with whom WINCHESTER, J. joins concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 1 The Petition in this case was filed in the name of Chase Home Finance Milwaukee. Although, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Petition, the name of the Plaintiff was not amended. The Final Journal Entry of Judgment inexplicably grants judgment to JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, successor by merger to Chase Home Finance LLC. As such, I concur that a question of fact remains as to the correct identity of the Plaintiff, and summary judgment was improper in this case.1
*68¶ 2 However, I respectfully dissent to the majority's statement that "[to commence a foreclosure action in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate it has a right to enforce the note, and absent a showing of ownership, the plaintiff lacks standing." See Majority Op. ¶ 5. Gill v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 1945 OK 181, 195 Okla. 607, 159 P.2d 717.2 I agree that in any foreclosure action a party must demonstrate it is the proper party to request adjudication of the issues. However, the issue of whether a party is the proper party to request adjudication of the issues is a real-party-in-interest issue, not an issue of "standing," as the majority frames it. See Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, 890 P.2d 906 (Opala, J., concurring). Justice Opala framed the issue correctly in Toxic Waste Impact Group:
Standing in the federal legal system is imbued with a constitutional/jurisdictional dimension, while in the body of state law it fits under the rubric of ordinary procedure. The U.S. Constitution, Article III, has long been held to require that a "case" or "controversy" is essential to invoke federal judicial jurisdiction and that a person's competence to bring an action is a core component of standing in a case-or-controversy inquiry. It is for this reason that standing is an integral part of the mechanism for invoking the federal judiciary's power.
Oklahoma's fundamental law places no restraint on the judiciary's power analogous to the federal case-or-controversy requirement. Under the earlier Code of Civil Procedure the suit had to be brought by the real party in interest. That requirement has always been non-Jjurisdictional. If a state court proceeded to adjudicate a claim pressed by one not in that status, its decision was not fraught with jurisdictional infirmity but rather regarded as erroneous for want of proof to establish an important element of the claim. An error in this category is waivable at the option of the defendant; and, if not asserted on appeal, the reviewing court may reach the merits of the case despite a plaintiff's apparent lack of standing at nisi prius.
Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, 890 P.2d 906 (Opala, J., concurring, ¶¶ 2-3) (emphasis added); see also Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon, 1998 OK 70, ¶ 24, 969 P.2d 337, 344 ("Using the term 'standing' to designate real-party-in-interest issues tempts courts to apply standing principles outside the context in which they were developed.... A defendant is entitled to have the suit against him prosecuted by the 'real party in interest' but 'his concern ends when a judgment for or against the nominal plaintiff would protect defendant from any action non same demand by another.") (Watt, J., Majority Op.)
¶ 3 The majority in this case cites Hendrick v. Walters, 1993 OK 162, ¶ 4, 865 P.2d 1232, 1234 and Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, n. 19, 163 P.3d 512, 519 for the proposition that "standing may be raised at any stage of the judicial process or by the court on its own motion." See Majority Op. ¶ 4. Those cases cite Matter of the Estate of Doan, 1986 OK 15, ¶ 7, 727 P.2d 574, as authority for this proposition. Arguably, however, Doan misstates the law:
Ever since the Code of Civil Procedure was replaced in 1984 by the Pleading Code, our nomenclature for identifying the party entitled to sue, which began to follow that of federal jurisprudence, has used "standing" as if it were a functional equivalent of the earlier procedural terms of *69art-real party in interest, one with ap-pealable interest, one occupying the aggrieved-party or pecuniary-interest status. It was during this transition that one of our opinions inadvertently referred to "standing" in terms of a jurisdictional requirement, thus creating the misimpression that the term has a jurisdictional dimension. Oklahoma's constitution has no case-or-controversy clause. Standing is hence to be viewed as an adjective-law concept. The inadvertent reference to the contrary should be treated as ineffective to alter standing's true character in the body of our law.
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I concur in today's opinion and in the disposition of the cause. If I were writing for the court, I would additionally declare that Doan's inadvertent reference to federal law is to be viewed as withdrawn. Lu-jan's tripartite standing test, which we adopt today, must be treated as having been received sans its federal jurisdictional baggage.
See Toxic Waste Impact Group, 1994 OK 148, 890 P.2d 906 (Opala, J., concurring ¶ 4).
¶ 4 Additionally, both Hendrick and Fent were original actions in this Court. As such, "standing" could have been raised at any point by this Court sua sponte. However, in a proceeding in District Court, because it is a non-jurisdictional issue, failure to assert that the Plaintiff is not the real party in interest may be waived. See Liddell v. Heavner, 2008 OK 6, n. 5, 180 P.3d 1191 (Opala, J., majority Op.); see also 12 O.S.2012 § 2008(D).
¶ 5 In this case, the facts demonstrate that Defendant raised this issue in the Answer as well as in the Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, the issue was properly appealed.
¶ 6 The majority also holds that a foreclosing party must have the "proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit." See Majority Op. ¶ 10 (emphasis added). Oklahoma pleading procedure does not require a plaintiff to have all evidence necessary to prevail on its claim at the time of the filing. Rather, what is required is a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" 12 ©.8.2012 § 2008(A)(1). Additionally, 12 0.8. 2012 § 2011(B)(8) provides that an attorney filing anything with the court certifies that to "the best of the person's knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ... the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." 12 O.S.2012 § 2011(B)(3) (emphasis added)3 Mortgage foreclosures, like other civil actions, allow the parties to continue to investigate and discover evidence up until the time of judgment.
¶ 7 While I agree that questions of fact exist so that summary judgment was improper in this case, I cannot agree with the majority's holding that the plaintiff must have the "proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit" because no authority states such and the Oklahoma pleading code requires otherwise.
. Attached to Plaintiff's Petition were copies of the unindorsed note and mortgage. Defendant David S. Eldridge, a licensed attorney, answered as counsel for the parties and raised the affirma*68tive defense of status and capacity of the Plaintiff to bring the action. Later, Defendants filed an amended answer and multiple Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's counsel produced the original unindorsed note and the assignment of the mortgage, and the trial court granted judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. On remand, the trial court, rather than dismiss the petition, may allow the Plaintiff to amend its petition. HSBC Bank USA v. Lyon, 2012 OK 10, ¶ 1, 276 P.3d 1002, 2012 WL 453621.
. In Gill, the plaintiff brought an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property. There was no discussion in the case of whether the plaintiff had standing to bring the action or whether the plaintiff was the real party in interest. In fact, the case was tried to the Court, and the appeal turned on the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial. The Gill decision stands for the proposition that the assignment of the note carries with it an assignment of the mortgage. It is not relevant to the standing analysis, nor does it stand for the proposition that the plaintiff must prove at the time of filing that it has a right to enforce the note.
. Likewise, while I agree that the UCC applies in this case because the note is a negotiable instrument, the UCC does not require that a foreclosing entity prove at the time of filing that it is the person entitled to enforce the instrument.