[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 15, 2007
No. 06-13704 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
BIA No. A96-021-018
SALFO KABORE,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(March 15, 2007)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Salfo Kabore (“Kabore”), a citizen of Burkina Faso, appeals the decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), adopting the decision of the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to deny asylum and withholding of removal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231, and relief
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c).
On appeal, Kabore argues that the IJ’s adverse credibility findings were
erroneous because such a finding was improper where the IJ concluded that his
misstatements were not malicious. Also, he alleges that he demonstrated a well
founded fear of persecution should he return to Burkina Faso, because (1) the
military was searching for him and came to his home; (2) the government has a
poor human rights record; (3) individuals with whom Kabore claims a connection
were murdered; and (4) that Kabore is a member of an opposition party.
Where the BIA affirms and adopts the IJ’s decision without opinion, as in
this case, the IJ’s decision becomes the final agency action subject to review. Al
Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir.2001). We review the IJ’s
findings of fact under the “substantial evidence test,” and must affirm the decision
“if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.
2005). As is the case with all factual determinations, assessments of credibility are
also reviewed under the substantial evidence test. Id. Under the highly deferential
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substantial evidence test, we “consider only whether there is substantial evidence
for the findings made by the [IJ], not whether there is substantial evidence for
some other finding that could have been . . . made.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
1022, 1029 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e review the
record evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision,” Forgue, 401
F.3d at 1286 (internal quotation marks omitted), and may not overturn findings of
fact unless the record compels it, id. at 1287.
To establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant
must offer “credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record.” Id. at 1287
(internal quotation marks omitted). If found to be credible, the testimony of an
applicant is alone sufficient to establish the required burden of proof; however, a
specific and cogent adverse credibility determination alone may be sufficient to
support the denial of an asylum application. Id.; see also Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005) (requiring that the IJ make an explicit
finding that petitioner was not credible). The applicant may rebut an adverse
credibility finding on appeal with proof that “the IJ’s credibility decision was not
supported by ‘specific, cogent reasons’ or was not based on substantial evidence.”
Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287. If an applicant supplies evidence other than his
testimony, the IJ may not rely solely on an adverse credibility determination. Id.
Upon review of the record, it is apparent that the decision rendered by the IJ
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and adopted in full by the BIA contained an adverse credibility finding that was
supported by specific, cogent reasons and based on substantial evidence. The IJ
explicitly determined that Kabore was not credible regarding the identity of his
best friend, the name of the political party to which he belonged, the date when the
military came to his home, and the date he arrived in the United States. Substantial
evidence confirms that finding.
On both direct and cross examination Kabore provided inconsistent
testimony about his best friend who was killed by the president’s brother. Kabore
initially testified that his best friend, Norbert Zongo (“Zongo”), was a chauffeur,
but when asked whether Zongo was really the journalist investigating the murder
of the chauffeur, Kabore changed his testimony and stated that Zongo was a
journalist and his best friend, the chauffeur, was named Ouangaua. He repeated
the same mistake during cross-examination.
Kabore also mistook the name of the political party to which he claimed
membership, testifying that the party’s acronym, ADF, stood for Democratic
Association of Popular Funds or, depending on the translation, Democratic
Association of Popular Fronts. According to the State Department’s Background
Notes, the name of the party is the Alliance for Democracy Federation.
Considering that Kabore based his petition on the death of his friend and his
membership in the opposition political party, these inconsistencies are material to
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his credibility. Kabore also repeatedly mistook the years in which the military
came to his house, he left his country, and arrived in the United States. These
omissions constitute substantial evidence in support of the adverse credibility
finding of the IJ.
Kabore argues that because the IJ found that his inconsistent testimony
regarding dates was without malice, such misstatements should not impact his
credibility. However, Kabore overstates the significance of the IJ’s statements.
First, we do not require a finding that the applicant maliciously testified
inconsistently to support an adverse credibility finding. Second, the IJ’s statements
regarded only the inconsistent dates that Kabore provided, not the other
inconsistencies in his testimony. Thus, the IJ’s statements do not undermine the
adverse credibility finding.
Kabore concedes that he failed to demonstrate past persecution, but argues
that he presented sufficient evidence to support a well-founded fear of future
persecution. However, Kabore did not provide any evidence that he would be
singled out on account of his political opinion or any other protected grounds if he
returned to Burkina Faso. Kabore argued that he was afraid to return to his native
country because of the death of his friend, the chauffeur; but, the chauffeur was
killed because the president’s brother believed that he stole a suitcase full of
money, and not because of any political opinion or other protected ground. Thus,
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substantial evidence corroborates the IJ’s decision to deny asylum to Kabore.1
Because an adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence,
and because Kabore did not provide corroborating evidence that he has a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground, we will not
disturb the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s decision denying Kabore asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. Accordingly, we deny
Kabore’s petition.
PETITION DENIED.
1
Since Kabore has not satisfied his burden to prove that he is entitled to asylum, “we also
deny his petition for review of his claims for withholding of removal under the INA and for CAT
relief.” Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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