have all violent offender database duties with respect to that offense for ten years after the
offender initially enrolls in the database." R.C. 2903.42(A)(1). "Violent offender database
duties" mean the duty to enroll, the duty to reenroll, and the duty to provide notice of any
change of address. R.C. 2903.41(H).
{¶5} The presumption above is rebuttable, and each violent offender must be
"informed of the presumption * * * , of the offender's right to file a motion to rebut the
presumption, of the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and of the effect
of a rebuttal and the post-rebuttal hearing procedures and possible outcomes." R.C.
2903.42(A)(1). For individuals classified as violent offenders under R.C. 2903.41(A)(1),
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such as appellant, the sentencing court "shall inform the offender before sentencing of the
presumption, the right, and the procedure, criteria, and possible outcome." R.C.
2903.42(A)(1)(a). An individual classified as a violent offender under R.C. 2903.41(A)(1)
and wishing to rebut the presumption of enrollment in the violent offender database must
file a motion with the trial court prior to or at the time of sentencing. R.C. 2903.42(A)(2)(a).
{¶6} Appellant appeals his conviction and sentence, raising two assignments of
error.
{¶7} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶8} THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY OR
VOLUNTARILY MADE AS THE COUR[T] FAILED TO ENGAGE IN A RULE 11
COLLOQUY REGARDING THE DEFENDANT'S REQUIREMENT TO REGISTER IN THE
VIOLENT OFFENDER DATABASE.
{¶9} Appellant argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily made because the trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) during
the plea colloquy.
{¶10} "When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement
of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution." State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179. Pursuant to Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(a), a trial court shall not accept a guilty plea in a felony case without personally
addressing the defendant and determining that the defendant is "making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty
involved." In general, a trial court is not required to inform a defendant about collateral
consequences before accepting a plea. State v. Tanksley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-
89, 2021-Ohio-2900, ¶ 20; State v. Wright, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28368, 2021-Ohio-
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4107, ¶ 26.
{¶11} In two recent opinions, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that there was no
indication Sierah's Law was enacted to inflict punishment and rejected the view that Sierah's
Law was punitive in effect. See State v. Hubbard, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3710; and
State v. Jarvis, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3712. The supreme court observed that "the
enrollment requirements are not imposed as part of the offender's sentence and notice of
those duties is merely provided to the offender either at his or her sentencing hearing or
upon his or her release from incarceration." Hubbard at ¶ 31.1 Rather, the court recognized
that "offender-registration schemes like Sierah's Law have 'long been a valid regulatory
technique with [the] remedial purpose' of providing information to law enforcement in order
to better protect the public." Jarvis at ¶ 12.
{¶12} This and other courts have recently held that the "violent-offender enrollment
statutes do not increase the punishment for the specified violent offenses" listed in R.C.
2903.41(A), including attempted murder. State v. Hubbard, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-
05-086, 2020-Ohio-856, ¶ 32. "Rather, classification as a violent offender and enrollment
into the violent offender database 'is a collateral consequence of the offender's criminal acts
rather than a form of punishment per se.'" Id., quoting State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d
7, 2008-Ohio-4824, ¶ 34; State v. Beard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109630, 2021-Ohio-2512,
¶ 42; Tanksley, 2021-Ohio-2900 at ¶ 22-24.
{¶13} "[B]ecause registration requirements are collateral consequences rather than
punishment, Crim.R. 11 does not require a trial court to inform a defendant of the
1. The requirement to inform an offender of violent offender database duties upon the offender's release from
incarceration applies to those classified as a violent offender pursuant to R.C. 2903.41(A)(2) (i.e., incarcerated
offenders who were convicted of or pled guilty to a violent offender qualifying offense prior to the effective
date of Sierah's Law). Appellant was classified as a violent offender under R.C. 2903.41(A)(1), as he was
convicted of a violent offender qualifying offense after the effective date of Sierah's Law. Thus, appellant must
be provided the requisite notice before sentencing, not upon his release from incarceration.
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registration and notification requirements before accepting a defendant's guilty plea." Beard
at ¶ 53. Furthermore, the maximum penalty "does not include the registration requirements
under the [violent offender database]." Id. at ¶ 51; Tanksley at ¶ 23 (finding that
classification as a violent offender and enrollment into the violent offender database are not
included in the maximum penalty of an offense). The trial court, therefore, was not required
to inform appellant of the applicable registration requirements under Sierah's Law before
accepting his guilty plea. Beard at ¶ 53. The trial court's failure to provide the mandatory
advisements of R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) during the plea colloquy did not render appellant's
guilty plea invalid.
{¶14} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶15} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶16} THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT IS VOID AS A MATTER OF
LAW FOR FAILURE TO INCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO THE VIOLENT OFFENDER
DATABASE AND THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON THE
DEFENDANT.
{¶17} Appellant argues that his sentence is void because the trial court failed to
comply with R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) before sentencing him.
{¶18} This court "does not review the sentencing court's decision for an abuse of
discretion." State v. Scott, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2019-07-051 and CA2019 07-052,
2020-Ohio-3230, ¶ 54, citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 10.
"It is instead the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) that governs all felony
sentences." State v. Watkins, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2020-03-005, 2021-Ohio-163, ¶ 48.
Pursuant to that statute, this court may increase, reduce, "or otherwise modify a sentence
that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to
the sentencing court for resentencing," if this court clearly and convincingly finds either of
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the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶19} As stated above, appellant was classified as a violent offender under R.C.
2903.41(A)(1) based on his attempted murder conviction. Accordingly, the trial court was
required to provide the advisements set forth in R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a) — the presumption
established under this division, the offender's right to file a motion to rebut the presumption,
the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and the effect of a rebuttal and the
post-rebuttal hearing procedures and possible outcome — before sentencing. The record
reflects that the trial court failed to do so prior to sentencing appellant.
{¶20} R.C. 2903.42(A)(3) further provides that when an offender, such as appellant,
has not filed a motion to rebut the presumption, "the trial court must provide to the offender,
at sentencing, notice of his or her duties under Sierah's Law." Wright, 2021-Ohio-4107 at
¶ 34. Specifically, the trial court must
require the violent offender to read and sign a form stating that
the violent offender has received and understands the notice. If
the violent offender is unable to read, the judge * * * shall inform
the violent offender of the violent offender's duties as set forth
in the notice and shall certify on the form that the judge * * *
informed the violent offender of the violent offender's duties and
that the violent offender indicated an understanding of those
duties.
R.C. 2903.42(C).
{¶21} R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) is a mandatory statute. Beard, 2021-Ohio-2512 at ¶ 58.
Because of the trial court's failure to comply with R.C. 2903.42, and 2903.42(A)(1) in
particular, appellant was not informed of the presumption of enrollment in the violent
offender database, of his right to file a motion to rebut the presumption, and of the procedure
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and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and therefore did not have an opportunity to file
a written motion to rebut the presumption. See State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
109142, 2021-Ohio-580; Beard. Furthermore, appellant was not aware of the effect of the
rebuttal or the post-rebuttal hearing procedures and possible outcomes. As R.C.
2903.42(A)(1)(a) requires that the notification be provided "before sentencing," the trial
court lacked the authority to proceed with sentencing appellant until the notifications were
given.
{¶22} We therefore find that appellant's sentence is contrary to law under R.C.
2953.08(G)(2) and sustain appellant's second assignment of error.
{¶23} Accordingly, we hereby vacate appellant's sentence and remand the matter
to the trial court for purposes of complying with the mandatory advisements of R.C.
2903.42(A)(1) and for resentencing. In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
{¶24} Judgment vacated as to appellant's sentence only and remanded to the trial
court.
PIPER, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.
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