MEMORANDUM OPINION
Linda Klahr, Claimant, sought compensation for injury to both her hands and thumbs due to repetitive trauma while employed by Respondent, Santas by Donna. Santas by Donna, in response, stated coverage was provided by the State Insurance Fund. State Insurance Fund, in response, stated they were not the responsible carrier because Santas’ insurance policy had been cancelled. The issue of temporary disability was tried on August 18, 1994. The following month an order was issued finding an injury date for Claimant of November 15, 1993; determining Claimant became aware of the injury in May, 1993; and, finding the employment aggravated a pre-existing impairment to both hands. The order also determined that at the time of awareness Petitioner, State Insurance Fund, was the insurance carrier for Respondent, Santas. The order found Claimant to be temporarily totally disabled and ordered benefits accordingly. It found the State Insurance Fund to be the insurance carrier, and ordered Fund to provide medical treatment. It is from this order that this review proceeding is brought.
Petitioner, State Insurance Fund, raised two errors in its petition in error. First, the decision of the trial court is against the clear weight of the evidence, and second, the court erred in determining liability in this cumulative trauma accident based upon the date of awareness rather than the date of last exposure. The first proposition raised in the petition does not allege an error cognizable in a review proceeding from the Workers’ Compensation Court, because here the standard of review is whether or not there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings of the trial court. Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 684 P.2d 548 (Okla.1984). Furthermore, this argument has been abandoned as it is not discussed in Petitioner’s brief.
Petitioner’s second argument is that it is an error of law for the trial court to have determined the date of injury to be the date
Title 85 O.S.1991 § 11(4), provides when the employee is last injuriously exposed to the hazards of a disease, the current employer, and the employer’s insurance carrier, if any, shall be liable therefor, without right to contribution from any prior employer or insurance carrier. Cumulative trauma injuries are accidental injuries, and not diseases. As such, the appropriate date of injury should not be established by a statute dealing with diseases. Likewise, the accrual of the statute of limitations as established in this cause by § 43 does not, by itself, change the accidental injury to a disease controlled by § 11(4). This case does not involve the statute of limitations and we cannot conclude that the statutorily changed method for computing the period of limitations also changed the method for determining the date of injury for assessing the liability of successive insurance carriers.
Consequently, we must determine that no error has been demonstrated by the Petitioner in this review proceeding. Any issue of apportionment between the Employer and the Fund would be a determination requiring a factual analysis. Apportionment was not mentioned or discussed in the proceeding before the trial judge, nor was it raised before the Three Judge Panel or in the briefs on review before this Court. Consequently, the issue of apportionment is not an issue here. The award is sustained.
SUSTAINED.
1.
Oklahoma Petroleum Workers' Compensation Association v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 887 P.2d 335 (Okla.App.1994), cert. denied.
The argument has also been rejected by this panel of the Court of appeals, SOUTHWEST UNITED INDUSTRIES v. BILL POLSTON NO. 82,471, currently pending certiorari. Also disapproving of the use of the date of last exposure as the date of injury is the case of Red Rock Mental Health and State Insurance Fund v. Karen Roberts, Kelly Services and the Workers Compensation Court, 65 O.B.J. 4047, - P.2d - (Dec. 6, 1994), currently pending rehearing in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which repudiates Utica and Bradley.