[¶ 19] In a series of decisions over the last year, this Court has settled the law in a troublesome area of workers' compensation: when can valid claims be denied because all *Page 96 reporting requirements were not followed. Because these denials must comport with the constitutional right to due process, our decisions developed an appropriate standard of review, focused on the proper interpretation of the statutory requirements, and distinguished between the definition of a "compensable injury" and that of an "incident" or "accident." Resolving whether notices and claims were timely presents mixed questions of fact and law, and our review is de novo. Wesaw v.Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶¶ 11, 12, 19 P.3d 500, ¶¶ 11, 12 (Wyo. 2001). Applying a de novo review to the denial of benefits for Logue's back injury, I find that the record does not support the denial, and I must respectfully dissent.
[¶ 20] The facts of this case are simple. In October of 1999, Logue injured her neck. Approximately a week or two later, Logue injured her back. It was the holiday season, a very busy time at her store, and she continued working. In May 2000, she had her annual check-up and reported neck pain and leg numbness to her doctor. A series of tests produced a diagnosis that she had suffered work-related injuries to both her neck and back. She reported the diagnosis to her Safeway department supervisor, and her employer provided her with an injury report that both completed and submitted to the Division. The Division denied her claim for both injuries stating they were not work-related and had not been timely reported.
[¶ 21] At the contested case hearing, Logue testified that she told her supervisor of her neck injury, and the hearing examiner found that Logue had timely told her supervisor in October that she had injured her neck. Safeway did not have Logue complete an injury report at that time. Logue then testified that she tripped and hurt her back but did not "report" it at that time. On cross-examination, Logue testified that she did tell her supervisor that she had hurt her back when it happened. She confirmed this fact on redirect examination. Importantly, the Division did not have Logue's supervisor testify. In Wesaw, we stated that if a claimant timely tells her supervisor of a work-related injury, her claim cannot be denied under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502. Wesaw, ¶ 15.
[¶ 22] Despite receiving the same testimony on both injuries, the hearing examiner found that Logue did not tell her employer about her back injury. The basis for this last finding was the hearing examiner's finding #19 which stated:
Had Logue had [sic] mentioned an accident at work, a supervisor would have filled out a report and faxed it to "loss control." Safeway would then contact the employee, discuss medical treatment and conduct an additional investigation if needed. Safeway did not do that in this case because Logue did not report a specific injury.
Yet we know that Logue reported her earlier neck injury, and Safeway did not follow this process. It is against the great weight of the evidence and purely speculative, in addition to being illogical, for the hearing examiner to decide that this process would have been followed for the later back injury when Safeway did not follow this procedure for the neck injury. We, therefore, have the same evidence, Logue's testimony, that she reported both the neck and back injuries to her supervisor after each happened. If that testimony is sufficient to establish the neck injury, then it is sufficient to establish the back injury.
[¶ 23] In addition, even if we assume that Logue's unrefuted testimony is not sufficient to grant her benefits for her back injury, we must nevertheless apply our law regarding "compensable injury." Wesaw, ¶¶ 15, 16. In its disclosure statement, the Division contended that Logue untimely filed her report on May 25, 2000. Logue had received her doctor's diagnosis on May 23, 2000. The hearing examiner determined that because Logue's symptoms increased during the holidays, Logue knew or should have known no later than January 2000 that she had a work-related injury or injuries. However, these symptoms were neck pains and are not relevant to the back injury. "Knowledge of the `full extent and nature of the injury' must be distinguished from an `incident' or an `accident' before the notice and claim requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-502 and *Page 97 503 are triggered." Id. at ¶ 17. There is no evidence establishing that Logue knew that her leg numbness was caused by the tripping incident that pulled a muscle in her back. She discovered that relationship when she received her doctor's diagnosis, and it was then that she knew the "full extent and nature of her injury."
[¶ 24] This is not a Beitel case where the claimant sought chiropractic treatment but did not file an injury report for several months. Here, the claimant suffered minor injuries and continued to work; however, repetitive trauma to those minor injuries resulted in a compensable injury made known to the claimant only after testing and a doctor's diagnosis. Logue timely filed her reports after receiving this diagnosis, the hearing examiner determined that these injuries were work-related, and she is entitled to benefits.
[¶ 25] I would reverse the hearing examiner's order. I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm.