[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 26, 2007
No. 06-13797 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00068-CR-DF-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SEAN BRYANT REGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 26, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sean Bryant Regan, through counsel, appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress, and his conviction for unlawful possession of an unregistered
firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Regan argues that the district court
clearly erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because the vehicle
checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment. First, Regan argues that the primary
purpose of the checkpoint was impermissibly for general crime control rather than
traffic safety. Second, Regan argues that even if the primary purpose of the
checkpoint was traffic safety, the checkpoint was unreasonable and violated the
Fourth Amendment because the government’s interest in preventing motorists
from running the four-way intersection was only slight as compared to the
significant intrusion upon the individual motorists.
“A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact.” United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1999).
We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and the court’s
application of the law to those facts de novo.1 Id. These factual findings include
the district court’s credibility determinations, to which we will “accord
considerable deference.” United States. v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749
(11th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ll facts are
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The parties agree that the application of the law to the facts should be reviewed de
novo, and they do not suggest that, to the extent Regan argues for the first time on appeal that the
checkpoint was unreasonable, we should review for plain error.
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construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.” United States
v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). “The individual challenging the
search has the burdens of proof and persuasion.” United States v. Cooper, 133
F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998).
The Fourth Amendment provides for the right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures, and mandates that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. A search or
seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d
513 (1997). Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a
weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640,
61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (citations and quotations omitted).
“It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates
a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990).
The United States Supreme Court, however, has “recognized . . . limited
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circumstances in which the usual rule [of individualized suspicion] does not
apply.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S.Ct. 447, 451 148
L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). For example, the Supreme Court has upheld brief,
suspicionless seizures of motorists at a sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing
drunk drivers from the road. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 445, 110 S.Ct. at 2488. In addition,
in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660
(1979), the Supreme Court suggested that a roadblock to question all oncoming
traffic to verifying drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations with the interest of
serving highway safety would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court, however, has held that a checkpoint program whose primary
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing violates the
Fourth Amendment. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38, 121 S.Ct. at 452.
Even if the government has the authority to conduct a checkpoint, the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment requires a determination of
whether the intrusion on an individual’s privacy was warranted in light of the
state’s interest. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-454, 110 S.Ct. at 2487. Still, the district
court should not attempt
to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the
decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement
techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.
But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among
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such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials
who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited
public resources, including a finite number of police officers.
Id. Thus, we must also consider whether the government’s “operation–as planned
or in the reality of its performance–violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights; that is,
whether [the checkpoint was] reasonable in the light of the state’s interest in
conducting the roadblocks, the effectiveness of the operation in promoting that
interest, and the level of intrusion on the individual’s privacy caused by the
checkpoints.” Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1995).
In this case, testimony at the suppression hearing supports the district court’s
finding that the checkpoint was implemented primarily to respond to traffic safety
concerns. District Court Opinion at 12 (“The Government has shown that the
primary purpose of the checkpoint in question was not to engage in general crime
control, but instead to police the intersection for drunk driving, to perform routine
checks for drivers’ licenses and vehicle registration, and to enforce compliance
with general traffic laws.”). The Monroe County Sheriff’s Office policy regarding
checkpoints indicated that they were to focus on the problem of road safety. In
addition, Officer Duncan and Cpl. Grindstaff reported that the purpose of the
checkpoint was to respond to complaints of motorists running the four-way
intersection at Teagle and Brownlee Roads, that the intersection was plagued with
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intoxicated drivers coming from neighboring counties, and that each vehicle was
stopped to check the motorists’s license and proof of insurance. See Sitz, 496 U.S.
at 445, 110 S.Ct. at 2481, Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401.
Furthermore, even though Deputy Blanks stated at one point that the purpose
of the checkpoint was to respond to a high volume of burglaries and narcotics
offenses in the area, that did not invalidate the lawfulness of the checkpoint. As
the district court noted, Deputy Blanks was not employed by the sheriff’s office in
a supervisory capacity; instead, he was in training at the time of the checkpoint.
Thus, he did not have a role in approving the checkpoint. In addition, Deputy
Blanks’s statement was not corroborated by other documentary and testimonial
evidence, and, at the suppression hearing, he clarified that the checkpoint had a
dual purpose.
With respect to the balancing of competing interests, the district court did
not err in finding that the checkpoint advanced an important state interest as
compared to the level of intrusion on individual’s privacy. First, the district court
did consider the competing interests implicated in carrying out the checkpoint,
namely, the county’s interest in maintaining highway safety, the checkpoint’s
effectiveness at achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion on an individual’s
privacy, and concluded that the balance of the interests weighed in favor of finding
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the checkpoint reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the after arrest reports and suppression hearing testimony confirmed
that the checkpoint was executed for the important state interest of ensuring
compliance with the state’s driver licensing and vehicle registration laws, and to
check for drunk drivers. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 445, 110 S.Ct. at 2481, Prouse, 440
U.S. at 657-58, 99 S.Ct. at 1398. The documentary and testimonial evidence also
showed that every motorist who drove through the intersection during the
checkpoint was stopped. Thus, the officers did not engage in randomized stops;
instead, every vehicle was stopped and every motorist was asked for
documentation. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400.
The evidence shows a checkpoint designed to comply with the Constitution.
Even though records of the time required to conduct the document inspection were
not kept, at the hearing Duncan testified that the checkpoint stop lasted an average
of one or two minutes. See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551 (upholding a less than one
minute checkpoint stop for document inspection and external sniff by a K-9 unit).
Evidence presented at the hearing showed that the sheriff’s office had received
complaints of traffic safety violations at the intersection.
In sum, the government’s interest in preventing accidents caused by
motorists, some of whom were intoxicated, running the four-way intersection, the
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effectiveness of the checkpoint in achieving the goal of traffic safety, and the level
of intrusion on an individual’s privacy caused by the checkpoint, weighs in favor
of the checkpoint. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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