[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 1, 2007
No. 05-17226 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-20938-CR-PAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMAL BROWN,
a.k.a. Pookalotta,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 1, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jamal Brown appeals his 260-month sentence, imposed upon re-sentencing
after remand, for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii), and 846. On appeal, Brown argues that his
260-month sentence is greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Specifically, Brown argues that the
catastrophic nature of his medical condition, namely, his quadriplegia, outweighed
the § 3553(a) factors. In addition, Brown maintains that there was an unwarranted
disparity between his sentence and the sentence of his co-conspirator who was the
leader of the drug trafficking organization.
I.
We have held that “[i]n reviewing the ultimate sentence imposed by the
district court for reasonableness, we consider the final sentence, in its entirety, in
light of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2006) (brackets in original) (citation omitted). In determining whether a
sentence is reasonable, the district court should be guided by the § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261, 125 S.Ct. 738, 765-66, 160 L.Ed.2d
621 (2005); United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005).
Section 3553(a) provides that district courts must consider, among other things:
(1) the applicable guideline range; (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
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(3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (4) the need for the sentence
imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense; (5) the need for adequate
deterrence; (6) protection of the public; and (7) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(6).
Although the district court must be guided by these factors, we have held
that “nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the
record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss
each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2005). “[A]n acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the
defendant’s arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is sufficient under
Booker.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005). “The
weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the
sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353,
1363 (11th Cir. 2006). We will not substitute the district court’s judgment in
weighing the factors unless “the district court committed a clear error of judgment
in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the
range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. The burden of
establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the
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§ 3553(a) factors lies with the party challenging the sentence. Talley, 431 F.3d at
788.
II.
The record before us amply demonstrates that the district court adequately
and properly considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and that the sentence it
imposed was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the statutory
purposes of sentencing. The 260-month sentence was reasonable for several
reasons. First, the court explicitly considered and evaluated many of the § 3553(a)
factors, including (1) Brown’s history and characteristics; (2) the nature and
circumstances of the offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (4) the need for the sentence to afford adequate
deterrence of criminal conduct; and (5) the need to protect the public from future
crimes of the defendant.
Second, although Brown suggests that the district court did not properly
weigh the sentencing factors, we have no trouble concluding that the district court
did not commit a clear error of judgment in applying the factors. We note that the
court granted a substantial downward variance after weighing the mitigating
factors, including the seriousness of Brown’s medical condition, against the
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aggravating factors, such as the seriousness of Brown’s offense, his criminal
record, and his commission of another drug crime after he was injured.
Finally, Brown’s assertion that his sentence created an unwarranted
sentencing disparity is without merit because the district court explained that the
disparity between Brown’s and his co-conspirator’s sentences resulted from
Brown’s more serious prior criminal history. Moreover, Brown’s 260-month
sentence was significantly less than the statutory maximum sentence of life
imprisonment.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Brown has failed to carry his
burden of showing that his sentence was unreasonable. His 260-month sentence is
therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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