[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 20, 2007
No. 06-14677 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00003-CR-FTM-33-DNF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TERRENCE LITTLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 20, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Terrence Little appeals his 151-month sentence for possession with intent to
distribute “crack” cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2, arguing that his sentence was unreasonable compared to the defendant in
United States v. Williams (M.R. Williams), 435 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2006), who
was convicted of a similar offense and received only a 90-month sentence.
We review the district court’s sentence for reasonableness. United States v.
Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2005). “[T]he party who challenges the
sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable . . . .”
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d
621 (2005), we have established a two-part process for district courts to use in
calculating sentences. Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. First, the district court must consult
and correctly calculate the range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
Second, the district court must fashion a reasonable sentence by considering the
factors enumerated in § 3553(a). Id. Included among the § 3553(a) factors are (1)
the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the history and characteristics of
the defendant; (3) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (4) the need for
deterrence; (5) the need to protect the public; (6) the Sentencing Guidelines range;
and (7) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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However, the district court does not need to state on the record that it has
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324,
1329 (11th Cir. 2005).
In addition, “the weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Williams
(A.E. Williams), 456 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. petition filed, No. 06-
7352 (Oct. 19, 2006). A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment in
weighing the relevant factors. Id. Moreover, we have rejected the notion that a
sentence within the guidelines is per se reasonable. Talley, 431 F.3d at 787. Even
so, “there is a range of reasonable sentences from which the district court may
choose, and when the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory
Guidelines range, [this court] ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable
one.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
Little’s sentence was reasonable. Because Little does not challenge the
district court’s scoring of the Guidelines, the only issue is whether in this case the
§ 3553(a) factors make a sentence within the Guidelines range unreasonable. In
imposing the sentence, the district court noted that it had considered the advisory
guidelines, factors set forth in § 3553, the statements offered in mitigation, and the
history and characteristics of this defendant. The court noted that some of Little’s
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prior offenses were “committed one right after the other.” As a result, the court
did not believe it was appropriate to depart from the guidelines.
Little’s reliance on our opinion in Williams is misplaced because in that
case, we held that in similar circumstances it was reasonable to vary below the
Guidelines range, whereas in this case, Little is asking us to hold that it is
unreasonable not to vary from the Guidelines range in these circumstances.
Because there are a range of reasonable sentences from which the district court
may choose, the fact that the sentence in Williams was found to be reasonable does
not make a significantly different sentence in a similar case unreasonable. Little
has not met the burden of showing that the sentence imposed was unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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