ON PETITION EOR REHEARING.
AILSHIE, J. —Respondent’s petition for a rehearing in this case does not present anything new or any question not originally considered by us, though it again discusses some questions which we did not deem it necessary to pass upon in the original opinion. The persistence with which counsel insists that we have mistaken both the law and the equities in this case has led us to again examine the ease at length, and, after so doing, we are unable to see wherein the judgment of the trial court could be affirmed. It must necessarily be true that the court cannot see either the law or the equities of a case in the same light in which they are viewed by counsel for the losing party; and it may be, indeed, that sometimes the court mistakes them entirely. However, notwithstanding counsel’s studied argument to the contrary, we are convinced that this is not a case where we have mistaken either.
We are asked in the petition to announce more definitely the position of the court as to what title White took under the deed of January 25th. The only interest the appellant claims, and for which he is litigating,' is an undivided one-half interest in this property, and we have held that under the record he is entitled to such interest. Under the deed of January 25th, the entire legal title passed from Beery to White. Dnder the contract of April 25th, Beery recognized that the entire legal title had passed from him and that all the interest he retained in the property was an equity. What that equity was is not recited, but we would infer from the record that it consisted in a vendor’s lien for the unpaid purchase price. By that contract Beery parted absolutely with all of his equity in an undivided one-half interest in this property. It therefore follows that after the execution of the contract of April 25, 1900, that both the legal title to the entire property and equitable title to an *660undivided one-hali interest therein was vested in White, and that by the terms- of that agreement White recognized a remaining equity in Beery to the other undivided half interest in this property, and for that equity agreed to pay the sum of $1,750 on or before January 1, 1901. White does not appear to have paid this sum or to have received any further deed from Beery to his equity in this remaining half interest. On the contrary, Whitney appears to have received a deed from Beery for the entire tract of land on May 13, 1901. So far as the facts, therefore, disclosed by this record are concerned, we conclude that the appellant Dewey now owns an undivided one-half interest in the property as described in the deed taken by him and Whitney the other one-half interest.
It is suggested that White acquired all the interest he obtained in this property while sustaining a fiduciary relation toward Whitney, his paitner, under the agreement of September 7, 1899. This we think is correct, and it is equally true with reference to Whitney. But counsel contends that this relation had been terminated prior to the date on which Whitney acquired his deed. To this we cannot assent. The contract of September 7th was made for a period of one year, and yet respondent repeatedly admits in his testimony that they continued to do business in all respects as though it were still in force and effect from the date upon which it was executed until the 1st of April, 1901, and that all that then occurred looking to the termination of the partnership relation consisted merely in respondent notifying White that he was going to declare the matter off. It takes more than a notice of this kind to dissolve a partnership and terminate a trust or fiduciary relation existing between partners. If White acquired the entire title, one-half thereof would undoubtedly have inured to the benefit of his partner, Whitney. If, on the other hand, he acquired only a one-half interest in the property and in the meanwhile and during the existence of that relation, and in pursuance thereof, his partner acquired the other half interest, then such interests and equities must offset each other and the obligations resting upon them by reason of such relation will be met in that respect.
*661Again, it is insisted by counsel that White and his grantee are estopped to now assert title to this property on account of' the declarations and statements made by White to Whitney and others after receiving the deed from Beery. These statements were of the same character as the testimony of Beery concerning the conditions imposed on White npon the delivery of the deed. It is not contended by appellant that the statements which are claimed to have been made by White after receiving this deed were not true. It would appear from this record that if he made these statements, he was, as a matter of fact, only stating what had actually occurred. But the trouble is that the law will not permit parol testimony of such matters to defeat the vesting of title. If, therefore, the statements he made were true concerning such matters, they were not of such a character as to prejudice the respondent or in any way to deceive him as to the facts or mislead him in his action or conduct. The respondent is presumed to have known, as a matter of law, that such conditions could not be attached to a deed upon its delivery to the grantee, and having had full notice of the execution of the deed and of the agreements and contracts in relation thereto, he was, as a matter of law, neither deceived nor prejudiced by the statements or declarations so made. So long as he obtains his share as a partner in the fruits of the enterprise, he has no cause for complaint.
It should be further observed that it nowhere appears that any of these statements or declarations made by White were subsequent to the contract of April 25th. It would appear, however, from the record that they must have been made prior to that time. It seems to us from a reading of the record before us that respondent must have understood that he and his associate White were acquiring title by virtue of the deed of January 25th and contract of April 25th, or else he would not have continued to occupy and improve the property for a period of more than a year thereafter. They do not appear to have had any other contract or agreement whereby they could acquire the title to that property, as they had failed to make their payments under the contract of December 26th, and that contract had been superseded by the contract of April 25th. It *662does not seem- reasonable that respondent wonld have spent a year’s time and labor on this property unless he felt that he had title or legal and binding obligations whereby he or he and his associate eonld acquire title thereto.
' Other questions were argued by respondent in his brief and have also been presented in his petition for rehearing, but we do not think they properly arise upon this appeal, nor is the record in such a condition as to justify us in discussing them. Besides, a legal determination of some of the points urged would necessitate other parties to the action in order to give them any binding effect. We find no reason for granting a rehearing in this case, and it will therefore be denied.
Stockslager, C. J., and Sullivan, J., concur.