dissenting.
Because C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3) unambiguously states that the time within which to file a notice of appeal in dependency or neglect proceedings “will not be extended,” I would dismiss the appeal as untimely. Accordingly, and with respect, I dissent.
Neither the untimeliness of C.J.’s (mother) appeal, nor its cause — her attorney’s eon-scious delay beyond the filing deadline in order to meet with mother and discuss her inconsistent directions concerning an appeal — is in dispute. Thus, unlike in People in Interest of A.J.H., 134 P.3d 528 (Colo.App.2006), here we need not consider prejudicial reliance on misleading action by the trial court.
Before the adoption of C.A.R. 3.4, a division of this court dismissed as untimely a parent’s appeal of a judgment terminating parental rights. People in Interest of A.E., 994 P.2d 465 (Colo.App.1999). In my view, the plain language and purpose of C.A.R. 3.4 make dismissal of untimely appeals in dependency or neglect proceedings much more appropriate than did the appellate rules applied by the division in that case.
The supreme court adopted C.A.R. 3.4 in 2005 to expedite appeals in such proceedings. People in Interest of A.J.H., supra. Consistent with that purpose, C.A.R. 3.4(b) reduces the time for appeal from the forty-five days allowed in other civil eases under C.A.R. 4(a) to twenty-one days. The twenty-one day deadline “will not be extended.” C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3). In my view, we may not decline to give effect to the plain language of a supreme court rule. See People v. Jackson, 972 P.2d 698, 700 (Colo.App.1998) (“We look first to the language of the rule itself, and if the rule is plain and unambiguous, we apply the rule as written.”).
For two reasons, I am not persuaded otherwise by the majority’s reliance on C.A.R. 2 to suspend the twenty-one day deadline in C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3).
First, I consider criminal cases such as People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893 (Colo.2005), and Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241 (Colo.1988), on which the majority relies, to be inapposite in civil cases. The broad discretion afforded by C.A.R. 2 is limited, “except as otherwise provided in C.A.R. 26(b).” That rule, in turn, prohibits enlarging “the time for filing a notice of appeal beyond that prescribed in C.A.R. 4(a).” And C.A.R. 4(a) governs “Appeals in Civil Cases.” Thus, ex*1154ercise of the power to suspend under C.A.R. 2 in criminal cases is not so limited.
Second, while agreeing with the majority that the language of both C.A.R. 2 and 3.4(b)(3) is plain, the rules still conflict. I would reconcile the broad discretion of C.A.R. 2 and the specific prohibition of C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3) in favor of the latter.
In adopting C.A.R. 3.4, the supreme court could have resolved the tension between C.A.R. 2 and 3.4(b)(3) by including in the former a limiting cross-reference to the latter, comparable to the limiting cross-reference to C.A.R. 26(b). But the history of C.A.R. 3.4 shows no express consideration of that tension.
The supreme court may well have determined that the limiting cross reference in C.A.R. 2 to C.A.R. 26(b), which covers most civil cases through C.A.R 4(a), sufficiently protected the clear mandate of C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3). This view finds support in the exceptions to C.A.R. 4(a), which include C.A.R. 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, but not C.A.R. 3.4. However, an assumption that the supreme court made such a determination is not necessary to save C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3) from the majority’s application of C.A.R. 2.
Traditional principles of statutory construction inform the analysis of conflicting court rules, Leaffer v. Zarlengo, 44 P.3d 1072 (Colo.2002) (interpreting C.R.C.P. 33), including the Colorado Rules of Appellate procedure. People in Interest of A.J.H., supra.
One such principle provides, “As a general rule, a special or specific statutory provision prevails over a general provision unless the general provision is later in time and the legislature has manifested a clear intent that the general provision should prevail.” Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Walter, 812 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Colo.1991); see Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901, 908 (Colo. 1993); see also § 2-4-205, C.R.S.2005.
Under § 2-4-205, the conflict between the provisions must be “irreconcilable” before the special provision will prevail. In my view, C.A.R. 2 and 3.4(b)(3) meet this test. Either C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3) means what it says, or it is nevertheless subordinate to C.A.R. 2. The only other appellate deadline that expressly cannot be extended is addressed in C.A.R. 26(b). That rule does not conflict with C.A.R. 2 because it is cross-referenced in C.A.R. 2. But the lack of a similar cross-reference in C.A.R. 2 to C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3) requires recourse to statutory interpretation principles.
C.A.R. 3.4 is more specific than C.A.R. 2, and it was also adopted more recently than C.A.R. 2. Hence, I would conclude that “the more specific language in [C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3) ] controls and prevails over the general language in [C.A.R. 2].” Leaffer v. Zarlengo, supra, 44 P.3d at 1079.
In reaching this conclusion, I acknowledge the policy of protecting fundamental parental rights from loss due to ineffective assistance of the parent’s counsel. See generally In re K.L., 91 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.2002) (citing numerous cases). But accepting late appeals to preserve parental rights is at odds with furthering children’s best interests by affording them permanence in dependency or neglect proceedings.
As the Minnesota Supreme Court explained in declining to accept a proeedurally flawed appeal of a decision terminating parental rights:
Were we to allow simple failure to follow the rules as a good cause exception, the majority of dismissals for failure to timely file and serve a notice of appeal would be appealed and reversed. Such a result would not only delay final resolution of these cases but would also strip the rules of their important function of providing litigants with clear guidelines in which substantive issues can be pursued. Further, if we wanted to avoid this wholesale result by limiting such an exception to child protection cases, we would be in direct conflict with our own policy, as reflected by the rules, that these cases in particular need to be expeditiously handled.
In re Welfare of J.R., 655 N.W.2d 1, 56 (Minn.2003) (emphasis added).
Further, using C.A.R. 2 to accept untimely appeals, contrary to the mandate of C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3), is a potentially limitless exception because parental rights do not diminish over time. The objective of protecting parental *1155rights affords no basis for distinguishing between the modest delay in this case and delays such as those in People v. Baker, supra (one year), and Estep v. People, supra (three years). Yet, “[e]ach delay in the termination of a parent’s rights equates to a delay in a child’s opportunity to have a permanent home and can seriously affect a child’s chance for permanent placement.” In re Welfare of J.R., supra, 655 N.W.2d at 5.
The majority’s application of its “only exceptional cases” test to the facts of this case illustrates the slippery slope that C.A.R. 2 becomes when used to disregard the mandate of C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3). Here, mother told her attorney she did not desire to appeal. Later, but still within the time allowed by C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3), she told him the opposite. Instead of filing a timely notice of appeal, counsel ignored the deadline, ostensibly to meet with mother.
With respect, such conduct by a client and an attorney is not “exceptional.” It is a typical foundation of many appellate legal malpractice claims. And to the extent that People v. Baker, supra, and Estep v. People, supra, illustrate “exceptional” eases, this conduct is distinguishable from both of them. In Baker, the defendant consistently expressed a desire to appeal. In Estep, the trial court was complicit in a procedural morass that led to an untimely appeal.
In my view, the only “exceptional” aspect of this case is loss of a parent’s opportunity to challenge the decision terminating parental rights. Because this case stands for no more, it encourages similar application of C.A.R. 2 in every untimely appeal of such a decision. And in those future cases, I perceive no principled basis on which to distinguish the two-month delay here from delays of four, six, or eight months, much less how to determine when the state’s “significant interest in finalizing a dependency and neglect proceeding in an expeditious manner,” People in Interest of T.D., 140 P.3d 205, 213 (Colo.App.2006), prevails over a parent’s fundamental liberty interest.
Accordingly, until our supreme court says otherwise, I would resolve this policy issue by following the plain language of C.A.R. 3.4(b)(3). Hence, I would dismiss the appeal as untimely.