¶ 1 Plaintiff Brian Donahue filed suit against defendants Seth Albert Smith and David Stoddard for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. During the litigation, defendant Smith died. Under rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the law firm representing Smith filed a suggestion of death with the court. Because plaintiff did not file a motion for substitution within ninety days after the suggestion of death was filed, as required by rule 25, the district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint as to Smith. We affirm.
¶ 3 Plaintiff filed a motion to enlarge the time for filing his motion for substitution on April 2, 1999. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a time extension and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
¶ 4 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint because the suggestion of death filed by Smith's law firm was insufficient to trigger the ninety-day time period during which plaintiff was required to file a motion for substitution. Additionally, plaintiff claims that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice.
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. . . . Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). The district court found that the motion to dismiss in this case was based on plaintiff's failure to "comply with these rules," specifically rule 25, and was not a dismissal "for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party." Id. Therefore, the district court concluded that the dismissal should constitute an adjudication upon the merits. Accordingly, the court entered an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
¶ 7 Plaintiff argues that the dismissal with prejudice was improper because a dismissal under rule 25 should be treated as a dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party, which must be a dismissal without prejudice under rule 41(b). See Bonneville TowerCondominium Mgt. Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (holding that dismissal with prejudice for failure to join an indispensable party would be an abuse of discretion).
¶ 8 We disagree. Rule 41(b) provides that, "[u]nless the court . . . otherwise specifies, a dismissal . . ., other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication on the merits." This language, excepting a dismissal for "lack of an indispensable party" from the rule's presumption that the dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits, applies only to a dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party under rule 19(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Because the language in rule 41(b) discussing a dismissal for lack of an indispensable party refers only to a dismissal under rule 19(b), and because the district court granted the motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's failure to comply with rule 25, the district court properly determined that the dismissal was for a failure "to comply with these rules." Therefore, under rule 41(b), a dismissal with prejudice was presumed, and the district court was not in error to so rule.3 *Page 555
¶ 10 Affirmed.
¶ 11 Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Russon, Justice Durham, and Justice Durrant concur in Justice Wilkins' opinion.