[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 19, 2007
No. 06-12842 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-20710-CR-DLG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTHONY BOATWRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 19, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Boatwright (“Boatwright”) appeals the district court’s sentence of
three-years’ probation with a special condition of six months’ home detention for
theft of government funds and for making materially false statements, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). On appeal, Boatwright argues that
his sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary and exceeds the
government’s recommended sentence. Because we find the district court’s
sentence reasonable, we affirm.
In particular, Boatwright argues that the district court’s sentence is
unreasonable because it fails to take into consideration (1) his good employment
history; (2) that he is caring for six minor children; (3) that he has no prior felony
convictions; and (4) that he did not use the Department of Housing and Urban
Development-funded housing assistance payments to purchase luxury items, but to
provide his family with the basic necessities of life. Moreover, Boatwright
contends that the district court, in imposing its sentence, should have considered
his statement at the sentencing hearing as to why the offense was committed.
We review sentences imposed under the post-Booker advisory Guideline
scheme for reasonableness. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1244-45
(11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-63, 125 S. Ct. 738,
765-66, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005) (holding that appellate courts review sentences
for unreasonableness in light of the § 3553(a) factors). Following the Booker
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decision, the district court first must correctly calculate the range provided by the
sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir.
2005). Next, the district court must consider the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) to determine a reasonable sentence. Id. We have held that once the
district court has correctly calculated the advisory Guideline range, it may then
impose a more severe or more lenient sentence as long as it is reasonable. United
States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005).
Our review for reasonableness is deferential. Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. “We
must evaluate whether the sentence imposed by the district court fails to achieve
the purposes of sentencing as stated in section 3553(a),” and in evaluating a
sentence for reasonableness, “we recognize that there is a range of reasonable
sentences from which the district court may choose . . . .” Id. The § 3553(a)
factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to
avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.
Id. at 786; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We also have noted that “when the
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district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guideline range, we
ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable one.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
In United States v. Scott, we held that a district court’s statement that it had
considered the § 3553(a) factors and the defendant’s arguments about those factors
is sufficient in post-Booker sentences to indicate that it considered the factors. 426
F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2005). We further held “that nothing in Booker or
elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” Id. at 1329. Moreover, we concluded that the defendant’s sentence was
reasonable because the district court accurately calculated the guideline range and
the defendant’s sentence at the low end of the range reflected the court’s
consideration of his evidence in mitigation. Id. at 1330.
In this case, the district court’s sentence was reasonable. The district court
correctly calculated the applicable guideline range and adequately considered the §
3553(a) factors. Before imposing the sentence, the district court expressly stated
that it had considered the statements of all parties, the presentence investigation
report, and the statutory factors. The court specifically considered the mitigating
factors that Boatwright offered. Although the district court did not explicitly
discuss every § 3553(a) factor, it was not required to do so. See Scott, 426 F.3d at
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1329-30. Finally, the district court’s sentence of three years’ probation with a
special condition of six months’ home detention was within the Guideline range
and did not exceed the statutory maximum sentence.
Based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we discern no
reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm Boatwright’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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