United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 30, 2007
July
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 07-30217
Summary Calendar
RAYMOND ANDERSON JR,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
MONSANTO COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:06-CV-4002
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Raymond Anderson appeals the district court’s summary judgment that
he take nothing on his claim of race discrimination against the Monsanto
Company. We affirm for the following reasons:
1. Anderson presented no evidence to the district court that tended to
establish that the reason given for his termination was pre-textual.
Even the unsubstantiated feelings of fellow employees that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 07-30217
Anderson’s supervisor, Andrus, was prejudiced—which Anderson
did not present in his memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment—are no evidence that Monsanto’s reason for terminating
Anderson was a mere pretext for discrimination. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (“conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated
assertions are inadequate”); see also Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc.,
288 F.3d 124, 135 (4th Cir. 2002) (“. . . affidavits [of other
employees], however, amount to no more than subjective beliefs, and
such evidence, without more, is insufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to any discriminatory conduct on [defendant’s]
part.”).
2. Anderson did not proceed on a mixed-motive theory in the district
court and only raised the issue after the fact of the summary
judgment in a motion for reconsideration, so we do not consider his
arguments on appeal that Andrus’ alleged prejudice played a
meaningful role in his termination. See Trust Co. Bank v. United
States Gypsum Co., 950 F.2d 1144, 1152 n.16 (5th Cir. 1992).
Similarly, Anderson did not argue in the district court until his
motion for reconsideration that Andrus, as opposed to Supervisor
Zamora and Business United Leader Pires, was the actual decision
maker. See id.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s
motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment. Anderson’s
use of the motion to 1) rehash arguments already presented at
summary judgment, 2) insert a new theory—mixed-motive—into the
case, and 3) introduce evidence previously available were not
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No. 07-30217
grounds for granting the motion. See Templet v. Hydrochem Inc.,
367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2004).
AFFIRMED.
3