The referee found that the defendant was a domestic corporation ; that since January, 1895, its affairs were managed by at least four trustees; that during all that period the plaintiff was one of the trustees and an officer of the company; that by one of the by-laws of the corporation the president was given power “to employ and discharge any and all employees. of the company, except as otherwise provided in these by-laws; ” that on or about the 1st day of January, 1895, an agreement was made between the plaintiff and one J. E. Ewing, who was president of the defendant, and also one of the trustees, by which the plaintiff was to be paid a commission of fifty per cent on business secured by him; that when this contract was made both Ewing and the plaintiff were trustees of the company and continued to be such trustees down to the termination of the agreement prior to the commencement of this action; that in the month of September, 1895, the plaintiff was paid a salary of $200 a month and expenses, instead of the commissions above stated, and this arrangement continued in force until the 1st of April, 1896, when a new agreement was made as to the plaintiff’s compensation which continued until the 4th of April, 1897; that on that day a new agreement was made by which the plaintiff was to receive a salary of $50 a week and expenses, which continued until the 1st day of January, 1899, when an arrangement was made by which the agreement of February 1, 1895, was restored so that the plaintiff was to receive fifty per cent commission on the New York city business and fifty per cent commission on business outside of New York city, and this agreement continued until the termination of the relations between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The referee also found that the services rendered by the plaintiff were outside of his duties as an officer of the defendant, and that the agreement entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant was a fair and reasonable agreement, and the compensation agreed to be paid the plaintiff was fair and reasonable for the services that he rendered; that by the terms of the agreement in force when the plaintiff was employed by the defendant upon a commission basis
Turning to the testimony it appears that Ewing, the president of the company, was its active manager during the period that the plaintiff was an employee or officer of the company. The plaintiff testified that in 1895 Ewing said to the plaintiff, “ ‘ Mr. Hooke, you don’t want to leave me. You can make $15,000 a year by working on commission just the same as I do. * * * You travel all around the country and pay your own expenses, and I will give you 50 per cent of all the advertisements you get,’ ” to which the plaintiff replied, “ All right, Mr. Ewing, I will do that.” Ewing said, “‘Now, Mr. Hooke, you don’t want to leave me. * * * You can go out on a commission basis, and get advertisements the same as I do. * * * You can make contracts with banks, and make contracts right along, like Tennyson’s brook that runs on and on forever. * * * These contracts will run right straight along from year to year, and we will pay you 50 per cent commission on the contracts until they are specifically stopped by the bank that made them. * * * You can make $15,000 a year easy. * * * You will get a certain amount of business the first year on which you will get 50 per cent. In the second year some of this'business will drop out, but what is continued you will get 50 per cent commission on just the same as if it was a new and original contract you made with them another year, and you will get 50 per cent commission on all contracts you made during that year, and so on ad infinitum.’ * * * He said, I would get 50 per cent on all subscriptions, as well as advertising, on any money I should bring into the company at all, or should be instrumental in bringing in, I would get 50 per cent on it all, the same as he took.”
The plaintiff having rested, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds, first, that Ewing had no authority to make such a contract; and, second, that the plaintiff and Ewing being officers and trustees of the company, the alleged contract was
Considering the business of this company, the fact that all of its agents or employees were paid commissions upon the advertisements that they obtained, and that the plaintiff worked for years under such an agreement, being credited by the responsible officers of the company with his commissions on the business obtained, the defendant is certainly estopped from repudiating liability to . pay for the services rendered by the plaintiff. In business corporations of this character the power of officers to make contracts in relation to its
The plaintiff also claims, and has been allowed by the referee, a commission upon advertisements which he had obtained, and which were continued after he left the employ of the company. I do not think that it can be said that such an agreement, by which the plaintiff was to receive fifty per cent upon all advertising contracts obtained by him, and subscriptions and sales of papers obtained by him, so long as such advertisement or subscriptions continued was proved. That finding is based upon the testimony of the plaintiff that the president of the defendant said, in speaking of the contracts upon which the plaintiff was to be entitled to commissions, that these contracts would run right straight along from year to year, and they would pay him fifty per cent commissions on the contracts until they are specifically stopped by the bank that made them. There is nothing in this to indicate an intention by the president to bind the company to pay to the plaintiff fifty per cent on all of the advertisements and subscriptions which were continued after the plaintiff had left-the employ of the defendant. The right of the officers to bind the corporation to pay a percentage of its business for all time to an employee is, to say the least, extremely doubtful; and certainly such a contract should not be inferred when the language used is consistent with an intention to compensate an employee for the services that he rendered while remaining in the employ of the company.
The judgment appealed from should, therefore, be modified by deducting the amount of $939.83 and interest thereon to the entry of judgment, and as thus modified the judgment should be affirmed, without costs.
O’Brien, McLaughlin and Hatch, JJ., concurred; Van Brunt, P. J., dissented.